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The conventional wisdom concerning capital market development would have us believe that 
dispersed ownership is the superior market structure for investors, while concentrated ownership is 
often correlated with lower capital market growth. Similarly, privatization of public firms is viewed as 
a necessary step for their success and surely for their global expansion. Private ownership is perceived 
as one of the preconditions for prosperous firms and deep capital markets, while state ownership and 
political influence are deemed to be impediments.  
Four decades of economic development in China, however, indicate otherwise. China’s capital 
market growth is quite striking—a sample of three randomly selected time-points over the last decade 
reflects a largely constant and significant increase in capital market growth, as measured by the number 
of firms listed and by total market capitalization.1 Additionally, market capitalization as a ratio of 
GDP—an indicator that is used to assess over/under valuation of a certain market and implies 
investors’ confidence—has been fast increasing and stabilized positively in recent years.2 At the end 
of 2005, China’s stock exchanges had 1,377 public companies with a market capitalization of 401.8 
billion USD at a 17.5 ratio to GDP. In 2010, the number of listed firms reached 2,063 with a total 
market capitalization of 4.028 trillion USD and a market cap to GDP ratio of 66. By the end of 2017, 
China’s capital market reached a striking 3,485 firms listed, with a total market capitalization of 8.7 
trillion USD and a 71.2 ratio to GDP. Putting controversies on data reliability aside,3 these figures,  
 
 
1 For simplicity reasons, unless stated otherwise, I use the singular term “capital market” in reference to both stock 
exchanges together. 
Despite some spikes and downturns, since 2007, shifts in total market capitalization in China overall correspond with 
similar shifts in other global markets. See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?locations=1W-CN-US-JP-DE (last visited May 24, 2019) 
(comparing total market capitalization of listed domestic companies with the same indicator at the world level, the United 
States, Japan, and Germany). A slow-down in new issuances since the last market turmoil in 2015 is worth mentioning. 
Yet the overall increase in the annual number of new issuances is maintained. For a comparable chart of Chinese IPOs 
both in China and abroad from 2013–2017, see Number of Chinese Company IPOs Domestic and Abroad from 2013 to 2018, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/279616/number-of-chinese-company-ipos-in-the-country-and-abroad/ 
(last visited May 24, 2019). 
2 The data in this paragraph was collected from the World Bank database. See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic 
Companies (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?locations=CN (last 
visited May 24, 2019) (providing a graph specific to China). The market capitalization to GDP ratio is applied to estimate 
whether a certain market is over or undervalued and by implication reflects investors’ sentiments and overall assessment 
of a given capital market. A ratio of market capitalization to GDP that is higher than 100 reflects an overvalued market, 
while ratios lower than 50 are said to reflect undervaluation. 
3 For example, data released by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2005 reports completely different figures: 
1,381 listed companies, with a market capitalization of 1.06 trillion RMB (approximately 132 billion USD), standing for 
only six percent of China’s GDP that year. See Donald C. Clarke, Law Without Order in Chinese Corporate Governance 
Institutions, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 131, 152-153 (2010). 




while randomly selected, reflect an undeniable continuous upturn in the number of firms listed, total 
capital market value, and a growing confidence of investors in the Chinese market.  
China’s capital market growth also stands out when compared globally. As early as 2001, just 
ten years after China opened its stock exchanges, China’s market capitalization was the largest among 
developing countries. Its market capitalization increased from being the twentieth in the world in 2005, 
representing only 1.17 percent of global market capitalization, to taking the second spot among all 
countries in 2016, when its market represented 10.1 percent of global stock market capitalization.4 
The achievements are worth noting at the individual firm level as well, where Chinese listed firms, and 
particularly corporatized listed SOEs, have established significant presence in global capital markets, 
a fact that has attracted broad attention. In 2018, China reached a record high of 120 Global Fortune 
500 firms, second only to the United States with a gap of just 6 firms. Of course, this reflects mostly 
on a limited number of Chinese listed companies; 75 percent of these firms are formally state-owned, 
and many more have indirect state-ownership and control through holding groups and pyramid 
schemes. Several “privately-owned” firms on this list are also controlled by the Chinese Party-state 
without any state-ownership.5 Still, the point stands; concentrated state ownership and political control 
do not stand in the way of business expansion, global reach, and capital market growth for Chinese 
firms.  
Was there a reliable and effective legal system in place, the picture above would not have been 
so puzzling. Such a legal system could presumably overcome the multitude of structural predicaments 
that characterize public firm ownership in China, reduce the cost of doing business and raising capital, 
and thereby support and explain growth. Having such a system in operation would conform to many 
prevailing views in both law and development and comparative corporate governance. The rise of the 
public firm in China and the growth of its capital markets, however, had little to do with the 
surrounding legal framework.  
When firms emerged in China in the mid-1980s, they did so with a shattered bureaucracy, an 
annihilated legal system, and a devastated isolated economy as their backdrop. They operated and 
issued securities through unregulated, informal markets that were not initiated by bottom-up private 
ordering pressures either. Later, when these firms were corporatized and issued their shares to the 
public, and laws and corporate governance institutions borrowed from corporate capitalism were 
promoted, the process was guided by political necessities rather than by economies of scale and 
demands of technological advancements. China’s political economy had a determinant role on the 
 
4 Second only to the United States, whose market cap represents 36.3 percent of the global market capitalization. This is 
based on data compiled by BLOOMBERG and presented by BUSINESS INSIDER and BESPOKE. See Kim Iskyan, China’s Stock 
Markets Have Soared by 1,479% since 2003, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 6, 2016, 7:00 PM),   http://www.businessinsider.com/world-
stock-market-capitalizations-2016-11; Which Countries Control the Global Stock Market?, BESPOKE (Mar. 30, 2015), 
https://www.bespokepremium.com/think-big-blog/which-countries-control-the-global-stock-market/.  
5 See generally Curtis Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 
(2014). Haier Group, Huawei, and even Alibaba and Tencent are among the Fortune Global 500 firms that are thought to 
have strong ties with the Party-state. 




design of corporate ownership and the consequent functions of the market. It also dictated how legal 
institutions will function.  
The outcome of this process was an enabling, outwardly convergent, yet largely ineffective 
corporate governance system that facilitates opportunism by corporate controllers, corruption, and a 
capital market that is beholden to the Party-state. Indeed, for corporate governance advocates, China 
stands as one of the most challenging environments in terms of group concentration, managerial self-
dealing, asset tunneling, and related-party transactions tied to corporate corruption. Yet, the allure of 
Chinese firms to domestic and outside investors is unquestionable.  
The implications of this are quite striking. China fostered the growth of successful and globally 
competitive firms, and its capital markets advanced to take a spot among the world’s most meaningful 
markets, despite weakly functioning “good” corporate governance institutions and strong “bad” ones. 
To be sure, the remnants of developmental state attributes, mainly the support and protection 
some firms receive from the Party-state, can explain part of the success story.6 There are also many 
ways to dispute and even to dismiss China’s capital market growth.7 While there is no one measure 
for “economic success,” I take the above growth picture as my starting point. I do not presume to 
offer an economic explanation for China’s capital market development or a path for what would be 
normatively desirable distant developments. Rather, my goal is more modest. I offer a theoretical 
account of China’s capital market growth conundrum. Through an expository analysis of the rise of 
the public firm and the evolution of capital markets, I aim to expose the conundrum and postulate an 
explanation. This explanation, I propose, lies in China’s political economy configurations and the 
shifts within this system.  
Changes in the political equilibrium of economic decision making within the Party-state 
organization affected the interests of individuals, policy makers, and organs within the system, pushing 
them to design and employ idiosyncratic governance mechanisms that promote growth. The result is 
public firms and a capital market that continue to grow and prosper, even though they are governed 
in unusual ways and in pursuit of unconventional goals. China’s political economy is therefore 
responsible for many of the market’s infirmities, but also holds the key to its unprecedented success.  
 
6 Mainly corporatized SOEs benefit from this. Common examples include access to credit on better terms from state-
owned banks regardless of underlying conditions, protectionist licensing treatment, rescue-type intervention in share trade, 
and lax competition arrangements. 
7 Common criticisms are concerned with questions of the reliability of growth indicating data and posit that the data is 
based on value inflation or outright misleading information. Others argue that existing growth indications do not rise to 
their full potential that could have been achieved given a better legal framework. See the works of Franklin Allen in this 
space. See, e.g., Franklin Allen et al., Dissecting the Long-Term Performance of the Chinese Stock Market (Mar. 13, 2018), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880021; Franklin Allen et al., Explaining the 
Disconnection between China’s Economic Growth and Stock Market Performance (Jan. 31, 2015) (paper presented at 
the China International Conference in Finance, July 9-12 2015, Shenzhen), available at 
http://www.cicfconf.org/sites/default/files/paper_736.pdf 




Chapter 1 presents the underlying conundrum surrounding China’s capital market growth. It 
then tracks the historic background upon which the large public firm emerged in China and points to 
the use of alternative, largely experimental transitional mechanisms that governed the budding market.  
Chapter 2 discusses the subsequent turn toward law and presents the formal institutional 
setting within which China’s listed firms are currently embedded. The chapter reviews institutions and 
mechanisms, both internal and external to the firm, that are commonly associated with “good 
corporate governance” regimes and examines their function in China. It shows how political economy, 
including the continued grip of state capitalism, created structural and perhaps even conscious 
predicaments that undermine the function of traditional governance.  
Chapter 3 offers an alternative resolution for China’s law and capital market development 
conundrum, found within China’s political organization and governance. It shows how political 
governance, in various forms that evolved throughout China’s economic transition, has monitored, 
incentivized, and held accountable corporate control parties. Finally, it points to recent developments 
that expand and legalize the use of political governance in the corporate context. I refer to these 
developments as the “politicization of corporate governance,” and consider their implications for 
firms, investors, and the role of the legal system in China.




CHAPTER 1:  CHINA’S LAW AND DEVELOPMENT CONUNDRUM—A CAPITAL MARKET 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
“It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is … national interest”8 
 
Winston Churchill, BBC radio broadcast, 1 October 1939 
  
Four decades of economic development in China are surrounded by a great puzzle: China was, 
and still is, able to achieve economic growth while not adhering to conventional views on economic 
develpment. 9 Throughout its economic transition, China strategically resisted policy measures that for 
decades were considered essential for economic growth, including rapid liberalization of monetary 
policy and trade, ownership privatization, a Western-style rule of law, and multi-party participatory 
governance.10 These were strongly advocated by international policy organizations and reformers as 
the necessary policies for all growth-oriented economies.  
China’s growth trajectory also does not follow the widely accepted views about the role of 
legal institutions in economic development. These views attribute much of the economic growth 
prospect of any given system to the credibility and quality of its legal institutions.11 China’s economic 
success, however, occurred in the absence of many of the qualities commonly attributed to a well 
functioning legal system. This reality, which I call China’s law and development conundrum, goes 
against fundamental economic and legal thought. Indeed, this conundrum spreads along a spectrum 
 
8 Winston Churchill, BBC Radio Broadcast (Oct. 1, 1939). Regarding the uncertainty surrounding Russia’s expected choice 
between the Allies and Axis, Churchill stated, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a 
mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” Id. 
9 China’s economic growth is hotly debated among economists. See, e.g., Thomas G. Rawski, Can China Sustain Rapid 
Economic Growth Despite Flawed Institutions?, in IN SEARCH OF CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT MODEL – BEYOND THE BEIJING 
CONSENSUS 86-108 (Philip Hsu et al. ed., 2011) (and the references therein).  
10 Village elections as well as the rhetorical propaganda of “multi-party cooperation” and “consultative democracy,” 
supposedly achieved through the presence of the Chinese People Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and its 
advisory legislative role, isn’t exactly multi-party democracy—two thirds of its members are representatives of the Chinese 
Communist Party.   
11 See, e.g., D. C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); Ronald Coase, 
The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72 (1998). North’s seminal work refers to institutions as both formal and 
informal frameworks that shape human interaction. Similarly, Coase makes clear that the working of an economic system 
and its productivity depend on transaction costs that “depend on the institutions of a country: its legal system, its political 
system, its social system, its educational system, its culture, and so on … a complex interrelated structure.” Nevertheless, 
their approach is mostly understood to address formal state-created institutions as the key determinants for economic 
growth, particularly those of property rights and contract enforcement. 
See, e.g., Donald Clarke, Economic Development and the Right Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 90 (2003) 
(interpreting North’s work and summarizing that “Productive capitalism needs formal adjudication, judiciary enforced 
contracts and inviolable property rights.”). See also DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 184 (2007) (labeling the institutional approach as ‘property rights 
reductionism’— one that views the property rights protection as the end-all of development policy).  




of dimensions, leaving academics, practitioners, and foreign policy makers puzzled. Within this broad 
spectrum, the success of Chinese publicly-listed firms and the domestic capital markets within which 
they operate is particularly striking and provides an excellent focal-point through which China’s law 
and development conundrum is examined here.12  
Capital markets and the firms that populate them are eminent components in any growth-
oriented economy. Firms are the primary vehicle through which large scale production and commerce 
take place. Their publicly listed form enables an aggregation of wealth of “innumerable individuals 
under the same central control.”13 Capital markets, in turn, facilitate financing beyond relational-based 
exchange, making capital accessible and less costly for firms. They enable large scale share-trade 
between unfamiliar parties by facilitating information flow from firms to investors and back to 
decision makers within firms. This informational function is expected to ensure the allocation of 
capital to the most deserving firms (commonly referred to as efficient allocation of capital), thereby 
aiding their further growth. Both the public firm and capital markets are considered major steps in 
financial development and in economic development overall: the deeper the capital market is, the 
greater the prospect for further economic growth is assumed to be.14  
It is argued that in order for the capital market to become larger and deeper, and to ensure 
efficient allocation of capital, it ought to be supported by legal institutions. This conventional wisdom 
claims to have identified the particular prescription that is best suited for capital market development, 
and by extension for economic growth. 15 While many controversies exist on various aspects within 
this paradigm,16 the following propositions constitute the common understanding about corporate 
governance and capital market development today:  
 
12 Milhaupt and Pistor took an illuminating approach to the relationship between law and economic development through 
the corporate governance lens. The authors offered an analysis of several country-based case studies that question many 
of the conventional law and development theories. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM 
(2008). 
13 ADOLF A. BERLE & C. GARDINER, MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 129 (rev. ed. 1967). 
14 Note that this does not mean that capital markets are crucial for economic growth; the evidence for that is far from 
conclusive. Yet scholars are largely in agreement that growth can be expanded when capital market activity increases. For 
the claim that higher levels of financial development are positively associated with economic development, see Robert G. 
King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 108 Q. J. ECON. 717 (1993). Specifically regarding the 
stock market, see Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth (World Bank Policy Research, 
Working Paper No. 1690, 1999). 
15 Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131-1150 (1997) (connecting legal origin 
with the availability of external finance and the size of the capital market); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. 
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (identifying investor protection indicators across countries and making connections between the 
ownership structure of public firms and these indicators); Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origin, 46 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 302 (2008) (providing a literature review of related studies). 
16 For general doubts as to the ability to produce all-inclusive indices, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive 
Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008). For critics on specific elements within the Law and 
Finance approach, see  infra note 21. 




- State ownership and heavy statist or political intervention impede market development,17 while 
privatization works better;18  
- Dispersed ownership is more conductive to capital market development than concentrated 
ownership;19 and finally,  
- Law matters: legal institutions, particularly those associated with investor protections,20 are 
needed to attract external finance and are thus crucial for capital market development.21  
Strikingly, China misses the mark on all three points. The development process of China’s 
public market presents a different story altogether and leaves its observers puzzled. The story suggests 
that at least under some circumstances, firms can develop and prosper while being subjected to state 
ownership and politicized control. It indicates that concentrated ownership can be associated with 
capital market growth. It also reflects that external financing might not be contingent on highly 
functioning legal institutions, and that public firms can thrive even under a legal system that enables 
profusion of related-party transactions and outright abuse of public shareholders. Capital markets, it 
 
17 Friedrich Hayek is known for developing a theory according to which legal systems with traditions that constrain 
government intervention (common law) are more compatible with a market economy than legal systems in which 
government power was more freely asserted (civil law). See Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek 
Might be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001). The argument is supported by various studies noted in La Porta et al., The 
Economic Consequences of Legal Origin, supra note 15.   
18 MAXIM BOYCKO ET AL., PRIVATIZING RUSSIA (1997) (arguing that in order to achieve economic growth, firms should 
be de-politicized and the state should be distanced from firm ownership through privatization). This was indeed the 
approach promoted by international policy organizations and applied via the privatization waves of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s across Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America. 
19 La Porta et al, supra note 15. See also Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) 
(inferring the same). But see Jeremy Edwards & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation, 5 GER. 
ECON. REV., 143 (2004). 
20 This entire line of argument based on empirical reasoning has come to be known as the “Law and Finance” approach. 
See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON., 430 (2008). Another thread of this 
literature is the legal origin theory, grounded in the same articles by La Porta et. al, supra note 15, which posits that the 
laws of common law countries are more protective of outside investors than those of (particularly French-)civil law 
countries, and thus are more conductive to financial development. The original studies did not consider emerging markets 
or transitional economies, but subsequent research addressed this in support. See, e.g., Simeon Djankov, et al., The New 
Comparative Economics, 31 J. COM. ECON. 595 (2003). 
21 Critiques of the Law and Finance approach and disagreements about the specific desirable elements are not lacking, but 
they all seem to hold that legal institutions and the availability of external finance are correlated. For questions as to the 
applied coding, see Holger Spamann, Law and Finance Revisited (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 
12, 2008) (re-coding the original data on shareholder and creditors rights based on different legal analysis and questioning 
LLSV’s results). For conflicting evidence from a broader historical view, see Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great 
Reversal: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON 5 (2003) (suggesting that by historic 
accounts, LLSV’s cross-country conclusions on the strength of the US stock markets versus weakness of continental 
European markets are misinformed). See also MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 12, at 23-25 (positing how changing the 
period of time selected for the examined growth in different countries—common law and civil law countries—provides a 
different outcome). For claims as to the inability of menu legal institutions to achieve intended results in practice without 
appropriate adaptation to local conditions, see Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003); 
Bernard Black et al., Methods for Multicountry Studies of Corporate Governance: Evidence from the BRIKT Countries, 183 J. 
ECONOMETRICS 230 (2014) (empirically questioning the predictive power of “common elements” and offering country-
specific governance indices). While not necessarily in critique of the Law and Finance approach, there is also controversy 
on the implied causality of legal establishment and market development. Most notably, see John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed 
Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange 
as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997) (stating that law tends to follow rather than precede economic change). 




seems, can expand despite, and perhaps due to, “bad” corporate governance. Finally, and with no 
contradiction, the story does support the general view that law matters, but for a completely different 
reason. When legal institutions of corporate governance took form in China, they did not operate to 
secure the rights of public investors in firms, but rather to implement the agenda of the polity and 
consolidate its power. Thus, the importance of law to capital market development increased over time, 
but its instrumental nature remained. 
  
Classification of China’s Development Trajectory  
 
To put China’s development trajectory into context, it is valuable to first identify its stages. A 
common classification follows the stated shifts in economic policy, which are reflected in the 
pronouncements of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congresses. These can be divided into three 
primary stages: 
The first and early stage of economic transition, known as “Growing Out of the Plan,”22 1978–
1989, started in December 1978 with the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP, 
which announced a “Reform and Opening” economic-policy.23 The focus of this early economic 
transition stage was on experimenting with various methods to increase productivity in the state sector 
and attracting foreign direct investments to the budding market. During the second stage of economic 
transition, known as the “Modern Reform Era,” 1992–2007, the Party proclaimed the establishment 
of a “Socialist Market Economy.” These years which formally started with the 14th Congress of the 
CCP, 24 saw a robust enactment of economic laws and central-state institutional establishment. Finally, 
the third and current stage of economic transition is known as the “Mixed Ownership Economy” 
stage. The term was coined by the 17th Congress of the CCP in 2007,25 and explicitly announced as 
 
22 Political economist Barry Naughton coined the term to represent the period in which China gradually stepped out of 
the planned economy avoiding a grand political struggle. See BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINESE 
ECONOMIC REFORM, 1978-1993 (1995). 
23 See Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao (中国共产党第十一届
中央委员会第三次全体会议公报) [Communique] (adopted and promulgated by the 3rd Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh Cong. of the Communist Party of China, Dec. 22, 1978, available at  
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65371/4441902.html.  
24 The Congress was held in October 1992; the economic plenum was held a year later. See Decision on Issues Concerning 
the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economy [hereinafter 14th Party Congress Decisions], in Zhongguo gongchandang 
di shisi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao (中国共产党第十四届中央委员会第三次全体会议
公报) [Communique] (promulgated by the 3rd Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Cong. of the Communist Party of China, 
Nov. 14, 1993), available at  http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65395/4441750.html.  
25 Hujintao zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiqi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao (胡锦涛在中国共产党第十
七次全国代表大会上的报告) [Report to the 17th Party Congress], (delivered by President Hu Jintao, Oct. 25, 2007) 
[hereinafter Report to the 17th Party Congress], available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/67507/6429847.html.  




the current “stage” of China’s economic transition during the 18th Congress of the CCP in 2013.26 
During this current stage, the Party plans to let markets play a more “decisive role” in the economy, 
and specifically to encourage the financial system and capital market activity while at the same time 
ensuring economic stabilization.27  
Finally, a word of caution lest anyone be misled by this classification of transition stages: China 
is often referred to as a transitional economy but the fact that its economic trajectory went through 
various stages of transition does not make it one. A “transitional economy” implies a process toward 
an end goal, most commonly toward ownership privatization and a liberal market economy.  Some 
economists have perhaps optimistically viewed China’s development trajectory to represent “gradual 
privatization,” as if an end result of complete privatization is inevitable.28 Most expert observers of 
China, however, agree that full privatization is not the end goal of the Chinese Party-state under any 
CCP-led regime.29 Hence, while over several decades there has been some reduction in the state’s 
direct equity holdings in PRC firms, coupled with varying spurts of growth in small to medium 
enterprises often called “private,” these reductions in formal equity shares do not amount to even a 
gradual reduction in control over the Party-state-operated assets. Accordingly, the term “transition” 
here refers only to the temporal aspect of the institutions discussed, without assuming any final results. 
 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF FIRMS AND THE CAPITAL MARKET 
 
To uncover China’s law and capital market development conundrum, I provide an historical 
account of the emergence of firms and capital markets. This account focuses on two key elements: 1) 
the rise of the large (public) firm; and 2) the creation of capital markets in their narrow sense. The 
review reflects how during the first and second stages of economic transition, China did not conform 
with the common development assumptions mentioned above. China’s public firms emerged and 
were able to expand with highly concentrated state ownership, and its capital markets evolved while 
relying mainly on transitional, often informal, experimental mechanisms.  Only halfway into the 
development of firms and capital markets did a policy-guided embrace of corporate governance 
institutions seen in other successful economies begin. But even then, the introduction of these 
institutions was directed by political economy necessities—mainly, the concerns for Party-state 
 
26 Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao (中国共产党第十八届中
央委员会第三次全体会议公报) [Communique] (adopted and promulgated by the Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
Central Comm. of the Communist Party of China, Nov. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Communique 2013], available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/15/content_31203056.htm (partial English translation). 
27 Id. 
28 Gérard Roland, Political Economy Issues of Ownership Transformation in Eastern Europe, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 31, 47-49 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995). 
29 The term “Party-state” refers to a one-party system in which one political party directs both the political process and 
the administrative governance of the state. 




legitimacy and the need to reconsolidate economic power. Private economic activity and capital market 
efficiency were of lesser importance, consequently rendering the newly established laws and 
institutions powerless and irrelevant.  
 
A. The Rise of the Large (Public) Firm 
 
One of the first instigators for the rise of public firms in China was the economic autonomy 
that the central Party-state gradually granted to local level governments in order to advance economic 
growth. Limited discretion to make decisions concerning economic policy has resulted in various local 
economic initiatives. One such initiative was a party-sanctioned local experiment in the state sector 
with various forms of organizational ownership.  It started in the mid-1980s at local-provincial levels 
and later expanded to be known as the national SOE (State-owned Enterprise) corporatization scheme. 
These experiments supplanted the nascent market forces; they were meant to incentivize economic 
activity in SOEs and to induce firms and their managers to adapt efficient measures to increase 
productivity. The corporatization experiment also took the place of the abrupt privatization approach 
that was common in other transitional economies.30  It introduced organizational ownership under 
heightened control and an illiberal economic system. 
As productivity increased and firms expanded, so did opportunities for abuse. Local economic 
power accumulated and introduced shifts in the delicate political equilibrium.  Local experiments with 
enterprise reform were replaced by efforts of the central-state to reorganize and consolidate power 
over firms, including by the use of legal reforms and institutions. The rise of the public firm in China 
was thus strongly directed by political-economy. The result was Party-state control over a great 
number of China’s most significant listed firms, one of the main attributes of China’s state-capitalism 
today.31 The following provides an overview of how the public firm emerged, business groups were 
created, and the Chinese Party-state became a dominant, often controlling, corporate stockholder.   
 
 
30 Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000) 
(discussing mass privatization of large firms in Russia and its dire consequences).  
31 Commentators have taken different views as to China’s Party-state involvement in the economy. Some have argued 
against the characterization of the Chinese economy as “state-capitalism.” See, e.g., NICHOLAS R. LARDY, MARKETS OVER 
MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESS IN CHINA (2014) (considering the rapidly growing private business sector as a major 
driver of economic growth and employment in China today). Others, such as Lin and Milhaupt as well as contributors in 
Milhaupt and Liebman’s edited volume, use the terms more freely. See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis Milhaupt, We Are the (National) 
Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013); REGULATING THE VISIBLE 
HAND?, (Curtis Milhaupt and Benjamin Liebman eds., 2016). I use the term to describe a system in which the Chinese 
Party-state directly or indirectly functions as the controlling shareholder of most significant PRC industrial groups and 
their domestic and globally-listed companies, as well as of the commercial and policy banks and financial firms, and at the 
same time stands behind the market’s regulation and enforcement institutions. 




1. Economic Decentralization and SOEs 
 
Under Mao Zedong’s command economic system (1949–1976), state-owned enterprises and 
by urban and rural collective enterprises carried out most economic activity in China.32 The basic unit 
for economic and social life, in both the collectives and state-owned enterprises, was the danwei—the 
working unit—which was a political as well as an administrative institution. Bound to the danwei for 
life, workers relied on it to provide their entire social welfare needs, including everything from housing 
and food to entertainment. The danwei exercised economic, social, administrative, and political control 
on behalf of the party and state, extending the Party-state’s presence and control to China’s grassroots.  
Above the working units, plant-level enterprises were organized into sectoral or geographical 
divisions, which were in turn assigned to various industrial bureaus.33 Under administrative control 
and central planning, economic resource allocation was executed by fiats that were driven by political 
and social needs rather than by supply and demand. The danwei itself had no economic independence; 
instead, it was assigned production quotas and was funded through the state budget to reach the 
quotas. Demand for the products was guaranteed through fixed outlets, which were transferred by 
command to the other danwei units within a given state-owned or collective enterprise. All “profits” 
were remitted to the state, and there was therefore no need for a modern taxation system.34 Under this 
economic and social reality, production units had no need for external capital. They had no incentive 
to seek new business opportunities, expand their production capacity beyond orders, or operate 
efficiently.  
Starting in the early 1980s and continuing throughout China’s long process of economic 
transition, reforms took place on a somewhat eclectic, trial-and-error basis of experimentation,35 which 
was endorsed by the central Party-state.36 Most economic policies were focused on state-owned 
enterprises and only gradually opened-up to the idea of private forms of ownership.37 The primary 
 
32 Under Mao, limited private economic activity was allowed from time to time to the peasantry. Private agriculture activity 
made up a very small portion of rural labor input. Andrew C. Mertha, From “Rustless Screws” to “Nail Houses”: The 
Evolution of Property Rights in China (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
33 Theodore Groves et al., China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market, 103 J. POL. ECON. 873, 876 (1995). 
34  STOYAN TENEV ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE 
INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 10-11 (2002). 
35 Sebastian Heilmann refers to “experimentation under hierarchy” as a “process of policy generation that legitimizes local 
initiative while maintaining ultimate hierarchical control.” Sebastian Heilmann, Experience First, Laws Later: Experimentation 
and Breakthroughs in the Restructuring of China’s State Sector, in GOING PRIVATE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURING AND SYSTEM REFORM 95-118 (Jean Chun Oi ed., 2011); Sebastian Heilmann, Experimentation under 
Hierarchy: Policy Experiments in the Reorganization of China’s State Sector, 1978-2008 (Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard U., Faculty 
Working Paper No. 172, 2008).   
36 Heilmann, Experimentation under Hierarchy, supra note 35. See also YUEN YUEN ANG, HOW CHINA ESCAPED THE POVERTY 
TRAP (2016) (suggesting that the empowerment of local agents to experiment with innovative policy solutions was a major 
component in China’s ability to “escape the poverty trap” despite weak legal institutions). 
37 With the exception of rural (mostly land related) reforms. Economic activity in rural areas and specifically in agricultural 
land had gone through different reforms that reflect different property rights arrangements. JANOS KORNAI, THE 
SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM 74-79 (1992); TENEV ET AL., supra note 34, at 11. 




goal of the experiments was to encourage more productive activity in state-owned enterprises. One of 
the first examples is the introduction of “shares” into enterprises. Although the term “corporatization” 
formally refers to the ownership organizational reform taken in SOEs in the 1990s, the process had 
started much earlier with experiments within collective enterprises in the countrysides, which later 
spilled over into state-owned enterprises.38  Shares were issued and given primarily to enterprise 
employees. In 1986, the State Council released regulations permitting local governments to select a 
few large and medium-sized SOEs in their localities as formal pilots for shareholding experiments, 
thereby acknowledging share ownership assignment as a formal experiment and applying it more 
broadly.39 However, the issued shares provided a fixed and guaranteed dividend cash payment much 
like a bank deposit and therefore did not create incentives to increase production.  
Other ways to incentivize local governments to increase productivity during the early 
transition phase were dual-track pricing and fiscal contracting. These schemes permitted state 
enterprises to sell excess products at newly-emerging market prices, remit part of the profits to the 
local government, and retain the rest. In the early 1980s, local governments were delegated such rights 
over a great number of state assets. It is estimated that already by 1985 state-owned enterprises 
controlled by the central government accounted for only twenty percent of total industrial output of 
all enterprises at or above the township level. By 1994, state assets controlled by the central 
government were only thirty-five percent of all state assets.40  In this environment, local governments 
have become largely dependent on their own generated revenues and less reliant on centrally allocated 
resources, thus creating dependence on local enterprises for revenue. This process has had meaningful 
implications for China’s political structure and is one of the main catalysts for China’s “Fragmented 
Authoritarianism” today. 41 As described by Lieberthal, the “decentralization of budgetary authority 
enabled many locales and bureaucratic units to acquire funds outside of those allocated through the 
 
38 The first local experiments with share issuance happened in the countryside before there was a formal acknowledgment 
of broad policy experimentation. For a detailed chronology of local initiatives and experiments with stock issuance and 
trading platforms, see CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J. T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: INSIDE CHINA’S STOCK MARKETS 
21-22 (2006) (mentioning Provisional Management Measures that were released locally by the Shanghai Branch of the 
People’s Bank of China in July 1984 as the first formal rules promulgated by a local government body to address the 
issuance of shares). The rules, known as the “Eight Articles” (Batiao) limited the issuance of shares to newly established 
“collective enterprises,” excluding SOEs from the initial experiments. Yet, shares of collective enterprises could be held 
by SOEs or other collectives, as well as by specific types of individuals, excluding party officials. Peasants were permitted 
to invest in shares, and employees could (and were often encouraged to) purchase shares of the enterprise they worked at. 
As Walter and Howie state, this was done in an effort to protect SOEs and party officials from the new, politically charged, 
capitalist initiative.  
39 See id. (mentioning approval of share issuance to Liaoning Fushun No. 1 Brick Factory in January 1980 as the pioneering 
share issuance, followed by the issue of shares of Chengdu Shudu Office Building Co. Ltd. the same year, Shenzhen Baoan 
County United Investment Co. Ltd. share issuance in 1983, and Beijing Tianqiao Department Store Co. Ltd. share issuance 
in 1984). 
40  Shuhe Li & Peng Lian, Decentralization and Coordination: China’s Credible Commitment to Preserve the Market under 
Authoritarianism, 10 CHINA ECON. REV. 161, 176-178 (1999). 
41 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Introduction: the ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism Model’ and Its Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, 
AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 1 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1991).  




central budget, which they could use to pursue their own policy preferences.”42 This was a shock to 
the political-economic equilibrium, creating new competition between localities and power shifts from 
the center.43 
Beyond its implications on the allocation of administrative and economic decision-making 
authority within the Party-state system, economic decentralization also had direct implications on the 
organizational ownership of state assets. It shaped how firms were structured, business groups 
emerged, and how the capital market evolved more broadly. Salient among these, economic 
decentralization directly informed the ways industrial enterprises were managed.  
Local governments started to create various schemes with the goal to increase production in 
the SOEs under their administrative management. Within each local government’s administrative 
boundaries, officials were assigned to manage the state assets organized in SOEs. These appointed 
managers engaged in “Management Contract Responsibility” arrangements with their local 
governments. Many of these new arrangements involved performance targets, compensation plans, 
and control rights,44 including, for example,45 1) contract-based arrangements between SOEs and their 
supervising government agency in which SOEs bargained for profit remittance targets, allowing the 
SOE to keep the surplus (in many cases, profits above target were distributed to workers and 
managers); 2) giving greater control to SOE managers over sales, pricing, production, and finally even 
on investments and labor decisions, in return for achieving profit remittance targets; and 3) when the 
central government introduced a share issuance system, managers and other senior employees received 
shares in their SOEs as an additional incentive to increase firm profitability.  
Such arrangements allowed the managers to have growing discretion over the use of the 
enterprise’s generated profits. The goal was to incentivize managers to perform better. Local 
government officials who were assigned to manage the SOEs were then able to use the retained profits 
and their broadened managerial discretion to expand the assets under their management.  
To further their authority, many opted to create SOE subsidiaries such as collective enterprises 
and joint ventures. To these affiliated businesses, they often provided local government sponsorship 
and personal patronage. This new form of asset diversification helped local government officials to 
gain more autonomy from supervising central government agencies. Consequently, local government 
officials emerged as dominant business players and powerful decisionmakers in their jurisdictions.  
The process of economic decentralization and these local experiments did not follow the 
globally advocated strategies for stimulating market development. They also functionally substituted 
 
42 Id. at 8. 
43 Susan Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots, in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL 
INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG ERA 101, 111 (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004). 
44  See Donald C. Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION 375, 415-416 (Thomas Rawski & Loren Brandt eds., 2008). See generally Li & Lian, supra note 40, at 176. 
45 Groves et al., supra note 33. 




for traditional corporate institutions and formed the baseline for the rise of the Chinese public firm.46 
Another result, however, was the accumulation of local powers, which had several important negative 
effects. 
First, strong local protectionism arose, and it guided economic and administrative decision 
making, including with respect to firms.  Known aspects of economic protectionism are the approval 
of risky investment schemes often without solid feasibility checks and the influence of local 
government officials on the supply of bank loans to SOEs.47 Another notable effect was on legal 
enforcement, which was tainted by selective enforcement in favor of local parties.48 Protectionism also 
led to informal internal trade barriers that different provinces created against each other and which 
influenced the operation of firms by limiting cross-provincial business cooperation and curbing 
competition.  
Second, such economic decentralization created the potential for conflicts of interest at 
various levels, between the administrative role of individual officials and their role as SOE managers, 
as well as between the central administration and the localities.49 In addition, multiple overlapping 
government agencies had a say in monitoring various aspects of the operations of SOEs, including 
labor, production, and resource allocation. This led to burdensome multilevel bureaucratic 
interference with SOE management by various state agencies and Party agents with conflicting 
interests.50 These lines of conflict created the concern that local officials (and SOE managers among 
them) would become less attuned to central government goals, and it made coordination between 
central and local government organs more challenging.  
The central government was not blind to these concerns and tried to curb the developing ties 
between local administrative authority and economic power.51 A separation between the government 
role and the commercial activities of SOEs was announced.52 Under this approach, government and 
 
46 See Clarke et al., supra note 44, at 415-416 (discussing managerial incentives as a functional substitution for corporate 
governance institutions). 
47 TENEV ET AL., supra note 34, at 20-21 (positing that the high level of nonperforming loans in the banking system creates 
a gap in incentives nowadays too). 
48 This influenced the wide spectrum of legal enforcement, including debt collections, bankruptcy, prosecution, and 
adjudication. Protectionism also tainted other administrative processes, such as business licensing, allocation of labor, 
credit financing, taxation, and profit retention privileges. Protectionism in the People’s Court system emanated from other 
related factors; economic decentralization and local self-funding also meant that local governments were the ones to fund 
the operation of the judicial system in their locales. See Randy Peerenboom, The Judiciary: In Search of Independence, Authority 
and Competence, in CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 280, 311(Randy Peerenboom ed., 2002). 
49 Jean Oi, The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy,144 CHINA Q, 1132, 1144-1145 (1995).  
50 Donald Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 4 CHINA ECON. REV. 494, 497-498 (2003). 
51 See Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jingji tizhi gaige de jueding (中共中央关于经济体制改革的决定) [Decision on 
Reforming the Economic Structure] (promulgated by the Central Comm. of the Communist Party of China, 3rd Plenary 
Session of the Twelfth Central Committee, Oct. 20, 1984), art. 6 [hereinafter 1984 CCP Decision on Reforming the 
Economic Structure], available at  http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64565/65378/4429522.html (showing 
noticeable beginnings of this shift). 
52 Howard Chao & Xiaoping Yang, Private Enterprise in China: The Developing Law of Collective Enterprises, 19 INT’L L. 1215, 
1220 (1986) (citing several decisions that instructed party and government officials to resign either from their company 




party officials were not allowed, at least not formally, to manage enterprises directly while also serving 
in other public posts. (This is not to be equated with the Anglo-American “separation between 
ownership and control,” which was implemented later through corporatization.)    
Over time, however, these steps to separate government from enterprises proved ineffective.53 
The separation seemed artificial and only added to existing operational difficulties. With little or no 
business or managerial knowledge, management appointees, now former government and military 
officials (members of the nomenklatura), were still conduits of the government unit that appointed 
them. Moreover, the appointing units continued to supervise the managers, a pattern that led to local 
corruption and capture. Unfamiliar with the new business reality, the supervising state agencies were 
caught unprepared, lacking the capacity to monitor their appointed agents.54 The concern for conflicts 
of interest materialized. New economic opportunities along with broader managerial freedom brought 
wealth extraction and asset stripping in SOEs. Managers freely partook in value and asset transfers 
and were not held accountable for losses.55  
By late 1980s, the relative inefficiencies of SOEs became a point of growing concern, especially 
in light of increasing competition from an emerging private sector (still mainly rural) and the limited 
penetration of foreign businesses.56 By the mid-1990s, forty-one percent of China’s SOEs suffered 
losses.57 A new social layer of crony-capitalists began to emerge.58 The former state officials and party 
members in their private capacity started to form a powerful interest group, whose members’ personal 
interests gradually became directly invested in China’s firms and have direct power over economic 
policy decisions. This process soon became the source of many of China’s current corporate 





posts or from their public one). This is not the situation nowadays, as senior executives in China’s biggest SOEs often 
simultaneously hold important positions in the government and the party. 
53 See generally, 43Michael Irl Nikkel, Chinese Characteristics in Corporate Clothing: Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's Company 
Law, 80 MINN. L. REV. 503, 518-520 (1995). 
54 Xue Liang Ding, The Illicit Asset Stripping of Chinese State Firms, 43 CHINA J. 1 (2000) (describing a “bleeding of the state 
sector” into the private hands of manager-appointees and officials assigned to supervise them). 
55 Dominic Ziegler, The Honeycomb of Corruption—A Little Reform in the State Sector Has Proved A Dangerous Thing, ECONOMIST, 
Vol. 355, Apr. 8, 2000, pp. CS8-CS10, available at https://www.economist.com/node/299621 (“reforms that have brought 
great complexity to the state sector's relations … ‘managers of Chinese state firms essentially have ended up capturing a 
sizeable portion of the widely scattered public property’”). 
56 Gary Jefferson, Are China's Rural Enterprises Outperforming State-Owned Enterprises? (World Bank China Series, Research 
Paper No. CH-RPS 24, 1993) (focusing on the rapid growth of Town-Village Enterprises as the critical element in China’s 
economic transition success). 
57 China Plans New Bankruptcy Law, WALL STREET J., Dec 30, 1994, at A4. 
58 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?, 211 CHINA Q. 624 (2012). 




2. National Level Schemes 
 
Asset stripping from SOEs, corruption, and capture were not rampant only within local 
governments but rather were carried out at all levels. Yet economic decentralization and the resulting 
accumulation of local powers were a main driving force behind the national level efforts that came 
next. The corporate form as an organizational ownership structure of SOEs was introduced and 
utilized as part of the central Party-state effort for national restoration to achieve both domestic 
consolidation and international competitiveness. 
Facing the institutional challenges discussed above, central government agencies started to 
develop schemes for structural reform. The State Commission for the Reform of the Economic 
System (CRES), a national state agency under the direct authority of the State Council that was created 
to handle economic reform and granted the authority to design and issue relevant policies, undertook 
one of the best-known initiatives. The CRES, without any prior move by the national legislature or 
even the Party, introduced a national legal reform of business enterprises.59  The two policy documents, 
known as the 1992 Normative Opinions, defined different legal forms of organization for equity share-
based enterprises. The 1992 Normative Opinions also prescribed normative business standards in 
such companies, introducing for the first-time modern principles of corporate organization.60  Despite 
being issued by an administrative state body rather than by a national legislator (the NPC or the State 
Council), the 1992 Normative Opinions are viewed as the first de-facto modern national business 
organization law.61 
A few months later, the central Party-state picked up these agency-led efforts through two 
important enterprise organizational plans: i) the “modern enterprise system;” and ii) accelerating 
business groups.62 These were meant to rebuild the troubled state sector while reconsolidating control 
over SOES.    
 
59  Youxian Zeren Gongsi Guifan Yijian [Normative Opinions on Standards for Limited Liability Companies] (promulgated 
by the State Comm’n for Restructuring the Economic Systems, May 15, 1992), available here 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=5740  [hereinafter Normative Opinion on LLCs 1]; Gufen Youxian 
Gongsi Guifan Yijian [Normative Opinions on Standards for Companies Limited by Shares]  (promulgated by the State 
Commission for Restructuring the Economic Systems, May 15, 1992), available here 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=5738&lib=law [hereinafter Normative Opinion on CLSs] [hereinafter together 
1992 Normative Opinions]. 
60 For example, enterprise legal personhood, shareholders’ limited liability, share ownership, transferability of shares, and 
formal separation between management and ownership. See Normative Opinion on LLCs 2, supra note 59, arts. 1, 22, 28, 
30, 39, 41-42. 
61 Not having a formal status of law and being the “opinions” of an administrative commission, the status of these opinions 
was subject to debate. In retrospect, the State Council confirmed their effect as a ministry-level regulation. See Nicholas C. 
Howson, China’s Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? A Modest Complaint, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L., 127, 137 
(1997). 
62 A parallel reform with much the same political consolidation purpose was the Tax Reform of 1994, which included 
methods to redefine the fiscal relationship between the central and local government and increase the center’s fiscal control. 
S. B. Herschler, The 1994 Tax Reforms: The Center Strikes Back, 6 CHINA ECON. REV. 239 (1995). 





i.   The “Modern Enterprise System” — Corporatization and Share-Ownership 
 
The Decisions of the 14th Party Congress announced a shift toward a “modern enterprise 
system.”63  This policy formally initiated a national process for SOE corporatization, in which a 
modern corporate form was adopted, although still on a probationary basis.  By adopting the features 
of the modern corporation as the organizational form that had proven successful worldwide, it was 
hoped that productivity would increase and that efficiency would start to guide the management of 
state-owned enterprises. 64  Interestingly, however, several elements from the 1992 Normative 
Opinions, including standards for shareholder protections,65  were not embraced by the CCP decision 
and were withdrawn in the enactment of the subsequent, and first, PRC Company law.66 
Adopting the contours of a modern corporation in law reflected a formal acknowledgment of 
several corporate attributes, such as a separate legal personality, limited liability, transferability of rights, 
and separation of ownership from management, which was referred to as “scientific management.”67 
Furthermore, it meant a (re)conceptualization of property rights ideas and specifically ownership 
interests through shares, even if this was still exercised mainly by the state on behalf of “all the 
people.”68 Indeed, as part of the corporatization initiative, share ownership rights in enterprises were 
formally recognized. The significance of this should not go unnoticed and is especially striking given 
that China’s first Property Law was enacted only in 2007. 69  Ownership of financial assets and 
particularly the economic rights attached to it were still openly frowned upon at that time.70 This had 
a simple ideological basis, as earnings from capital assets ran counter to the basic Marxist view of 
labor-based income. Thus, a share system that was taken beyond local experimentations and 
acknowledged in a formal national law had to be motivated by a strong national purpose. It is indeed 
well established among China commentators that the corporatization scheme was designed to attract 
 
63 See 14th Party Congress Decisions, supra note 24.  
64 Donald Clarke, How China’s Effort to Bring Private-Sector Standards into the Public Sector Backfired, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE 
HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 35 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. 
Milhaupt eds., 2015). 
65 Howson, supra note 61 (comparing the 1992 Opinions and related documents with the 1993 Company Law). 
66 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa [The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. of the Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1994) [hereinafter “1993 Company 
Law”]. The Company Law was later revised. See infra note 147. 
67 Id. arts. 3-7. 
68 Although all assets were possessed by the state in the traditional state-owned enterprises system, the corporatization 
process and share-ownership can be viewed as distinguishing between administrative possession and the recognition of 
the state (and state bodies) as a property share owner. 
69 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquanfa [Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007). On the controversies surrounding the enactment process, see 
Songyan Sui, New Property Law Shakes Up China, BBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2007, 1:10 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/6429977.stm. 
70 Only in 2002, following Jiang Zemin’s 2001 speech and the official proclamations of the 16th Communist Party 
Congress, were party members officially welcome to pursue investment-sourced income. 




public finance to recover the failing state sector.71 However, given the shifts in China’s political-
economic equilibrium, it was also an act of consolidating control over business organization. 
In the process of corporatization, SOEs as industrial-ministerial or provincial-line state 
agencies were converted from their former organization into one of the corporate forms recognized 
under the newly enacted Company Law. The law distinguished between three main corporate forms 
of organization:  (1) a Limited Liability Company (LLC) (youxian zeren gongsi) intended for a small and 
more closely held group of investors, similar to the close corporation form in the United States; (2) a 
Joint Stock Limited Company, also known as a “company limited by shares” (CLS) (gufen youxian gongsi), 
which may be a listed company or an unlisted company, although the assumption was that a company 
will be established with the intention to list in the future; and (3) a Wholly State-Owned Limited 
Liability Company (guoyou duzi gongsi), a special type of LLC wholly owned by a state body. 72 
As part of their reorganization, the corporatized SOEs had to shed their social welfare 
functions and maintain only their productive assets and human capital. 73  These newly created legal 
entities were then either grouped under (1) central and local-level state bodies (e.g., central, provincial, 
and municipal government organs with jurisdiction over a particular industrial sector or region), which 
were now reorganized as holding companies with subsidiary “legal person” holdings; or (2) organized 
with other existing PRC enterprises (such as collectives and other companies that were also controlled 
by non-central government bodies) and given a “legal person” status.74  
The controlling shares of these corporations were issued to the industrial ministry or to other 
national and local government units from which the corporation was created. The structural outcome 
of this corporate organization process was the consolidation of the productive assets and human 
capital of traditional state-owned enterprises and their vesting in several now-corporatized SOEs in 
which the central or the local government now had shares.  
It was assumed that the new corporate shareholding capacity of the state would eliminate 
conflicts between the various state agencies involved in the firms’ operations since they would have 
one vehicle, the shareholder vote, to promote their goals.75 In addition, the corporate form was not 
only thought to be better suited for efficient management but was also essential in order to make 
external equity financing possible. 
 
71 To establish this conclusion, scholars present the percentage of listed firms originated from SOEs. For example, Clarke 
brings sources to show how at the end of 2000, of the 1,088 listed companies on both exchanges, over 900 were originally 
traditional state-owned enterprises. At the end of 2001, out of 1,160 listed companies, approximately 1,103 were originally 
traditional state-owned enterprises. Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 125, 131 (2006). 
72 For the LLC form, see 1993 Company Law, supra note 66, arts. 3, 9, 19, 20. For the CLS form, see id. arts. 3, 73, 74. For 
the wholly state-owned LLC form, see id. arts. 3, 64. 
73 The social welfare functions were transferred to “social affairs units” (shiye danwei) under relevant ministries. See DALI L. 
YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND THE POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 
(2004). 
74 Harry G. Broadman, The Business(es) of the Chinese State, 24 WORLD ECON. 849, 860-863 (2001). For an extensive analysis 
of Chinese listed firms group formation, see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31. 
75 For a critique, see Clarke, supra note 50, at 497-500 (noting how the same state entity can still seek multiple, sometime 
conflicting goals and how the state still in practice kept exercising its control not only through its shareholding capacity). 




While formally initiated at the national-level by the new Company Law of 1993, the 
corporatization scheme was implemented gradually and by experimentation first. By the mid-1990s, 
the State Council selected 100 large and medium size SOEs for a pilot program. The SOEs that were 
corporatized as CLSs could now raise equity investments from domestic and foreign investors and 
assign them shares in return. From this point onward, while companies with dominant state ownership 
were still colloquially called SOEs, it is more accurate to refer to them as state-controlled companies.  
A survey of 2,343 pilot enterprises conducted by the State Statistical Bureau in 1997 revealed 
that 85 percent of the enterprises had corporatized into one of the legal corporate forms. Among 
these, 39 percent adopted the wholly state-owned form, 23 percent adopted the LLC form, and 
another 23 percent adopted the CLS form.76 By the end of 2000, over 80 percent of all state-owned 
enterprises surveyed were transformed into corporations, and over 1,200 large enterprises were 
restructured specifically as CLSs.77 
While the restructuring effort was carried out successfully and the corporatized firms quickly 
attracted outside financing (see below), in practice, however, the contribution of this process to 
management quality, accountability, and efficiency was limited. One of the main reasons was the 
cognizant design of the share structure in the corporatized SOEs.  
Strategically refraining from privatization, the newly corporatized SOEs that turned to equity 
financing were required to maintain a third of their shares as state shares. These shares were classified 
as common but untradeable shares and could be owned only by state entities. Another third of the 
newly issued shares were reserved for legal persons. These were also common but untradeable shares 
and were only transferable to other legal persons with appropriate approvals that included price 
determination.78 During that time, China’s economic laws determined that legal persons were domestic 
organizations with formal legal personality, which meant that the definition in practice excluded 
individuals.79 Moreover, since purely private businesses were at that time few in number, legal persons 
de-facto meant enterprises that were state-owned or state affiliated.  This diversification of different 
types of common shares practically meant that about two-thirds of a listed company’s shares were 
directly and indirectly held by organs of the state. It also meant that only about a third of the company’s 
shares—the public float—were transferable.80 This system isolated state shares from market forces 
and had implications on the valuation of listed companies. Most important, the potential disciplinary 
role of the capital markets on the insiders of the firms was curtailed from the start.  
 
76 He Jun, An Empirical Study on the Governance Structure of Listed Companies [Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Jieguo de Shizheng Fenxi. 
(Jingji Yanjiu)], 5 ECON. RESEARCH. J (1998).  
77 TENEV ET AL., supra note 34. Unfortunately, the source does not mention the total number of firms surveyed and 
therefore the percentage of CLS corporatization in SEOs is unclear.  
78 Wenxuan Hou & Edward Lee, Split Share Structure Reform, Corporate Governance, and the Foreign Share Discount Puzzle in 
China, 20 EUR. J. FIN. 703, 709 (2014). 
79 The Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 4th session of the fifth National People’s 
Congress, December 13, 1981, effective July 1, 1982, was enacted to govern agreements between domestic “legal persons.” 
Those at that time were legal entities restricted to the state sector, SOEs and/or collectives. The law was amended in 1993 
to include all domestic registered and licensed business entities (still, not individuals). 
80 Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A. Kim, Corporate Governance in China: A Modern Perspective, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 190 (2015). 




The share composition started to change after the split-share structure reform was announced 
in 2005.81 State-owned shares and legal-persons’ shares were, in principle, gradually subjected to 
market discipline. Today, legal person shares are held by entities such as industrial enterprises (mostly 
SOEs), holding companies, non-bank financial institutions, and research institutions. These legal 
person shares are largely still indirectly controlled by the state. 
Yet, even today, making state and legal person shares tradable does not mean these shares are 
suddenly being traded. State ownership in significant cases is retained. Either state bodies do not trade 
their shares in practice82 or they trade their shares through a private placement to another state-owned 
or affiliated enterprise. Alternatively, in many instances and often following policy directives, state 
ownership is reduced but control is maintained through mergers and acquisitions, diversification to 
subsidiaries and holding groups, and group formation. While these methods are globally-common 
business strategies,83  they resulted in the entrenchment of voting control at the hands of the state and 
its affiliates while reducing equity ownership and accountability for losses.84  
 
ii.  Business Group Formation 
 
Another key effort that the central Party-state took to reconsolidate control over SOEs was 
the acceleration of business group formation. As early as 1987, the CRES encouraged SOEs to 
organize as “business groups” (qiye jituan).85 In its Opinions for the Establishment and Encouragement 
of Business Groups [The Business Groups Opinions],86  the enterprise group was defined as a multi-
level organizational structure, with various circles of enterprises tied together by a charter and by 
shared organizational features, yet each with corresponding autonomy.87 This organizational structure 
 
81 A self-assessment study conducted by the CSRC and China’s State Economic and Trade Commission before the share-
structure reform was launched found that seventy-seven percent of China’s controlling shareholders in a study that 
included 1,175 listed firms could be considered state entities, while in about a third of the companies a single-state 
shareholders held more than half of the shares. See Clarke, supra note 3, at 148 n. 58. 
82 Id. 
83 Another business strategy to raise capital is to leverage the firm. Debt capital does not require the state to give up control 
nor dilute its ownership interests and has become an acute problem especially for local-level SOEs. Kun Su, The Inner 
Structure of Pyramid and Capital Structure: Evidence from China, 9 ECON.: THE OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-J., 1 (2015) 
(finding that multiple layers of pyramid structure increase a “leverage effect” and the motivation of the ultimate owner to 
expand debt financing). 
84 See discussion infra Chapter 2. 
85 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 714. 
86 The Opinions on the Establishment and Development of Business Groups, issued by the State Commission on 
Restructuring the Economy and the State Economic Commission, recognized Business Groups as a “multi-level 
organizational structure” with separate legal personality. See Guanyu Zujian he Fazhan Qiye Jituan de Jidian Yijian (关于
组建和发展企业集团的几点意见 ) [Opinions on the Establishment and Development of Business Groups] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l Econ. Sys. Reform Comm’n & the Nat’l Econ. Comm’n, Dec. 16, 1987) [hereinafter Business 
Groups Opinions], available at http://www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/fg21829/31802.shtml. 
87 Id.  




expanded in the following years until it turned into a national goal.88 The creation of national business 
groups eventually applied systematically along former ministerial or sectorial line bureaus.89  
During corporatization and the introduction of a share system, group companies were also the 
corporatized SOEs that issued shares and raised equity capital from the public—the business group’s 
publicly listed firm.  These, in many cases, became China’s national champions. Other enterprises 
under the same core company within the group provide related services to support the main 
corporatized listed firm, such as research and development or education subsidiaries, the group’s 
finance company, and other service entities (subsidiaries or affiliated firms) that expand the group’s 
network through contractual arrangements.90  
Today, the picture that has emerged is one of an intricate layered network of dozens of related 
companies within business groups in specific industrial sectors. Enterprise groups must register as 
such,91 a status that grants their various entities opportunities for preferential taxes, stock listing, and 
government contracts.92 Entities within the group are tied to a parent “core” company, above which 
the state presides. The core company functions as the holding company in the group. The main 
production enterprise within the group is the “group company”—the unit to which most of the state 
assets as well as economic and production activities were funneled through the corporatization process.  
The policy of accelerating business group formation was meant to encourage competition, 
prevent monopoly, promote technological progress, and improve economic efficiency through, 
among other ways, economies of scale.93 In many key industries, however, and especially after state 
assets were restructured under the national State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) and its local branches—which hold controlling or full ownership interests at 
the core parent company—group formation actually led to monopolistic and oligopolistic group 
power. 94  Since the reorganization of state assets in groups meant carving corporations out of 
industrial-sector ministries and agencies, groups from inception were de facto confined to certain 
geographical areas or to a certain step in the production chain within a given industry.95 Thus, while 
 
88 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 714. 
89 Brødsgaard, supra note 58, at 627-628. 
90 For the various entity components of the national business groups in China, see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 717-
721. 
91 The Business Group Opinions were further developed with the issuance of Qiye Jituan Dengji Guanli Zhanxing Guiding 
(企业集团登记管理暂行规定) [Provisional Rules on Business Group Registration] (promulgated by the St. Council, 
Sept. 1, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 1997). For a comprehensive review on their function today, see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 
31, at 712-720. 
92 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 714. 
93 Business Groups Opinions, supra note 86, art. 5. See also Brødsgaard, supra note 58, at 627-628; Lin & Milhaupt, supra 
note 31, at 714. 
94 For example, in energy, petroleum, telecommunications, and chemicals industries. Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 5, at 
690-691, n.129. 
95 This is the case particularly for central-state held groups in strategic industries. One of the examples most commonly 
referred to in the literature, is the asset reorganization and corporatization of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. See id. at 
692.  




they were theoretically competing with parallel groups, they in fact accumulated market dominance in 
their designated roles.  
While the group structure may have limited the development of domestic competition, it 
contributed to China’s competitive abilities in the global market. As noted by Lin and Milhaupt, the 
government encouraged business group formation to foster the growth of national champions as 
engines of development.96 Finally, the national endorsement of business group formation had an 
additional important goal, to aid the Party-state in “streamline[ing] control over the economy.”97 In 
theory, by reducing information and coordination costs, national-level vertically integrated groups are 
able to transmit and implement economic policy more easily, serving and amplifying central-level 
control.98   
Notwithstanding these aspirations, policy makers acknowledged several concerns from the 
very beginning of this strategy in the late 1980s. The Business Groups Opinions cautioned against 
potential conflicting interests not only between various levels of group member companies but also 
between different levels of the state. The Business Groups Opinions emphasized that groups should 
not operate in ways that would damage national interests.99 However, concerns have materialized at 
both levels: the group system furthered local-level networks, and it concentrated economic and 
administrative power in the hands of a few national champions and their leaders. At least from a 
domestic perspective, it seems that the endorsement of business group formation backfired. 
 
96 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 699 (“One highly distinctive characteristic of state capitalism in China is the central 
role of about 100 large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (guoyou qiye) controlled by organs of the national government in 
critical industries … These globally significant SOEs are China’s national champions.”). See id. at 714, n. 51 (noting that 
the creation of national champions was explicitly recognized as a goal of the central government in 1996 in the Outline 
Report on the Ninth Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social Development and the Perspective and Goals of 
2010. See Guanyu Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan “Jiu Wu” Jihua He 2010 Nian Yuanjing Mubiao Gangyao Ji Guanyu 
“Gang Yao” Baogao De Jueyi (关于国民经济和 社会发展“九五”计划和 2010 年远景目标纲要及关于《纲要》报
告的决议) [Outline Report on the Ninth Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social Development and the 
Perspective and Goals of 2010) (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 17, 1996). See also Lin & Milhaupt, supra 
note 31, at 712 (noting that the encouragement of business group formation is a common strategy in many other countries, 
and is often used to fill institutional voids, and reduce transaction costs of administrating economic policy). 
97 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 714. 
98 There are, however, several articles that suggest the opposite view. See Joseph P. H. Fan et al., Institutions and Organizational 
Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids, 29 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1217 (2013) (arguing that local government 
organizational pyramids are designed to minimize political costs of state interference, further suggesting that this was 
implemented by local governments in an effort to assign them more credibility to nonintervention vis a vis investors); Kun 
Su et al., Pyramidal Structure, Risk‐Taking and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Local SOEs, 26 ECON. TRANSITION 401 (2018) 
(viewing business group formation as a form of decentralization that was aimed to reduce political influence on firms by 
increasing intervention cost along the layers of the pyramid); Min Zhang et al., Pyramidal Structure, Political Intervention and 
Firms' Tax Burden: Evidence from China's Local SOEs, 36 J. CORP. FIN. 15 (2016) (looking at the influence of state-pyramids 
on corporate tax burden, finding that state-pyramidal layers are significantly and negatively associated with effective tax 
rates, which the authors argue indicates that group pyramids formed to protect local state-owned enterprises from political 
intervention). It should be noted that Lin and Milhaupt focused on national level groups under SASAC, thus the views on 
the use of business groupism might not be in contradiction. Either way, scholars would probably agree that at the local 
level, the endorsement of business groups had increased decentralization and added to conflicting interests. 
99 Business Groups Opinions, supra note 86, art. 13. 




During the first few years of the scheme, the national-level endorsement of business groups 
boosted empire-building by the localities and widened the divide between central-level and local-level 
economic power. Local governments had used the opportunity to create pyramid-layered business 
groups that dissociated them from central government control. 100  This form of economic 
disentanglement from central control through local-group organization is an aspect of the shifts in 
China’s political economy that carries implications today.101 Also, with respect to national-level groups, 
since many of the most important national champion groups were converted from previous industrial 
ministries, there was a strong political pressure to maintain their rank within the bureaucratic 
hierarchy.102 As a result, these business groups and the general managers of many of their corporatized 
SOEs still enjoy a status equivalent to that of a minister or vice minister in the state’s hierarchical 
bureaucracy. This makes supervision over them by state administrative bodies charged with tensions 
and battles over authority.  
In sum, the policy endorsement of business group formation has been a significant contributor 
to China’s rising economic power, particularly in the international front. However, it has also amplified 
the conflicts of interest between the various authorities of the state, both horizontally and vertically. 
Furthermore, business group formation also intensified conflicts at the group level itself. Having to 
consider group-level implications, the core company and its controlling state-owner became further 
alienated from the shareholders’ interests in each firm within the group.103  
 
B. The Formation of Capital Markets (in their narrow sense) 
 
Capital market institutions operate to reduce the costs of raising external finance. This is 
achieved primarily by facilitating transactions in a large number of securities simultaneously, making 
information easily available to potential and existing investors, and reducing the costs of monitoring. 
Importantly, capital markets promote efficiency by allocating capital to the most deserving firms. 
Capital markets in China, however, evolved primarily to serve other functions. The following review 
examines how capital markets, in their technical, narrow sense, formed in China, focusing on the 
primary mechanisms through which stocks were issued and traded and the institutions that were 
created to govern them. 
 
100 See sources in supra note 98 (positing that this was also a form for the local governments to attract investors by 
committing through the pyramid structure to less government interference). 
101  In previous work, I suggested how such economic disentanglement from the central Party-state may eventually 
empower public investors through a budding form of a market for corporate control. See Tamar Groswald Ozery, Minority 
Public Shareholders in China's Concentrated Capital Markets—A New Paradigm, 30 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 45-48 (2016). 
102 Brødsgaard, supra note 58, at 612. 
103 See discussion infra Chapter 2. 




Like the creation of corporations, capital market activity in China was initiated informally on 
an experimental basis, which was later broadened by provisional national schemes before finally being 
formalized. Also similar to the making of the corporate form, the justification for establishing formal 
nation-wide capital markets lay primarily in their function as a financing tool for SOEs.104 While the 
stock markets were formally active since 1990, in the second half of that decade, the state started to 
support the system of public share issuance explicitly when searching for alternatives to bank lending. 
Commentators attribute this to the pressing need to rescue the troubled state sector, which became 
deeply indebted at that time.105  This shaped stock market development ever since as a platform to 
finance the restructuring of SOEs, rather than as a marketplace that promotes efficient allocation of 
capital. The implications extend to the present, as clearly seen through frequent Party-state measures 
in keeping stock prices up in order to sustain the value of corporatized SOEs. As with the emergence 
of the public firm, the levers of the capital markets have been moved by shifts in power dynamics as 
central Party-state institutions made efforts to regain full control over the emerging market. 
 
1.   Share-Offering Platforms 
 
The first share offerings in Chinese entities after the initiation of market reform were tested 
offshore on the Hong Kong exchange or conducted informally by local institutions. This occurred 
during the second half of the 1980s. The initiators were local financial institutions, mainly local bank 
branches, special economic zones, securities companies, and local OTC trading centers.106  The State 
Council approved the establishment of formal securities exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen on June 
2, 1990. The new Shanghai Stock Exchange opened on December 19, 1990 and was followed by the 
opening of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in July 1991.  Even after the two stock exchanges began to 
operate, informal local trading continued in major cities.107 The management of the two formal stock 
exchanges remained in the hands of their respective local governments through “municipal securities 
commissions” in cooperation with the local branches of the People’s Bank of China. Each stock 
exchange was therefore effectively an administrative unit, integrated into the operation of its local 
government. Local officials from the various municipal bureaus were involved in all aspects of the 
stock exchange’s operations—from the selection of which enterprises would be corporatized, through 
the approval of share issuance, to the listing process itself.108 Moreover, given the absence of unified 
guidance on how to operate the exchanges, the stock exchanges largely operated on a trial-and-error 
basis. This practice, naturally, allowed much room for local discretion and protectionism. 
 
104 STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA'S STOCKMARKET: A GUIDE TO ITS PROGRESS, PLAYERS AND PROSPECTS 20-25 (2003). 
105 Clarke, supra note 3, at 151-152.  
106  For a detailed account on local experimentation with share offerings, see WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 38. 
107  Id. at 27. 
108 Id. at 29-30. 




In 1992–1993, along with the enactment of a law for corporations, the central Party-state 
started to centralize its control over the two stock exchanges. These efforts included consolidating the 
regulatory and supervisory authority over the operation or the exchanges, as well as gaining control 
over the issuance process itself. This latter effort was intended through the design of a quota system, 
addressed below. The main motive, as described by Walter and Howie, was the fear from losing 
control over the development process to local officials, who promoted issuances in selected 
corporations and consequently accumulated substantial economic and administrative power through 
the emerging capital markets. The authors describe a “share fever” in both exchanges and a specific 
incident of over-subscription in Shenzhen, which created great disappointment among potential 
investors and provoked public riots against local protectionism. This led to the establishment of two 
national securities market regulators, the State Council Securities Commission and China’s Securities 
Supervision and Management Committee.109 The State Council subsequently issued a provisional “law” 
on securities, which set temporary mechanisms for share listing.110 This temporary yet important 
document set the procedures for share issuance, trading, and disclosure by CLSs, prohibited insider 
trading practices, and established civil and criminal liability for securities violations for the first time. 
Honing their new national authority, the security regulators issued a complementary set of temporary 
rules, 111  which prohibited securities fraud and specifically addressed insider trading and other 
misconduct in the budding stock markets.112   
The efforts to consolidate authority over the securities market culminated with the adoption 
of a national law for securities.113  Substantively, the 1998 Securities Law only supplemented the prior 
1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuance. Organizationally, however, it was extremely 
meaningful as it centralized the regulatory authority and control over the stock exchanges and over 
the development of the securities markets more broadly, under the authority of one ministry-level 
 
109 Both institutions were founded in October 1992 and consolidated under China Securities and Regulatory Commission 
(the CSRC) following the enactment of the Securities Law in 1998. See infra note 113. 
110 Gupiao Faxing Yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulation on the Administration of Issuance and Trading 
of Stocks] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 22, 1993) [hereinafter The Provisional Regulations on Share Issuance]. 
111 Interim Procedures on the Management of Stock Exchanges (promulgated by the Securities Comm’n of the St. Council, 
July 7, 1993), art. 4, available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100050789.shtml  (“Stock exchanges are 
subject to the management of the local people's governments and the supervision and control by the China Securities 
Supervision and Control Committee” [a body under the Securities Commission of the State Council (SCSC) which 
preceded the CSRC.]); Jinzhi Zhengquan Qizha Xingwei Banfa (禁止证券欺诈行为暂行办法) [Provisional Measures 
for the Prohibition of Securities Fraud] (approved by the St. Council, Aug. 15, 1993, promulgated by the SCSC, Sept. 2, 
1993) [hereinafter The 1993 CSRC Provisional Measures Against Fraud], available at 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/434690.htm. 
112 HUI HUANG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS: INSIDER TRADING LAW IN CHINA (2006). 
113 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengchuan Fa [Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
the 6th Meeting of the Standing Comm. of the 9th Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, amended Oct. 27, 2005, and Aug. 
31, 2014, effective Aug. 31, 2014), available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=233280&lib=law [hereinafter 1998 
Securities Law]. 




state agency—the China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC).114  The CSRC has been 
exclusively responsible for China’s securities regulation ever since. 
 
2.   The Quota System   
 
Another important effort to reconsolidate central state control over the stock market took the 
form of a quota system, which was officially in place from 1993 until 2000. This effort backfired, 
however, and only amplified regional powers. 
The quota system was a national effort to administer the process of share issuance and control 
its scope. It was intended to ensure that the newly available external finance would be funneled to 
selected state-owned companies, while controlling supply and thereby keeping prices of newly offered 
shares high. 115  Technically, this administrative governance mechanism was based on a defined 
preapproved national pool of shares to be issued. The size of the national pool was determined 
annually by the central government through the People’s Bank of China. Provincial governments (in 
the case of local firms) or central ministries (in the case of firms owned by a central ministry) then 
negotiated with their respective branch of the securities regulator on their allocated quota. Similarly, 
they bargained about which firm they would eventually recommend to the center for share issuance. 
After reaching an agreement, a request was submitted to the central securities regulator, which decided 
how to allocate the national pool between the regions and ministries. The central authority also 
decided which of the recommended companies would then enter a formal review process toward their 
initial public offerings. Each such company had to go through an individual approval process, during 
which information about the company was considered as well as its rule-obedience record.116 In their 
account of the quota system, Pistor and Xu point out that the central authority approved the firms 
recommended to it in most cases. This, they suggest, indicates that from the outset, the real power 
was in the hands of the local governments and the ministries in selecting the firms to begin with.117  
As a side note, while the term quota system refers only to the mechanism for the selection of 
IPO issuers, the pricing of IPOs also went through similar transitional administrative governance 
methods. Initially, the relevant government level directly determined the price for an IPO issuance. 
Toward 1995, pricing started to be based on consultation and bidding between the issuing company, 
 
114 (Robin) Hui Huang, The Regulation of Insider Trading in China: A Critical Review and Proposals for Reform, 17 AUSTL. J. CORP. 
L. 281, 284 (2005). 
115 See generally Donald Clarke, The Role of Non-Legal Institutions in Chinese Corporate Governance, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2009). 
116 For a detailed account, see Katherina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from 
China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 184 (2005).  
117 Id. at 197-198. 




its underwriters, and the relevant local authority. It was only toward 2005 that the price for IPO 
issuance started to rely on open market inquiry and evaluation.118 
As for quality control, in the absence of market price mechanisms to evaluate companies, the 
quota system was also intended to provide quality-guided administrative selection. This was designed 
by including incentives at both regional and company levels that were supposed to ensure an effective 
evaluation of companies prior to their selection. Regions whose selected companies performed well 
after their shares were issued were awarded larger future quotas.  Companies that performed badly 
were subject to potential delisting, which could reduce the region’s future quota. The purpose was to 
incentivize firms and local government officials to pass their recommendations to the center based on 
collected and verified information, and thereby to identify “more [rather] than less viable firms” as the 
potential issuers.119  
Commentators note several positive results of this administrative system, concluding that it 
was an important transitional mechanism that facilitated share-issuances in the absence of advanced 
capital market mechanisms. The quota system induced some level of information exchange and 
disclosure in the newly emerging capital market, a valuable factor in the absence of mandatory 
information disclosure standards and enforcement. Intense bargaining between the center and local 
governments encouraged interregional competition. Furthermore, it also introduced capital market 
growth measures as a basis for administrative decision making for future quotas, which presumably 
incentivized local officials to keep a watchful eye on firms in their region.  
At the same time, however, the implementation of the selection process within the quota 
system quickly became crooked. Increasingly motivated by personal considerations and selection 
biases, the system intensified local protectionism. The incentives and accountability methods 
described above backfired. Since local officials personally benefited from the image of better-
performing companies, they had little incentive to press for reliable disclosure. Instead, they were 
prone to turn a blind eye to inaccurate reports or even actively assist firms in committing fraud.120 
Moreover, the system did not address matters of information disclosure in the post-IPO stage. It 
became clear that this transitional mechanism should end and be replaced by a formal approval process 
for IPOs with more transparent, impartial listing standards and disclosure rules for secondary trade. 
In that sense, the enactment of the 1998 Securities Law was the beginning of a turn from a rather 
arbitrary administrative system of share issuances to a more centralized and formal governance. In 
 
118 On the various transitional methods for IPO price determination, see Chen Su & Jing Yu, Market-Oriented Reform of 
China’s IPO System and Information Disclosure Regulation, in THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET VOLUME I: A RETROSPECT AND 
ANALYSIS FROM 2002 39 (Cheng Siwei & Ziran Li eds., 2014).  
119 Pistor & Xu, supra note 116. 
120 Id. at 199-200. 




2001, the CSRC issued new measures for the administration of IPOs, which formally ended the quota 
system.121 
 
     * * * 
This review reveals the process through which public firms emerged in China, including the use 
of transitional mechanisms that had a meaningful influence on how capital markets sprouted. Absent 
any other institutional framework, public firms developed through a process of local experimentation 
followed by national administered expansion that was guided by political necessities. Political economy, 
then, rather than economies of scale or technological progress, motivated the creation of the public 
corporation. Then, when formal national schemes kicked in, they were likewise designed primarily 
with political functions— the need to reconsolidate economic and administrative control by the 
central Party-state and to finance China’s struggling state sector. The rise of the public firm and the 
formation of capital markets therefore reflect the limited yet marginally increasing role of law in the 
early stages of China’s capital market development and the presence of political determinants.
 
121  Measures for the Administration of New Share Issuance by Listed Companies (promulgated by the China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n, Feb. 25, 2001), available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/mftaotlcins697/ (partial 
English translation). Note, however, that the actual implementation of the Quota System persisted until 2003. 




CHAPTER 2: CHINESE LISTED FIRMS AND THE PUBLIC SHAREHOLDER “CLASS”—A 
STRUCTURED PREDICAMENT 
 
A “political farce under the pretext of law”?122 
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, July 2016 
 
Political economy was a major driving force at the dawn of the public corporation in China, 
as shown in Chapter 1. Transitional, informal, and often locally-initiated government experiments – 
rather than the law – directed firms and capital market activity. 
Yet the limited role for legal institutions at this stage might also be explained as reflecting the 
early stage of market development. Many countries walked a similar path, in which they were able to 
initiate a capital market where firms raised capital from investors even in the absence of a supporting 
legal system by using functional substitutions. Entrepreneurs and investors in emerging markets seem 
to be less deterred than expected by low-quality legal institutions.123 Even in the most advanced 
markets, some scholars argue, the law followed rather than led capital market development, which was 
instead instigated by bottom-up resourcefulness.124 
Comparative experience from transitional economies also reflects that during early stages of 
economic transition, the state may be particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking behavior. Unregulated 
areas and nascent financial markets enable state capture more freely, allowing more opportunities for 
officials and their affiliates to capture the state for private benefit. 125  Alternative substitutions, 
especially informal ones, are often ambiguous and arbitrary and thus cannot fully avoid the infirmities 
that are created during the early stages of transition. Indeed, the trajectories of developing and 
 
122  Hannah Beech, China Slams the South China Sea Decision as a ‘Political Farce, TIME (July 13, 2016), 
http://time.com/4404084/reaction-south-china-sea-ruling/ (quoting China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in response to 
the final award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the South China Sea case). 
For the tribunal’s award, see Tribunal Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, South China Sea (Phil. v. Chin.), P.C.A. 
Case No. 2013-19, 19-28 (Jul. 12, 2016). See also Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case View, 
https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7, accessed June 11, 2017. 
123 Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 282-290 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). See also 
Mariana Pargendler et al., In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms, 46 CORNELL INT'L 
L.J. 569 (2013). 
124 See Coffee, supra note 21 (arguing for private ordering by entrepreneurs and the stock exchanges in the United States 
prior to regulatory action); Mahoney, supra note 21 (for preempting private regulatory action by the NYSE); Yoshiro Miwa 
& Mark J. Ramseyer, The Value of Prominent Directors: Corporate Governance and Bank Access in Transitional Japan, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 273 (2002) (Firms in early twentieth century Japan created corporate governance arrangements by private 
ordering—they hired prominent industrialists to their board. This functioned as a quality signal to the market in the absence 
of legal arrangements.).  
125 Black et al., supra note 30; Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property 
Rights: The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Paper No. 11772, 
2005). 




transitional economies have caused many observers to believe that local substitutions can only go so 
far.126 The status of the financial system is often treated as a proxy for such a turning point. Robust 
capital markets, particularly, are said to require high-quality, reliable, and perhaps internationally 
familiar investor protection mechanisms and disclosure standards that only developed legal 
institutions seem to provide. 
Conceptually, this is also the point where development scholars meet corporate governance 
convergence proponents. In the corporate and capital market literature, globalization is said to push 
firms and markets into a competitive Darwinist mode, in which they either adjust or perish.127 The 
pressures of international competitive capital and product markets are thought to cause firms and 
markets to adapt their governance in pursuit of the most efficient corporate rules and structures. 
Absent such adaptation, suboptimal firms and markets will fall behind. In a competitive global market, 
therefore, convergence is viewed as an inevitable step for any growth-oriented economy.128 In the 
process of adaptation, corporate laws, practices, and structures will become more congruent, 
ultimately converging into one optimal model—mainly, that of Anglo-American (really American) 
corporate capitalism.129   
This convergence discourse now distinguishes between formal convergence and functional 
convergence.130 The dominant view predicts that functional convergence will occur first behind a 
formal curtain that persistently holds back legal change. 131 A process of bottom-up pressures breeding 
functional convergence will at a certain point bring a more formal reform. 132 
Both the development approaches and corporate governance theories thus hold that even 
where functional substitutions provided enough assurances for market economic activity to sprout, 
more conventional institutions of corporate governance should, and will, take their place at a certain 
 
126 See generally Ricardo Hausmann et. al, Growth Accelerations, 10 J. ECON. GROWTH 303 (2005). See also Kevin Davis & 
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J.  COMP. L., 895, n. 162 
(2008) (citing Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 
VA. L. REV. 1517, 1554-65 (2006) and the references therein). 
127 Coffee, supra note 21. 
128 The opposing view of consistent divergence is identified with path dependence theories. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & 
Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (proposing a theory 
of path-dependence that explains persistent divergence in corporate systems); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 
84 VA. L. REV., 1145 (1998) (suggesting that convergence, even when efficient, will be limited due to internal political 
economy). 
129 Representative for this view are Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (arguing that around the world corporate systems are 
converging toward a single, shareholder-oriented model).  
130 In my view, in this discourse, formal convergence has conceptually aligned with transplant strategy and no longer 
represents a slow gradual process of adaptation in (formal) laws. The perception of convergence as a gradual adaptation 
process is represented in the idea of functional convergence alone. 
131 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001) (formal 
variations and persistence will remain but will be overshadowed by functional convergence). Bebchuk and Roe elaborate 
potential reasons for this, such as path dependency, sunk costs and political rejection. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 128.  
132 John Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U.L. 
REV. 641 (1999); Coffee, supra note 21. 




point in the development process. Accordingly, the prevailing view regarding China too was, and still 
is, skeptical as to the country’s ability to sustain capital market growth without developing the 
institutions that are identified with corporate capitalism. 133 Some evidence on the passing efficacy of 
local-managerial incentive schemes as functional substitutes supports this view.134 
At first glance, China’s capital market development during the second stage of transition (the 
Modern Reform Era, 1992–2007) seems to follow this understanding. During the late years of this 
stage, corporate governance took a more structured, investor-oriented turn through regulatory action 
by central state authorities. China’s policy makers have formally embraced many of the institutions 
traditionally identified with corporate capitalism. This turn was not abrupt, but rather evolutionary. 
The growing market and the various political needs and motivations co-evolved along with the rising 
legal system, which together determined how firms and the capital market would develop.  
 
I. A TURN TOWARD LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS—CONVERGENCE WITH CORPORATE 
CAPITALISM 
 
As seen earlier, the opportunities and interests of a new variety of economic actors within the 
Party-state system started shifting when market economic activity was enabled. This echoed back into 
the system, as policy-makers—troubled by the shifts in internal political-economy—turned to legal 
construction to achieve a reconsolidation of power. By the early 2000s, an increasing body of national-
level economic laws and regulations gradually replaced the probationary mechanisms used earlier.135 
Central-state agencies and institutions were created and given regulatory and supervision authority 
over various aspects of the financial market.136 This shift in the use of the legal system to govern firms 
and the capital markets exemplifies a more general proclaimed turn toward law during the 15th Central 
 
133 See generally IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH (Dani Rodrik ed., 2003). 
With respect to China specifically, see ASIFMA, CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS: NAVIGATING THE ROAD AHEAD (2017), 
available at https://www.asifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/china-capital-markets-final-english-version.pdf; 
Minxin Pei, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY (2006); Yingi Qian, How 
Reform Worked in China, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 297 (Dani Rodrik 
ed., 2003); Thomas G. Rawski, Will Investment Behavior Constrain China’s Growth?, 13 CHINA ECON. REV. 370 (2002). 
134 Existing evidence suggests that local managerial incentives functioned relatively well during early stages, when they had 
a positive effect on profitability, total factor productivity, and return on equity. However, with increasing liberalization 
during the 1990s, managerial incentives seem to have lost their functional contribution to efficiency. See Clarke et al., supra 
note 44, at 416. 
135 It should be noted, however, that an “experimentation first” strategy is still the approach used to introduce new 
economic measures into the market. 
136 A few examples include the CSRC (founded 1998), SASAC (founded 2003), China’s Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC, founded 2003), and the China National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, founded 2003). 




Party Congress, 137 in which the CCP declared a move toward a Chinese-type “rule of law.”138 This was 
also when the Central Party Congress first used the term “corporate governance” as part of its 
economic reform planning.139 
In the following years, problems within the troubled state sector were accompanied by new 
external and domestic pressures to adopt national corporate governance standards. In 2001, a wave 
of worldwide corporate scandals did not skip China. A number of large Chinese corporations were 
involved in accounting fraud and market manipulation, causing losses to many investors and also 
reflecting badly on China’s state asset management system.140 As one commentator noted: “These 
events provided the needed crash for legal change. Disappointed investors started to demonstrate in 
front of the CSRC building.”141 Together with the effect of the Asian financial crisis and the global 
competition that China started facing following its 2001 WTO accession, these events led to extensive 
discussions about corporate governance and induced the formal embrace of many Western corporate 
governance institutions into the market.142 
The CSRC took a lead role in this turn. As part of the efforts at the time to consolidate 
economic and administrative authority, the CSRC was given the administrative and political latitude 
 
137 On the intensification of legal construction efforts during that time, see William P. Alford, A Second Great Wall? China's 
Post-Cultural Revolution Project of Legal Construction, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 193 (1999). See generally Perry Keller, Sources of 
Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (1994). 
138  See Report to the 15th Party Congress (delivered by President Jiang Zemin, Sept. 12, 1997), Ch. VI (Reforming the 
Political Structure and Strengthening Democracy and the Legal System) [hereinafter Report to the 15 th Party Congress], 
available at http://academics.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/308S/Readings/jzm15CCP.htm (“Govern[ing] the country 
according to law and making it a socialist country ruled by law.”). 
139 See JANE FU, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 5 n.55 (2010) (referring to the 
CPC’s Central Committee Resolution on Major Issues Regarding SOEs Reform and Development in the “Announcement of 
the fourth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth CCP National Congress”). 
140 See Y. L. DUAN, LUNDA GUDONG GUQUAN LANYONG JI SHILI [ABUSING MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER CONTROL: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE] (2001) (summarizing various fraud cases, including the Yorkpoint Science & Technology stock 
scheme, the fall of Daqing Lianyi, Dong Fang Electronics, PT Hong Guang, Monkey King A, Lantian shares, Yi'an 
Technology, Yin Guangxia, and Zhengzhou Baiwen).  
141 Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 451, 464 (2003). 
142 This is not to say that the customary ideas and elements that are generally packaged within the “corporate governance” 
discourse were not considered in China before corporate governance formally penetrated the political and legal 
consciousness. To the contrary, some ideas, even some that are conventionally seen as “Anglo-American” in nature (such 
as shareholder-centrism and fiduciary duties), were in fact considered even before the establishment of the 1993 Company 
Law and long before their formal adoption in the 2005 Company Law. Interestingly, the penetration of these ideas, like 
many market developments in China, also happened on experimental levels or by institutions that are not responsible for 
primary law making. See, e.g., Nicholas C. Howson, The Doctrine That Dared Not Speak Its Name: Anglo-American Fiduciary 
Duties in China’s 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior Convergence, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 193 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008) (describing how Anglo-American corporate fiduciary 
duties were first introduced in China in the early 1990s to serve the limited number of PRC issuers accessing foreign capital 
markets, first by an administrative letter to the Hong Kong Exchange, and later by special supplementing provisions that 
were not included in the Company law itself). See also Nicholas C. Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts, 
1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 EAST ASIA L. REV. 303 (2010) [hereinafter Howson, 
Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts] (finding judicial implementation of doctrines resembling derivative suits, veil-
piercing, and fiduciary duties by the Shanghai People’s Courts before explicit authority was granted to courts in these 
matters, and even before such doctrines had a formal legal basis).  




to form national-level corporate governance schemes.143 One of its first steps in this direction was its 
2001 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies. The Code was intended to improve the 
“modern enterprise system,” standardize behavioral rules for directors, supervisors, and senior 
managers, and clarify shareholders rights. The Code was largely based on the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance. Among its provisions, it stipulated disclosure and voting standards for related-
party transactions, specified duties that controlling shareholder owe to the company and other 
shareholders, required the disclosure of controlling shareholders’ interests (including the ultimate 
controller), and emphasized the independent operation of the company from its controlling 
shareholders, including the introduction of a cumulative voting system for the election of directors 
and an independent directors scheme.144 Still, like many other corporate governance codes around the 
world, the Code presented guiding principles that were mostly broad and vague with no accountability 
measures for violators. It described best practices from which firms were left to choose.145  
The highest government organs—the NPC and the State Council—also issued several 
proclamations and legal amendments, which clearly reflected the formal acceptance of a law and 
finance-style approach to corporate governance.146 In 2005, the 1993 PRC Company Law was revised 
 
143  See Nicholas C. Howson, “Quack Corporate Governance” As Traditional Chinese Medicine: The Securities Regulation 
Cannibalization of China’s Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, 37 SEATTLE U.L. 
REV. 667 (2014). For discussion on public enforcement and regulatory action by the CSRC, see also infra pp. 94-97. 
144 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n 
and the State Economic and Trade Comm’n, Jan. 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.html.  
145 For example, the first chapter of the code outlines shareholders’ rights with neither explanations of these rights, nor of 
what would be a fair treatment of these rights and how a violation would be handled. Another example is the requirement 
of independent directors in listed companies. Article 49 requires companies to establish an independent director system 
in accordance with other relevant rules. While article 52 does specify further that listed firms’ audit and compensation 
committee should include a majority of independent directors, they are not granted any special voting powers. Id. arts. 49, 
52. 
146 For instance, a relevant State Council Opinion states: 
The quality of listed companies must be upgraded. The quality of listed companies is the source of value 
for securities market investment…We should improve the structure of corporate governance of listed 
companies, and by following the requirements of the modern corporate system, form a check and 
balance mechanism among the power organ, the decision-making organ, the supervisory organ and 
corporate managers… We should regulate the acts of controlling shareholders and prosecute those 
committing acts to damage the interests of listed companies or those of small and medium-sized 
shareholders… 
Guanyu Tuijin Zibenshichang Gaigekaifang he Wendingfazhan de Ruoganyijian (关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定
发展的若干意见) [Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of 
Capital Markets] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 31, 2004), available at 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/sootscoptroasgocm970/. See also Guanyuzuohao Guancheshishi Xiudinghou 
de Gongsifahe Zhengquanfa Youguangongzuo de Tongzhi (关于做好贯彻实施修订后的公司法和证券法有关工作
的通知) [State Council Notice on Good Implementation of the Revised Corporate and Securities Law] (promulgated by 
the St. Council, Dec. 23, 2005), available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/ content_212077.htm (the 
Opinion emphasizes to various levels of the government the need to implement the revised Company and Securities laws, 
which established mechanisms for the protections of corporate constituents, in order to promote capital market 
development). Moreover, Chapter IV of China’s 2008 White Paper on promotion of the “rule of law” deals specifically 
with “Legal Systems Regulating the Order of Market Economy,” which points to the need for “safeguarding the lawful 




wholesale,147 evidencing a shareholder empowering approach through more robust governance rights. 
Formally, the revised statutes created various mechanisms for the protection of shareholders’ rights 
and interests, and strengthened other protections. These included enacting explicit fiduciary duties of 
corporate directors, supervisory board members, and officers; requiring nomination of independent 
directors in listed companies; enabling a derivative lawsuit for shareholders; and providing certain buy-
back guarantees for shareholders.148 Perhaps most striking, the 2005 Company Law also adopted 
something like fiduciary duties for controlling shareholders toward the company and other 
shareholders.149 At the same time, the Securities Law and the PRC Criminal Law were revised as well, 
and together the laws introduced much-needed recourse for injured shareholders as well as criminal 
liability based on securities law claims.150  This framework provided the tailwind for the CSRC to take 
a stronger approach to investor protection through several administrative regulations, which the 
commission issued in the following years.151  
These developments might be mistaken for convergence with Western corporate capitalism. 
If the governance of Chinese firms and the functioning of the capital market indeed converged with 
corporate capitalism’s prescribed recipes for investor protections and capital market growth, then 
China’s capital market growth and the domestic and global success of its firms could be explained on 
the basis of this belated convergence. This conclusion, based on facially similar investor-protecting 
laws and institutions, would be a mistake. An examination of one regulatory action will illustrate how 
seemingly convergent norms are divergent in both function and intent. 
 
 
rights and interests of corporate investors and stakeholders.” Zhongguo de Fazhi Jianshe (中国的法治建设) [China’s 
Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law] (promulgated by the Information Office of the St. Council, Feb. 
28, 2008), available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/ node_7041733.htm. 
147 The prior 1993 Company Law was revised at the 18th meeting of the 10th National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China on October 27, 2005 and was last amended December 28, 2013. Gongsifa (公司法) [Company Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, rev’d Oct. 27, 2005, last amended Oct. 26, 
2018, effective Oct. 26, 2018) [hereinafter “the Company Law” or “2005 Company Law”], available at 
https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/aec0c211a78989e9bdfb.html?keyword=company%20law . The 1998 Securities Law 
was amended at the same time. See supra note 113. 
148 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 22, 122, 142, 147-150, 151, 152.  
149 Id. arts. 20, 21. 
150 Gonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa Xiuzheng An (liu) (中华人民共和国刑法修正案（六）) [6th Amendments to 
the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., June 29, 
2006) [hereinafter Amendments to the Criminal Law], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-
01/02/content_1388005.htm. The amended provisions relevant here are amendments to articles 161, 162, 163, 169, 182 
that set criminal liability in cases of (respectively) false reporting, and non-disclosure that leads to “serious damages to the 
interests of shareholders or any other person”; concealing or disposing of company property “so that serious damages are 
caused to the interests of the creditors or any other persons”; and the use of corporate position for personal gain, including 
accepting bribes and commissions in various forms (separate standard and procedure for criminal liability was set for 
public servants in state owned corporations); violation of  fiduciary duties by directors, supervisors, or senior managers of 
a listed company, or by a controlling shareholder or actual controller (as well as when the controller instigated other 
corporate officers to such violation) that have caused “serious loss to the interests of the company”; and manipulation of 
the securities or futures market. 
151 For a partial list, see infra pp. 94-97. For a fuller account, see Howson, supra note 143, at 698, 701-707.  




Shareholder Empowering Regulatory Action 
 
  The 2005 Company Law defines the shareholders’ assembly as the company’s main authority 
with an extensive list of powers.152 It goes beyond the mere protection of basic shareholder rights by 
enabling direct shareholders’ governance participation through the shareholders’ meeting, with the 
following powers:153 1) to determine the company’s operating guidelines and investment plans; 2) to 
elect and replace directors and supervisors (except for the representatives of the employees) and to 
decide their remuneration; 3) to approve reports of the board of directors; 4) to approve reports of 
the supervisory board; 5) to approve annual financial budget plans and accounts; 6) to approve plans 
for profit distribution and loss recovery; 7) to decide on changes to the registered capital; 8) to approve 
the issuance of corporate bonds; 9) to adopt resolutions on a corporate merger, division, change in 
the company’s form, dissolution or liquidation; 10) to amend the bylaws; and 11) to exercise other 
powers provided for in the bylaws. For certain fundamental transactions, a supermajority shareholder 
approval is required.154 
  A review of the law further shows that the powers conferred on the shareholders’ assembly 
even go much beyond these enumerated authorities. A resolution by the shareholders’ general meeting 
is also required in other situations that are mentioned throughout the law. A shareholders’ approval is 
required, for example, to execute the limited circumstances in which the company can purchase its 
own shares.155 Their approval is required for the company to guarantee the debt of a shareholder or 
actual-controller. Other “important matters” might also require a decision by the shareholders (e.g., 
“to transfer or accept any significant assets”).156 Moreover, even a decision on the issuance of new 
shares is not reserved to the board and can be decided by the general meeting.157  
 
152 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 37, 98, 99. This appeared even in the 1993 Company Law: article 37 for LLCs 
and article 102 for CLSs. See 1993 Company Law, supra note 66, arts. 37, 102.  
153 See 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 37(7)-(10). These rules also apply to listed companies. Id. art. 99. These 
articles also enable written consent in lieu of convening an actual shareholders’ meeting, reducing the costs of shareholders’ 
participation. 
154 The general rule for a shareholder resolution is majority vote. Id. art. 103. Yet, some business decisions require approval 
by two-thirds of the voting rights of the shareholders present: bylaw amendments, changes in the registered capital of the 
company, resolutions concerning merger, split-up, dissolution, or change of the company form; as well as a decision to 
purchase or sell any important asset or to provide guarantees that exceed thirty percent of the company's total assets within 
a year. Id. arts. 103, 121. Article 16, the only article in the law that addresses directly the concern about abusive related 
party transactions, requires the approval of the majority of disinterested shareholders for guarantees given by the company to 
its controlling shareholder. Id. art. 16. 
155 Note the circumstances requiring the shareholders’ assembly approval were narrowed down in the recent amendment 
by shifting approval in some of the circumstances to the board. Compare the 2005 Company Law before and after its 2018 
amendment. Id. art. 142. 
156 Id. art. 104. See also id. art. 124 (requiring a shareholders’ meeting in situations where the number of disinterested board 
members are insufficient). Interestingly, the law even states the possible involvement of the shareholders’ meeting in the 
hiring and dismissal of the company’s accounting firm. Id. art. 169. The shareholders’ meeting has the ability to demand 
the presence of a director, supervisor, and senior manager at its meeting, and such office holders have a duty to answer 
shareholders’ inquiries presented there. Id. art. 150.  
157 Id. art. 133. 




  Individual shareholders are given an expansive right to information and document 
inspection,158 as well as individual standing rights to approach the People’s courts on procedural or 
substantive grounds.159 Additionally, the 2005 PRC Company Law allows a group of shareholders with 
a ten percent or more equity interest in the firm to request a special shareholders’ meeting and enables 
shareholders holding at least three percent of the firm’s equity to submit shareholder proposals to the 
board.160  
  It clearly appears as though China’s policy makers had opted for an empowering, shareholder-
oriented corporate governance. The prescribed rights reflect an invitation for hands-on engagement 
in corporate decision making that seems far beyond the powers conferred on shareholders in other 
systems, even those in U.S. and U.K. corporate laws—the origins of shareholder-primacy notions.161 
Judged solely based on the provisions above, contemporary China offers one of the most robust 
shareholder-empowering corporate statutes in the world. 
  In practice, however, this facially shareholder-empowering regulatory framework does little to 
empower public shareholders or restrict the behavior of corporate control parties against them. The 
formal participation rights granted under the Company Law apply generally to the “shareholder class” 
and do not operate to improve the position of non-controlling (thus real public or minority) public 
shareholders. While this arrangement may have worked in widely-held markets, in a concentrated 
market, true commitment to outside investors should have carried mandatory provisions, 162 
specifically tailored to minority public shareholders.163 The shareholder-empowering approach taken 
 
158 Id. art. 97. 
159 On procedural violation grounds, see id. art. 22. For alleged violation of a shareholder’s right for information, see id. art. 
33. For a form of appraisal related to specific circumstances in which the company buys back the shareholder’s shares, see 
id. art. 74. For derivative suits, see id. art. 151. For individual lawsuits against directors or managers, see id. art. 152. See also 
id. art. 183 (requesting a dissolution in court). 
160Id. arts. 101, 102. 
161 For example, in the United States, under the Model Business Corporation Act and Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL) all corporate powers are vested with the board of directors, and the corporation is managed under their broad 
discretion, which has been expanded by the courts. According to the DGCL and the corporate laws of many other states, 
directors are nominated by the existing board and shareholders only have the right to vote on such nominees at the annual 
meeting. Generally, for shareholders to propose their own nominees they need to initiate an expensive proxy contest. In 
addition, in staggered board firms, the ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause is limited. There are only 
a handful of matters that require shareholders’ approval: amendments to the corporate charter (as opposed to bylaws, 
which can be amended by the board of directors), and mergers, consolidation, or a sale of all or substantially all assets. 
Shareholders may convene a special shareholders’ meeting only if the company’s bylaw permits them to do so, and a 
shareholder proposal is generally nonbinding. See Delaware General Corporation Law, Del. Code tit. 8 § 101-398. See 
generally Model Bus. Corp. Act (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2002).  
162 For theoretical support for this approach, see Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets 
Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393 (2003) (arguing that corporate laws must incorporate some form of minority protection as a 
mandatory rule and examining various such forms in different jurisdictions). 
163 For examples of mandatory approaches in comparatively concentrated markets, see infra notes 280, 335-336 (discussing 
audit and compensation committees in Israel). On mandatory non-controlling shareholders board representation in Italy, 
see infra note 296. On compelling institutional shareholders’ vote on certain matters in Israel, see infra notes 255, 279.  
For general data on countries that adopted minority veto rights, see OECD, RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS AND 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/50089215.pdf. More generally on the 
use of disinterested shareholders’ consent as a regulatory device in a dispersed market (Australia), see Jennifer Hill, Visions 
and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 69–71 (2009). 




in China serves in actuality only to further the Party-state as the controlling shareholder. The 
controlling shareholder will continue to govern the firm absolutely in a myriad of ways. For example, 
absent mandatory cumulative voting on board elections, the controlling shareholder will be the one 
to nominate and elect the company’s directors, who in turn have singular power to appoint top 
management. The controlling shareholder’s appointed board members will set the agenda for 
shareholder meetings and thereby be able to hinder any shareholder proposals from a three percent 
shareholder technically authorized under the Company Law. Similarly, since voting is not required and 
the law does not call for recusal of a controlling shareholder(s) vote, the controlling shareholder alone 
will usually satisfy any mandated supermajority requirement for the approval of certain transactions.164 
This is especially likely since no quorum is required to convene a shareholders meeting, and only the 
votes of those attending the meeting are counted.  
  In addition, the admittedly more “enabling” approach taken in the revised Company Law165 
enables the parties to contract around the default rules. This means that the 2005 amendment enables 
the controlling shareholder to contract into an even more robust control. Given the almost 
nonexistent bargaining power of minority shareholders, which is intensified by the pyramidal holding 
structure prevalent for many PRC issuers, any “opt-in” governance arrangement that is favorable to 
minority shareholders will not be adopted. Thus, as observed elsewhere, “an interventionist state, 
concentrated ownership, and shareholder-friendly law may be mutually reinforcing, especially when 
the state holds large blocks of stock in its own right.”166  
  Furthermore, lest anyone think that whatever minority shareholder governance rights are on 
offer can or will be enforced (whether mandatory or contracted-into), other structural impediments—
grounded in China’s political economy—cast a large shadow of doubt as to the ability of public 
shareholders to secure these rights.167  
Finally, at a conceptual level, there is also divergence in the notions of shareholder primacy.  
In the Chinese context, shareholder primacy stands for completely different ideas than those of 
corporate capitalism.  With the 1993 Company Law, when state-owned firms populated the market, 
the emphasis was on the authority of the shareholders’ assembly as a collective, representing the 
interests of the public, rather than on the shareholders’ interests as individuals. Some elements in the 
 
164 For a list of matters that require supermajority consent, see supra note 154. A unique exception where the minority de-
facto is granted a negative veto is in article 16 of the 2005 Company Law, which requires the approval of a majority of 
disinterested shareholders for decisions to provide a guarantee to a shareholder of the company or to its actual controller. 
See 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 16.  
165 On the shift toward an enabling system in the 2005 Company Law amendment and the contrast with mandatory CSRC 
orientation, see Howson, supra note 143, at 698, 701–07. 
166 Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 55, 85 (Reinier H. Kraakman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009) (saying the 
same with respect to France). 
167 For a discussion on these institutional and structural predicaments, see infra Chapter 2, Section III.  




2005 Company Law still resonate with this approach.168 In particular, the preamble to the amended 
Company Law and Article 5 state the company’s obligation to social morality, mandate social 
responsibility, and point to the accountability of the company to the general public.169 These articles 
reflect a much-criticized view of the company law as still speaking largely to state-owned firms.170 
Some commentators even suggested that China’s shareholder primacy approach resembles its 
hierarchical political governance, in which the NPC is the source of authority for all lower governance 
levels.171 While this view is baffling as it overlooks the ultimate authority of the Party (in both the 
corporate and the governmental contexts), it certainly reflects the divergence from corporate 
capitalism notions. The consequences go beyond just theory. The divergence carries real implications 
for decision making and accountability. For instance, to whom are fiduciary duties owed?172   
Relatedly, the widely accepted association of shareholder-primacy with the notion of 
shareholder value (maximization of market share price) under corporate capitalism is not the norm in 
China.173 In the Chinese context, shareholder-primacy, through the shareholders’ assembly, instead 
reflects the primacy of the controlling shareholder’s goals and interests, whatever they are in a given 
situation.  
Despite the formal recognition of shareholders’ rights and the apparent borrowing of 
conventional corporate governance mechanisms, most of these institutions fail to perform their 
supposed functions. Investor protections remain weak in practice, and corporate governance has been 
deployed in ways that run counter to market efficiency. Notably, implementation is not hindered due 
to the lack of appropriate local adaptations, as may have been the case for other transplants around 
the world.174 Indeed, a number of commentators praise China’s corporate governance framework as 
the product of a well-thought out, decades-long, intellectual sifting and cherry-picking process.175 The 
 
168 Junhai Liu, Experience of Internationalization of Chinese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: How to Make the Hybrid of Civil 
Law and Common Law Work?, 107 EUR. BUS. L. REV 114 (2015) (interpreting the modern corporate law as meaning that 
“the power of the corporations shall be from the shareholders, for the shareholders and by the shareholders.”). 
169 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 5 (When conducting business operations, a company shall comply with the 
laws and administrative regulations, social morality, and business morality. It shall act in good faith, accept the supervision 
of the government and general public, and bear social responsibilities.).  
170 See generally Donald Clarke, Blowback: How China’s Efforts to Bring Private-Sector Standards into the Public Sector Backfired, in 
REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND 29 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2016). 
171 Liu, supra note 168, at 114. 
172 There are multiple options implied by the 2005 Company Law. Article 149 along with articles 148, 150, and 151 with 
the derivative suit therein, posit the option of fiduciary duties owed to the company. Article 151 suggests accountability 
to the shareholders’ assembly. Article 152, however, seems to be focused on the infringement of shareholders’ interests 
(as individuals), raising a private right of action against directors and senior managers. Finally, the preamble and article 5 
add the duties of the company, and by extension its representatives, to the general public. See 2005 Company Law, supra 
note 147, arts. 5, 148-152.   
173 Clarke, supra note 170, at 42 (“A special Chinese twist in the doctrine of shareholder primacy appears here, however: it 
is not the same thing as maximization of share value. If that is what the state shareholder wants, then there is no divergence. 
But if the state shareholder wants the SOE to pursue other goals, then the SOE may do so.”). 
174 Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, 1 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 
59 (2000); Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325 (2000). 
175 The adaptation to local conditions is reflected not only in the selection of various provisions from different legal systems, 
but also through some uniquely Chinese characteristics adopted in the 1993 Company Law and maintained throughout its 




mechanisms borrowed were not blindly-transplanted, but instead were carefully selected and tailored 
to the preexisting political infrastructure.   
In short, traditional corporate governance institutions in China are weak by design.  China’s 
own political economy trumped the new laws and corporate governance mechanisms, just as it had 
created and then trumped the preceding provisional local arrangements. This time around, the source 
within China’s political economy that is responsible for this conscious weakness can be found in the 
regime’s state-capitalism attributes. China’s state-capitalism ascended during this transitional stage and 
has trapped a growing crowed of public shareholders in what I call a “structured predicament.” As a 
result, instead of monitoring insiders and protecting investors, the existing framework gives corporate 
control-parties a license to expropriate with impunity.  
 
II. “CHINESE-STYLE” STATE CAPITALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC SHAREHOLDERS  
 
A. The State as an Ultimate Controller—Consequences for Public Investors 
 
As seen earlier, the Party-state advanced the organizational features of the public firm in 
China—a corporatized non-privatized legal entity embedded within a group structure—to increase 
value in SOEs and push back against rising local autonomy.  The result was the creation of pyramid 
holding groups, within which many of China’s listed SOEs currently reside and on top of which Party-
state organs preside as dominant, often-controlling, shareholders that operate through powerful 
human agents as corporate insiders. This organizational structure presents insurmountable monitoring 
challenges and abundant opportunities for the abuse of public shareholders, affecting both their 
governance and economic rights. Furthermore, this ownership structure perpetuates itself. It helps 
entrench controlling parties and supports state-capitalism, through which firms can be harnessed in 
pursuit of national and political goals, as well as for the personal interests of their control-parties 
(corporate insiders and agents assign to supervise on behalf of the state quo controlling shareholders). 
 
 
amendments. Examples include the “social-economic order” in the preamble and article 1 in both laws, the institution of 
legal representative, the dual board structure, and more. See Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First 
Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 273, 275 (1995) (on the idiosyncratic legal representative 
concept); Xinhe Cheng & Zhenghua Li, The Application of Comparative Law to Chinese Economic Legislation, 3 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 
150, 152 (1994). Some Chinese commentators see this cherry picking from different systems as a unique Chinese model. 
See, e.g., Wei-Wei Zhang, The Allure of the Chinese Model, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/01/opinion/01iht-edafrica.3357752.html. For a similar choice of words, see Suisheng 
Zhao, The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 419, 424 (2010) (“What 
makes the Chinese model unique is that the communist regime has safeguarded its own policy space as to when, where 
and how to adopt Western ideas.”). 
Some even track this model back to the Qing dynastic 1904 corporate law. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 168, at 112. 
But see Liufang Fang, China's Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 149, 260 (1995) (critiquing the 1993 
Company Law for lack of its “contextualization to the lay of the land”). 




1. Excess Opportunities for Self-Dealing by Agents 
 
By turning in the early 1990s to the modern corporate form with its separation between 
ownership and control, China’s policy makers sought to cure mushrooming self-dealing and asset 
stripping in SOEs. As commentators note, however, this was an ill-fitting importation of a problem 
rather than a solution: 176 “[Yet] calls for government-owned enterprises to be independent of 
government ‘interference’ are calls for nothing short of utter nonaccountability for management.”177 
The separation of ownership and control during corporatization imported the paradigm vertical 
agency problem into a system with an already complex range of idiosyncratic institutional monitoring 
challenges. 
Corporate theory suggests that when ownership is concentrated, the main beneficiary of any 
value increase in the firm is the controlling shareholder. With abundant inside information, controlling 
shareholders can also efficiently preempt market reactions by identifying managerial slack early and 
simply replacing badly performing managers. The controlling shareholder is therefore the corporate 
constituent that is most incentivized and best situated to monitor corporate insiders. Under state 
corporate control, however, no ultimate real principal exists at the top of the state’s holdings. This 
structural predicament became known as the “absentee principal” or the “absent owner” (suoyouzhe 
quewei).178 There is no real principal who would personally benefit from monitoring and thus no one 
with the incentive to monitor. This situation creates relative apathy toward corporate misconduct on 
the part of government officials, the representatives of the controlling-state shareholder. Consequently, 
firms in China became controlled by unmonitored powerful insiders (neibu ren kongzhi).179 Vast self-
dealing took place not only by the insiders themselves but also by the agents assigned by the state to 
supervise them.180 The modern corporate form, therefore, became conductive to corruption as well. 
The absence of a real ultimate principal with enough incentives to monitor on behalf of the 
state was presented as one of the primary reasons that led to the establishment of SASAC in 2003.181 
SASAC was designed to replace various state-asset management enterprises with a unified national, 
 
176 TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM 190 n.43 (2013). 
177 Clarke, supra note 50, at 498 (suggesting that a more appropriate reform would have been one that focuses on managers’ 
accountability to the state as a shareholder, rather than a reform that increased management autonomy). 
178 Id. at 499. 
179 See Hui (Robin) Huang & Juan Chen, Takeover Defenses and Its Regulation in China: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, 
(work in progress manuscript) (on file with author). 
180 See Clarke, supra note 71, at 148 (“a 2002 study of corporate governance by the CSRC and the SETC revealed, on the 
basis of self-reporting alone, that forty percent of listed companies engaged in related-party transactions with their top ten 
shareholders.”). See also Nicholas C. Howson & Donald Clarke, Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in 
the People’s Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243, 
248, 254-257 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) (“ 'Tunneling' by individual insiders and controlling shareholders, both 
state and non-state, by means of related-party transactions is notorious; in 2002 tunneling by controlling shareholders was 
estimated at 96.7 billion yuan, equivalent to the total amount of money raised in stock markets in the same year.”). 
181  See Main Functions, SASAC, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170831013424/http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408028/n1408521/index.html (last visited 
May 24, 2019).   




ministry-level agency.182 It was assigned to shoulder the State Council’s role as a controlling corporate 
shareholder by exercising shareholder governance rights.183 The assigned governance rights are at least 
in principle more extensive than those granted to shareholders by the Company Law.184 In their 
account of SASAC’s governance rights, Lin and Milhaupt note that the board of directors, the standard 
corporate governing body, seems entirely missing in some of the firms controlled by SASAC.185 
Additionally, SASAC was formally granted vast authority to restructure, regulate, and supervise the 
companies under its control. These combined powers arguably gave the agency strong influence on 
the reorganization of entire industries.186  
Despite its extensive governance rights assigned in the SOE Assets Law,187 SASAC faces 
strong resistance from various interested parties. SASAC shares its administrative powers with other 
national-level ministries with a say in relevant industries.188 It can also face strong resistance from the 
firms it supervises and facially controls, some of which are also ministry-level, economically-powerful 
industry behemoths.189 Most importantly, SASAC exercises its governance powers, and particularly its 
control rights in management, in the shadow of an overall Party control.190 This shadow control by 
the CCP is achieved through various means, including: 1) the closely-followed recommendations of 
the CCP’s Organization Department on the appointments of senior corporate managers in leading 
 
182 Several Asset Management Companies preceded the establishment of SASAC. The Asset Management Companies 
(AMC) was run by an Asset Management Agency under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. They were assigned 
the task of recovering non-performing loans owed to China’s four state banks. For details, see Ben S. C. Fung & Guonan 
Ma, China's Asset Management Corporations (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 115, 2002), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=846288. See also Nicholas C. Howson, The AMC Debt-for-Equity 
Swaps: Opportunities for Foreign Capital, CHINA BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 56. 
183 The formal capacity of SASAC to act as the shareholder on behalf of the state was established in law only six years after 
the agency was created. See Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo Qiye Gouyou Zichan Fa (中华人民共和国企业国有资产
法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 2009) arts. 1, 3 [hereinafter SOE Assets Law], available at 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=7195&lib=law. 
184 A few examples: 1) SASAC has the power to propose directors and supervisors to the shareholders’ meeting in any 
“state invested enterprise” regardless of the ratio held by the state. Compare id. arts. 5, 22(3), 24, with 2005 Company Law, 
supra note 147, arts. 37(2), 39, 101, 102. 
2) SASAC is granted a formal veto right on the transfer of state-assets of any state-invested enterprise, regardless of its 
actual holding ratio in such enterprise. See SOE Assets Law, supra note 183 § 5 (Transfer of State-owned Assets) 
(particularly art. 51). See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 743 n.135 (noting the need for SASAC’s approval of share 
transfer in a subsidiary). 
3) Beyond conventional company law fiduciary obligations, the SOE Assets Law specifically includes a fiduciary obligation 
that directors, supervisors, and senior managers owe not only to the company, but specifically to the state as a shareholder. 
See SOE Assets Law, supra note 183 arts. 26, 71 (determining directors, supervisors and senior management’s liability for 
actions that causes losses of state-owned assets, including administrative liability when such office holders are also state 
functionaries). 
185 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 738 n.121 (noting that by the end of 2012, only 51 of the core parent companies of 
the 117 national business groups had established a board of directors). 
186 For extensive analysis of SASAC in support of this view, see id. 
187 Supra notes 183-184. 
188 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 726.  
189 Id. at 736. 
190 Id. at 737-738 (referring to this relationship as “a highly institutionalized sharing arrangement between the Party and 
SASAC.”). 




firms; 2) the training of most senior SOE managers through the Party school and training system; and 
3) the Party personnel evaluation system. More recently, this control has been formalized and 
institutionalized into the governance of corporatized SOEs and firms more generally,191 a change that 
is further undermining the corporate capacity and administrative authority formally reserved to 
SASAC.    
Even after the reorganization under SASAC, the Party-state regularly promotes multiple, often 
conflicting goals that its agents on the ground must balance.192  Despite the common perception that 
the Chinese Party-state operates as a unitary political organization, not only are there various interest 
groups at different levels of the state, but the interests of the Party itself might differ from those of 
state agencies and officials (at least when looking beyond senior levels of government positions in 
which the overlap of Party and state leadership roles is less common).193   
Therefore, despite SASAC’s formal role in the organizational chain, it seems that its corporate 
capacity is an empty box, to be filled by whichever interested party (a ministry, Party-state organ, or 
individuals) is most invested in the situation and has the most political-economic power in each case. 
Assigning a central state agency as a controlling shareholder did not solve, and perhaps cannot solve, 
the problems that arise from the lack of an ultimate real principal. It only mirrors the institutional 
challenges already within China’s political economy. 
In the crossroads of these competing forces are the corporate insiders and Party-state 
individuals who stand to gain from the disarray of conflicting institutional interests. Indeed, no matter 
how many layers are added to the institutional arrangement, since the state (and the Party) is an abstract 
collective, it must necessarily operate through human agents.194 State corporate-control in China, 
therefore, features the same type of self-dealing concerns that the paradigm agency analysis envisages, 
yet it amplifies the problem by reproducing the links (agents) in the chain that can exploit the situation 
while weakening those with direct incentives to limit it. This is an exacerbated form of the well-known 
corporate monitoring predicament— “who monitors the monitors?,”195 which is extended in China 
to multiple layers of agents inside and outside the firm.  
 
2.   Heightened Opportunities for Abuse by Controllers  
 
As if these features of state-corporate control in China are not challenging enough, 
corporatized SOEs face further difficulties due to misaligned interests between their various 
shareholders. This includes conflicts within the state itself and also between the state as the controlling 
 
191 See discussion infra Chapter 3, Section III. 
192 Clarke, supra note 50, at 498. 
193 I develop this further in Chapter 3, Section I. 
194 Clarke, supra note 50, at 497-500. Clarke expressed this with respect to older forms of state asset management 
organization and before the reorganization under SASAC, but the substantive claim still stands. 
195 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, STAN. L. 
REV. 819, 835-836 (1981) (discussing this question as part of the costs of the separation between ownership and control).   




shareholder and the “class” of public shareholders. To the extent that the state is able to incentivize 
its agents—both the officials assigned to monitor corporate insiders, and the professional managers 
appointed to operate corporatized SOEs—to pursue the state’s goals rather than their own selfish 
interests, the benefits to the firm and its other shareholders might still be marginalized. Whichever 
goal ends up being prioritized, it will not necessarily align with the most efficient and productive 
business conduct. 
Thus, even under an assumption of benevolent, well-coordinated, state asset management, the 
state as a controlling shareholder may direct the firm in pursuit of objectives that simply run counter 
to the interest of the firm as a profit-maximizing business. Examples of this in China include the use 
of state-controlled firms to advance geopolitical goals without sound expectations for economic 
return; 196  harnessing management control to enforce broad social and political agendas, 197  or to 
accelerate the implementation of market-structure reforms; 198  using state-controlled firms to 
implement special social tasks;199 and, as recently seen, to influence or even control capital market 
volatility.200 
This phenomenon is not unique to the Chinese state’s corporate control. There are many 
examples of governments using their corporate role to advance goals that a profit-oriented shareholder 
would probably avoid. 201  The reasons for this are not always clear since governments could 
 
196 Many investments of Chinese companies in Africa are said to be first and foremost designed to gain a national foothold 
in the continent and control over natural resources. Moreover, the use of controlled firms for geopolitical goals is clear 
from the robust transaction activity around the Belt and Road initiative. Many of the projects are criticized for being 
economically senseless but nevertheless pass corporate governance approvals (even in private firms). See Jenni March, The 
Rise and Fall of a Belt and Road Billionaire, CNN (Dec. 2018), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/12/asia/patrick-ho-
ye-jianming-cefc-trial-intl/. By the end of 2016, China’s SOEs contributed sixty percent of China’s outbound investments, 
playing an important role in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. See Wendy Wu, How the Communist Party Controls 
China’s Industrial Titans, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (June 17, 2017, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2098755/how-communist-party-controls-chinas-state-owned-
industrial-titans. 
197 Clarke, supra note 71, at 140-141, 149 (pointing to the use of state corporate-control in the enforcement of state policies 
on birth control among employees).  
198 Michael Firth et al., Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China, 45 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 685, 692, 699–704 (2010) (reflecting that SOEs’ managers during the split-share 
structure reform easily passed generous compensation schemes, due to pressures to implement the reform quickly, even 
when the scheme was against the firm’s economic interests). 
199 There are numerous instances of state-controlled firms being called upon to assist the government in a broad array of 
social tasks, from the Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo, to assistance in the Party-state’s natural 
disaster management schemes. See Jiangyu Wang, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China's State-owned Enterprises, 
47 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 663 (2014) (“According to a Xinhua report, twenty four hours after the Qinghai Yushu 
earthquake hit on April 14, 2010, China’s big SOEs, including the state-owned airlines and airports, energy companies, 
telecoms, transportation firms, medical companies, and agricultural trading companies, were called upon by the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Council (Dangzhongyang, Guowuyuan) to participate in the rescue efforts by providing 
services and materials.”).   
200 During the 2015-2016 market downturn, buy-sale orders by state-controlled insurance firms and financial institutions 
were directed by the Party-state to control market decline. Gabriel Wildau, China’s ‘National Team’ Owns 6 Percent of Stock 
Market, FIN. TIMES, (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/7515f06c-939d-11e5-9e3e-eb48769cecab. 
201  See generally IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES AND 
CORPORATIONS? (2010); ALDO MUSACCHIO & SERGIO G. LAZZARINI, REINVENTING STATE CAPITALISM: LEVIATHAN IN 
BUSINESS, BRAZIL AND BEYOND (2014); Curtis Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned 
Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform, 50 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 473 (2017); Curtis 




presumably utilize other tools to reach the same results. Yet, states in their shareholding capacity have 
harnessed their corporate control to maintain high employment levels in certain firms or industries.202 
In some cases, governments have directed corporate decision making to uphold strategic control of 
specific industries (e.g., via strategic planning of M&A),203 or fixed sale prices through their corporate 
influence in order to curtail inflation,204  or to ensure sufficient domestic availability of essential 
products.205 
It is well established that controlling shareholders can promote their interests more easily by 
enlarging their voting control relative to their cash flow rights.206 This can be done through deploying 
legal structures, such as pyramidal ownership, dual-class shares, cross-shareholdings within business 
groups, voting agreements, and other business arrangements.207 The result (and often the aim) of these 
ownership structures is the dissociation of public investors from governance, which allows the 
controller to extract private benefits of control more freely.208  
Increasing the state’s voting control disproportionately to its cash flow rights was actively 
pursued in China throughout its market transition to the present day—from the inception of its 
 
Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling, Propping, and Policy Channeling, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 6 (Luca Enriques & Tobias Tröger eds., 2019) (suggesting a distinction between 
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Yoram Gavison, כיל-עסקת פוטאש  [Potash-ICL Deal], MARKER (Oct. 31, 2012, 12:25 AM), 
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emphasizes the political and social motives behind the position of the Israeli government, see Pav Jordan, Israel Wants 
Details on Potash Corp. Bid for Israel Chemicals Ltd., GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
investor/israel-wants-details-on-potash-corp-bid-for-israel-chemicals-ltd/article4893258/.  
203 As in the Israel Chemicals Ltd. example. Id.  
204 As in the case of fuel prices charged by Brazilian Petroleum company Petrobras. Milhaupt & Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs, 
supra note 201, at 6.  
205 As in the case of Coal India price control policy below market prices and against public investor’s objections. See Clarke, 
supra note 170. On the Brazilian Petrobras and Brazilian Eletrobras contractual overpayments to the government on 
various rights and services, see Milhaupt & Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs, supra note 201, at 3.  
206 Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholding, 57 J. FIN. 2741 (2002); Stijn 
Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81 (2000).  
207 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of 
Separating Control from Cash-flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). 
208 Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1641, 1645 (2006) (“increased productivity accrues to shareholders in proportion to their equity, while private benefits of 
control are allocated based on governance power.”). But see Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and 
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J., 560 (2016) (suggesting that entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them 
to pursue their vision the way they see fit, rather than necessarily to reap private benefits at the expense of public 
shareholders). 
With respect to China, see Guohua Jiang et al., Tunneling through Inter-Corporate Loans: The China Experience, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 
1 (finding that the use of intercorporate loans by controlling shareholders to siphon funds from publicly listed companies 
is most severe in firms where the controlling shareholders’ controlling rights are larger than their ownership (cash flow) 
rights).  




corporatization process with SOEs that raised passive equity capital while keeping state shares non-
tradable,209  through the reorganization of these firms into larger pyramid holding groups, and to the 
recent waves of M&A activity that reduced the number of state-controlled businesses but enhanced 
their scope. 210  When it was completed, the Chinese Party-state—including central and local 
governments, ministries, and other state bodies—retained, and in fact leveraged, its ultimate control 
over the majority of listed companies.211 
Instead of relaxing ownership structures in ways that would better align the interests of the 
state with those of other shareholders, the Party-state has recently opted to further reinforce the gap 
through its mixed-ownership scheme.212 This economic scheme, branded as a plan to “privatize” 
Chinese listed firms through a blend of private and state ownership,213 only deepens the dissociation 
further and entrenches the state as a controlling-minority shareholder in many such “privatized” firms.  
One might argue that the state’s pursuit of these goals is no different than actions by private 
controlling shareholders, which are common around the world. In both cases, the controller uses the 
firm to facilitate private benefits of control (pecuniary or nonpecuniary).214 When this is done at the 
expense of the firm and its other shareholders, such as through outright theft or by related-party 
transactions that are not at arms-length,215 the extraction is equally exploitive,216 whether carried out 
by a state or by a private shareholder. 
 
209 Clarke, supra note 50, at 496-497; Nicholas C. Howson, Protecting the State from Itself? Regulatory Interventions in Corporate 
Governance and the Financing of China’s ‘State Capitalism’, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM, 49 (Benjamin Liebman & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2015). 
210 CHINA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A COMPARISON WITH EUROPE 5-6 (Jean-Pierre Cabestan et al. eds., 
2002) (pointing out that between 2003 and 2010, the total number of SOEs dropped from 159,000 to 114,500, but the 
total assets of 121 large national SOEs managed by SASAC increased from 3 trillion to 20 trillion yuan). 
211 Joseph P. H. Fan et al., The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in China 6-9, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=686582. For a more general discussion of the market structure and 
state dominance during the corporatization period, see Liufang Fang, China’s Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 149, 224-228 (1995).  
212 On the current promotion of a “mixed ownership economy,” see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
213 Defined as: “cross-shareholdings by, and mutual blends of, state-owned capital, collective capital, and non-public 
capital.” 2013 Communique, supra note 26. This was followed by detailed CCP decisions to guide central and local state 
organs (including the NPC and the State Council on its various ministries) on how to implement and pursue the mixed 
ownership goal. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding (中共中
央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定) [Decision on Certain Major Issues Concerning the Comprehensive 
Deepening of Reform] (promulgated by the Central Comm. Communist Party China, Nov. 15, 2013) [hereinafter The 3rd 
Plenum Decisions of 2013], available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1115/c64094-23559163.html. For critical 
analysis, see DANIEL ROSEN ET AL., AVOIDING THE BLIND ALLEY: CHINA’S ECONOMIC OVERHAUL AND ITS GLOBAL 
IMPLICATIONS (2014). 
214 For the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits that controlling shareholders may extract at the 
expense of minority shareholders, see Gilson, supra note 208, at 1661-1667.  
215 For the different aspects of related-party transactions, see Luca Enriques et al., Related-Party Transactions, in ANATOMY 
OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3rd. ed. 2017). 
216 The value extraction by corporate controlling shareholders received the name “Tunneling.” For the seminal works on 
tunneling, see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003); Simon 
Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV 22 (2000). 




While this argument has conceptual merits, some practical differences are notable. First, 
empirical research points to the prevalence of tunneling in Chinese state-controlled firms relative to 
other firms.217 The use of intra-group transfers, such as through loan guarantees,218 which allocate 
resources from publicly-listed firms to private related parties, is particularly prevalent in China.219 This 
suggests that there is something in the nature or the structure of state control in China that is different 
and more conductive to tunneling. Perhaps it is the multiple complex layers within the institutional 
structure that intensify conflicting interests as discussed above; perhaps the absentee principal; and 
perhaps it is the combination of these features that invites more opportunities for abuse from all 
directions. 
Second, state controlling shareholders differ from private ones in the externalities of their 
actions on public shareholders. State controlling shareholders often have only an attenuated eye to 
profits. The persistent choice of the state to maintain control over various industrial firms rather than 
to diversify its investments as a passive equity investor raises at least a strong presumption that its 
reasons for maintaining control are not for profits only.220 Moreover, while the same might sometimes 
also be true for private controlling shareholders, a rational private investor will strive to maximize her 
own economic value (or that of her affiliates). Private investors that seek to use the corporation for 
other goals are quickly pushed by existing statutes (or case law) to pursue these goals through 
alternative forms of business organization.221  
 
217 M. Jian & T. J. Wong, Propping through Related Party Transactions, 15 REV. ACCT. STUD. 70 (2010) (finding that abnormal 
related sales propping done for the benefit of the controller is more prevalent among state-owned firms and in regions 
with weaker economic institutions); Jiang et al., supra note 208 (discussing the scope of abuse by controlling shareholders 
through the use of intercorporate loans to siphon billions from hundreds of Chinese listed companies during the 1996–
2006 period, and its significant economic consequences in firms); Qiao Liu & Zhou (Joe) Lu, Corporate Governance and 
Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A Tunneling Perspective, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 881 (2007) (suggesting evidence 
that controlling shareholders use earnings management to tunnel); Winnie Qian Peng et al., Tunneling or Propping: Evidence 
from Connected Transactions in China, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 306 (2011); Kun Su et al., Ultimate Ownership, Risk-taking and Firm Value: 
Evidence from China, 23 ASIA PACIFIC BUS. REV. 10 (2017) (examining risk taking and ownership structure in Chinese listed 
firms, results show that the presence of ultimate controlling shareholder and the divergence between its control right and 
cash flow right, through pyramid structures, lead to lower corporate risk-taking and firm value); Kun Wang & Xing Xiao, 
Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling and Executive Compensation: Evidence from China, 30 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y, 89 (2011) 
(tunneling by controlling shareholders reduces the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and suggesting 
that controlling shareholders have less interest to strengthen pay for performance measures due to their ability to extract 
value through private benefits of control). 
218 Nan Jia et al., Coinsurance within Business Groups: Evidence from Related Party Transactions in an Emerging Market, 59 MGMT. 
SCI. 2295 (2013). 
219 Henk Berkman et al., Expropriation Through Loan Guarantees to Related Parties: Evidence from China, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 
141 (2009). 
220 At least by accepted theories of risk diversification through diversified portfolio investments. 
221  The development of benefit corporations, nonprofit enterprises, and social purpose organizations reflects this. 
Especially in the United States, where SEC rules for shareholder proposals limit their substance and influence, and where 
case law developments around Dodge v. Ford precludes controlling shareholders from disregarding firm value 
maximization in pursuit of other, even socially value-maximizing, objectives. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an 
Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008) (critiquing Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching 
Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008). 




To maximize her private benefits, a private controller will deploy control either to self-deal or 
to monitor. In both scenarios, the controller first needs to make sure that the firm is sufficiently 
successful for value extraction. An increase in the general pie enlarges the delta that is then available 
for unequal distribution through e.g., connected transactions. When the controller has enough “skin 
in the game,” 222  even a rapacious controller will be interested in increasing value and thus in 
monitoring corporate insiders to some degree. The interests of a private controller, therefore, align 
with those of public shareholders at least to the point that enables self-enrichment. 
When the state is the controlling shareholder, however, and aside from the self-dealing by its 
agents, the state often exerts its control for purposes that have only an attenuated link to economic 
value.223 Recent evidence on corporate tax compliance in SOEs suggests that tax functions as a form 
of “dividend” to state controlling shareholders and as an excess cost to other shareholders. 224 
Presumably, the state has low motivation to distribute dividends since it has other, perhaps more 
socially legitimate routes, such as taxes, to extract corporate value at the expense of public shareholders 
and the firm. Furthermore, as opposed to the portion that a private controller can extract, the 
expropriation by the state is not capped by the general corporate pie. The state can, and does, find 
ways to stream funds to its controlled firms when needed through cross-subsidizing firms 225 and from 
the deep pocket of its citizenry. The use of the corporate form by the state as a controlling shareholder 
thus does not depend on the value of the corporation. The link between the financial strength of the 
invested firm and the scope of “private benefits” available for extraction by the state is weak. One 
might argue that the state will be able to “take” more from a more profitable firm. It is also the case 
that for various reasons (not necessarily pecuniary) the Party-state is greatly committed to preventing 
a decline in the value of state assets. But as the evidence so far shows, this alone does not induce the 
state as shareholder to increase corporate monitoring.226  Instead, so far, other methods to prevent the 
decline of value in state assets were applied more firmly.227  
Finally, even when the Party-state as a controlling shareholder prioritizes economic value-
maximizing in firms, it differs from private investors in its investment approach. The state as 
controlling shareholder is bound to aim at a pie that is far beyond that of a specific firm. The 
 
222 Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53 (2018). 
223 For examples, see supra notes 196-205. There are of course examples in which a state controlling shareholder would act 
as a profit maximizing investor, increase the pie, and then take care of distribution. In these cases, such as in the 
Singaporean model of the State Holding Company Temasek or in various Sovereign Wealth Funds, the state is involved 
as a relatively passive investor, and its actions as a shareholder are economically oriented. 
224 Providing an agency cost analysis for tax compliance or avoidance in SOEs, the authors also found that their results 
are particularly pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance 
evaluations. See Mark Bradshaw et al., Agency Costs and Tax Planning when the Government is a Major Shareholder, J. ACCT. & 
ECON. (forthcoming 2019). 
225 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 745. 
226 In Chapter 3, I discuss how, while this commitment did not bring the state to monitor effectively, it is part of the 
reasons that recently induced the Party to fill-in the monitoring void within firms. 
227 For instance, by inducing state-controlled firms and financial institutions to rescue a declining stock market following 
recent market decline. Supra note 200. 




corporatization process and the subsequent group formation led to the state systematically holding 
ownership of stocks in competing companies within the same industry. With its cross-industry 
ownership, the state adopts a broad view of profits that expands beyond a single firm across industries 
and the market at large.228 Thus, even as a profit-oriented investor, when adopting an industry-level 
(“portfolio level”) perspective, the Chinese state looks beyond the benefit of a specific firm. Some 
firms will be sacrificed for others, according to the state’s relative ratio or following “portfolio-level” 
goals.229  
Viewing the state as a profit-oriented investor with holding positions in firms across industries 
suggests significant implications beyond firm-level governance as well. These include implications for 
market competition, an issue that recently caught the attention of scholars through the phenomenon 
of common ownership.230 The major difference here, of course, is that the Chinese Party-state, in 
contrast to ordinary institutional investors as common owners, has much larger stakes (or de-facto 
control) and takes up an active position in its invested firms.231 This reality makes both concerns—
competition and the potential disregard for firm-level interests— more pressing.232 
 
228 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 745 (referring to the organizational ownership structure under SASAC: “These realities 
suggest that the central-SOE sector as a whole, rather than individual firms, is of greatest concern to SASAC in carrying 
out its governance responsibilities… the practice of rotating top managers among firms in the same industry makes a good 
deal of sense if maximizing shareholder wealth at individual firms is less important to the controlling shareholder than 
building up a number of globally competitive firms in critical industries.”). 
229 Much like the conflicting interests of an index fund that currently trouble American scholars, albeit not as a passive 
investor. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/28/index-funds-and-the-future-of-corporate-governance-theory-evidence-
and-policy/. 
230 The theory suggests that when investors have multiple holdings in firms within the same sector, they will adopt an 
industry level view and will encourage, explicitly or implicitly, anti-competitive practices at the expense of consumers and 
the public good more generally. See George S. Dallas, Common Ownership: Do Institutional Investors Really Promote Anti-
Competitive Behavior?, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Dec. 
2, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/02/common-ownership-do-institutional-investors-really-promote-
anti-competitive-behavior/#more-112996. 
231 The U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission define common ownership as 
“the simultaneous ownership of stock in competing companies by a single investor, where none of the stock holdings is 
large enough to give the owner control of any of those companies.” See OECD, HEARING ON COMMON OWNERSHIP BY 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND ITS IMPACT ON COMPETITION – NOTE BY THE UNITED STATES (2017), available at 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)86/en/pdf. 
232 This point is different from the “agency costs of state-capitalism,” which was raised by Milhaupt and Pargendler based 
on Gilson and Gordon’s “agency cost of agency capitalism.” These accounts speak to the conflict of interests between the 
holding entity and its ultimate beneficiary. In the Chinese case, the state acts on behalf of “all the people.” While this 
comparison is fascinating, I believe that the state, even as a shareholder, does not have a corporate-style “fiduciary 
obligation” to the Chinese people per se. The Chinese people, as the theoretical ultimate beneficiaries of state ownership, 
did not electively entrust their economic and governance rights with the state the way that record holders entrust their 
investment with an institutional intermediary (state-owned pension and social security funds excepted). Such a relationship 
thus cannot be addressed by the agency theory alone. A different framework, possibly involving public ownership theories, 
is required. That concern is outside the scope of this project. See Ronald Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of 
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Milhaupt & 
Pargendler, Governance Challenges of SOEs, supra note 201, at 5. For an additional account of the agency costs of institutional 
investors, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89 (2017). 




 The analysis above does not imply any normative claim against state ownership in and of itself, 
nor against Chinese state ownership specifically. It can certainly be the case that state corporate control 
has benefited the Chinese economy, its market development,233 and Chinese society at large. Rather, 
the point here is that the state’s corporate control in China, under the current organizational structure, 
is particularly alarming for public shareholders. It combines the ills of dispersed ownership with the 
perils of controlling shareholders and amplifies them through every link of the organizational chain. 
Public shareholders in China may be losing on all fronts. 
 
B. The Party-State’s Financial and Capital Market Control 
 
Apart from its position as a shareholder, the Party-state’s control is felt in the infusion of its 
interests into the Chinese capital market through its central position in other areas that affect corporate 
business, particularly the financial industry and labor market. The Party-state implements this control 
through its several roles, as a regulator, enforcer, and often owner of the main players in these fields. 
This picture is frequently described as Chinese “state capitalism.”234  It is a system in which the Party-
state directly or indirectly functions as the controlling shareholder of most significant industrial groups 
and their domestic and globally-listed companies, as well as of the commercial and policy banks and 
financial industry firms, and at the same time acts as the market’s regulator and the main enforcement 
institution.235 A study by Lin and Milhaupt shows the various ways through which the Party-state 
controls the debt market. In the bond market, for example, bond issuers are primarily organs of the 
central or local governments, thereby circumventing a national level prohibition against local 
government debt issuance by using special financing vehicles. 236 The Party-state’s dominance in the 
debt market is felt not only in the identity of bond issuers but also throughout the entire network of 
market intermediaries. The underwriting industry, despite having a relatively large number of players, 
which entails more competition, reveals the absolute dominance of state-owned financial 
intermediaries. The main banks, securities companies, and other financial institutions conduct the 
underwriting activity, and the great majority of them are owned by the state. At the time of the study, 
 
233 Recall that the law and finance approach that links investor protections with capital market and economic development 
is contradicted by China’s conundrum. 
234 See generally REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 
(Benjamin Liebman & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2015); Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 697 n.9. 
235 Commentators have taken different views as to the Party-state involvement in the economy. Some have argued against 
the characterization of the Chinese economy as “state-capitalism.” See, e.g., LARDY, supra note 31 (considering the rapidly 
growing private business sector as a major driver of economic growth and employment in China today). 
236 Local Government Financing Vehicles issue 36.8 percent of the total outstanding corporate debt instruments. Central 
SOEs controlled typically by SASAC issued 28.6 percent, and local SOEs controlled by local SASAC branches issued 21.7 
percent of the total. Facially private enterprises issued only 12.7 percent of all outstanding corporate bonds. See Li-Wen 
Lin & Curtis Milhaupt, Bonded to the State: A Network Perspective on China’s Corporate Debt Market 20-21 (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 327/2016, 2016), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810209. 




out of all financial institutions that perform underwriting activity with at least two percent of the 
underwriting market, only one (Minsheng Bank) was not state owned, and even it maintained a close 
reciprocal relationship with the government.237 Similarly, Lin and Milhaupt found that in the credit 
rating industry, which is also seemingly competitive, the state owns the majority of firms (five out of 
nine agencies).238 The potential for conflicts of interest and “partisan rating” is clear. As most bond 
issuers are politically connected to the Party-state, credit ratings are skewed upwards239 and thus do 
not perform well as reputational intermediaries.240   
This Party-state control over debt financing resources affects the availability of alternatives to 
equity financing and increases its control over the capital market overall. Considering only the 
shareholding capacity of the Party-state does not provide a complete picture of China’s state capitalism 
and its implications for the capital market. The Chinese Party-state is omnipresent in every market 
element: from outright trading suspensions in the capital market; through a licensing regime that can 
be exercised to limit the operation of certain market players; geopolitical changes that bring stricter or 
laxer M&A and antitrust norms, which affect business conduct and profitability; through monetary 
control over the repatriation of funds by SAFE (the State Administration of Foreign Exchange); and 
finally, even to protectionist legal enforcement in commercial cases.  
The implications for public shareholders—their status and the role they can play in the capital 
market—derive from the complete array of Party-state economic control and not merely from its 
position as a shareholder. The remainder of the chapter addresses the implications of China’s state 
capitalism on the functioning of traditional corporate governance institutions. 
 
III. ANALYSIS OF CONVENTIONAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
 
  As seen thus far, China’s political economy and the continued embrace of state capitalism have 
created a structured predicament in which public shareholders are disempowered and subject to open 
exploitation by various corporate control parties. Howson describes the situation as “a ready invitation 
to opportunism, ‘tunneling’, minority shareholder exploitation and oppression.”241 In this section, I 
will examine whether traditional monitoring and disciplining mechanisms can overcome this structural 
predicament. 
 
237 Id. at 21-22. 
238 Id. at 22-23 (also pointing out that sixty percent of all rated corporate bonds were rated by a state-owned rating agency). 
However, on expectations for future regulation that will open-up credit rating to foreign agencies, see Miller Matthew & 
Umesh Desai, China’s Move to Open Up for Global Rating Agencies May Lift Debt Credibility, REUTERS (Dec. 8. 2016, 6:27 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-ratings-idUSKBN13X168.  
239 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 236, at 34-35. 
240 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 802-803 (2001). 
241 Howson, supra note 209, at 6. 




Foundational corporate law theories view the public corporation as a capital-raising vehicle.242 
By the same account, corporate governance in public firms (including securities regulation) should be 
designed to facilitate the development of the capital market as a dynamic and efficient capital allocation 
mechanism whereby capital is allocated to the most deserving firms. Striving for efficiency, capital 
markets and corporate governance regimes should minimize the costs of monitoring corporate control 
parties. These costs emanate from the separation between the owners of the corporation and those 
who control it, and their potential conflicting interests—which constitute the basic premise of modern 
public firm theory.243 Following this approach, it is asserted that corporate governance should focus 
on mechanisms that will prevent the exploitation of investors by those who control their investment, 
or, in positive terms, on “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment.”244 If investors’ expectations for a fair game are met, the theory 
goes, they will be reassured and encouraged to continue investing. This will keep the cost of financing 
low and will promote a vibrant capital market with minimal monitoring costs. It follows that potential 
exploitative behavior by corporate control parties (insider management and controlling shareholders) 
can be minimized by an array of monitoring mechanisms gathered under the umbrella of the system’s 
corporate governance regime.  
The remainder of this chapter examines traditional mechanisms of corporate governance and 
their operation in China. By traditional mechanisms, I mean the mechanisms that are conventionally 
assigned a monitoring and disciplining role in corporate governance, whatever their contribution to 
firm/market value is. For each mechanism, I describe its assigned role under the conventional 
understanding and then evaluate if and how it functions in China, and whether it serves the interests 
of public shareholders. These traditional mechanisms fall into two categories, firm-internal and 
external monitoring mechanisms, as follows:245  
 
Internal Governance Mechanisms: 
•  Shareholders (institutional investors, other shareholder coalitions) 
•  Other Internal Governing Bodies (board of directors, independent directors, supervisory 
board) 
•  Other Corporate Constituents (employees, creditors, consumers, managers) 
 
242 Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967). 
243 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 n.1 (1983) (citing BERLE 
& MEANS, supra note 13, at 129). 
244 See generally Michal Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 737 (1997). 
For different approaches to corporate governance, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM (1985) (presenting a broader institutional economics contractarian view). See also Stuart L. Gillan, Recent 
Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 381 (2006) (presenting a broad, inclusive approach). 
245 For the previous appearance of some parts of the following review, see Groswald Ozery, supra note 101. 





External Monitoring Institutions: 
•  External Markets (the market for corporate control, capital market, product market, 
managerial labor market) 
•  Gatekeepers (lawyers, accountants & underwriters, the financial press) 
•  The Legal System (public enforcement—the CSRC, stock exchanges; private 
enforcement— the People’s Courts system) 
 




The failure of monitoring by the state as a controlling shareholder calls attention to the issue 
of monitoring by other shareholders, whether public individual shareholders or blockholding 
coalitions. 
In contrast to controlling shareholders and blockholders, dispersed shareholders have 
information asymmetries, collective action problems, and incentives to free-ride others. These make 
it difficult and uneconomical for shareholders with few shares to monitor corporate control parties.246 
Individual public shareholders therefore typically take passive holding positions. Yet, dispersed 
shareholders may form coalitions that increase their ability to monitor and discipline corporate insiders 
in various ways. 247 Through aggregate action, they are potentially able to collect enough votes to make 
specific corporate governance proposals, challenge the decision-making of incumbent managers, and 
even oust underperforming managers and take control of the firm.248 
In firms with controlling shareholders, public shareholders, even when building coalitions, are 
generally unable to assemble enough votes to contest control directly. Yet, they can still engage in 
governance and have some monitoring functions when acting in concert. 
 
 
246  Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604 (2005) (positing a 
contractarian view, in which shareholders are only owners of a residual claim, not of the corporation itself); Easterbrook 
& Fischel, supra note 243. 
247 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Marcel 
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007). 
248 See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (providing an example of shareholder participation effort 
in the context of a contested election battle—“proxy fight”); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (providing an example for shareholder accumulating votes and submitting a precatory proposal to influence 
company business strategy and board composition). 




i. Institutional Investors 
 
  Over the last few decades, shifts in shareholder composition, particularly in widely-held 
markets, have raised expectations for greater public participation through institutional investments.249 
Although the views on institutional investors’ actual engagement in governance and contribution to 
firm value are far from conclusive,250 it certainly seems that the recent accumulation of corporate 
power and potential for activism by institutional investors is transforming the corporate governance 
landscape.251 
Certainly, the degree of involvement by institutional investors depends on the country’s 
political economy, including the applicable regulatory framework, the sophistication of the financial 
industry, and the extent to which such institutional investors have been co-opted. 252  When a 
controlling shareholder exists, the power of institutional investors to influence corporate decision 
making and monitor effectively is limited from the outset. The presence of institutional investors is 
 
249 For the canonical view, see Black, supra note 247 (depicting traditional institutional investors as promising monitors); 
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990) (suggesting a model by which institutional 
investors are affecting “the passivity story”). For a more recent perspective, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 247, at 1042, 
1047–70 (explaining the disillusionment about the traditional institutional investors’ activism, yet reflecting similar hopes 
regarding hedge funds as new, promising activists). 
250 For views supporting institutional investors’ activism, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) (empirically testing and refuting the claim that activists’ interventions by hedge 
funds are costly to firms and their shareholders in the long term); Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An 
International Study, 30 REV.  FIN. STUD. 2933, 2933-2971 (2017) (finding that incidents of activism and their contribution to 
return is greater with high institutional ownership, particularly with respect to U.S. institutions); April Klein & Emanuel 
Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and other Private Investors,  64 J. FIN. 187, 187-229 (2009) (examining the 
success rate of activist campaigns by Hedge funds, VC funds, PE funds, and individual investors).  
For the opposing views, see, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on 
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016) (arguing that engagement by activist hedge funds has costly externalities on 
long term firm investment); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical 
Evidence, CONTEMP. FIN. DIG., Autumn 1998, at 10 (concluding that no empirical evidence supports the claim that activists 
improve long term market performance); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Shareholder Activism a Valued Mechanism of 
Corporate Governance, 18 YALE. J. ON REG. 174, 187–219 (2001) (reviewing studies on shareholder proposals submitted by 
public pension funds in the United States and finding an insignificant effect on firms’ performance). 
251 For recent reports on the rise of institutional investors’ ownership in the United States and its potential implications 
on governance, see Bebchuk et al., supra note 232, at 91, 92-93; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 232, at 865;  John C. Coates, 
The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve, (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 19-07, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337.  
252 Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 1, 24–25 (2008) (discussing the conditions that made the United Kingdom a more favorable jurisdiction 
for shareholder participation through institutional investors, compared to the United States). 




more limited,253 tied to the state,254 or co-opted within a group of dominant shareholders.255 In these 
markets, while institutional investors are technically able to overcome apathy and collective-action 
problems that hold back monitoring by dispersed shareholders, they rarely have the incentives to do 
so. Scholars have begun to explore the complexity of internal agency problems that affect the power 
and function of institutional investors, even in dispersed markets. 256  Such agency issues are 
exacerbated where institutional investors are entwined with larger business groups through business 
relations and ownership, as is the case in many concentrated markets. In some cases, institutional 
investors are even controlled by the listed firm whose public share float they manage.257 This increases 
their support for incumbent insiders without accountability to their ultimate beneficiaries. This 
situation has prompted several scholars and policy makers to propose more mandatory intervention 
in concentrated markets that seek to promote public shareholder engagement through institutional 
investor stewardship.258 
With respect to the PRC, the institutional investment industry experiences all the general 
predicaments that impede the ability of institutional investors to monitor and engage in governance, 
and then some. The limited scale of the industry is one of these impediments. According to reports 
by China’s stock exchanges, most retail investors manage their equity investments individually and not 
through institutional investor accounts. Out if their total accounts, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange respectively report that 0.33 percent and 0.46 percent are institutional 
accounts compared to individual (retail) investors’ accounts.259  
 
253 Only a small scope of institutional investment, measured by assets under management, was noted for Portugal, Greece, 
Spain, Turkey, Poland, and other OECD countries. See OECD, THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING 
GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 112 (2011); Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro Matos, The Colors of Investors’ Money: The Role of 
Institutional Investors Around the World, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 499, 524–30 (2008) (providing data on institutional ownership by 
country). 
254 Such as in China (see the discussion that follows). Regarding India, see Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, Large Shareholder 
Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Evidence from India, 1 INT’L REV. FIN. 161, 166 (2000). 
255 Such as in Israel, France, Korea, Singapore, and Brazil. For the Israeli case, see Assaf Hamdani & Yishay Yafeh, 
Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders, 17 REV. FIN. 691 (2012). For France, see Carine Girard, Success of Shareholder 
Activism: The French Case, BANKERS, MARKETS & INVESTORS, Nov.-Dec. 2011, at 26. See generally Stuart Gillan & Laura T. 
Starks, Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective, (Weinberg Ctr. for 
Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 2003-01, 2003),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=439500. 
256 Bebchuk et al., supra note 232; Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 229; K. A. D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 219, 223, 241 (2004). 
257 Hamdani & Yafeh, supra note 255. 
258 Id. at 711-14 (“it is legal intervention—rather than minority shareholders’ voting power—that drives institutional 
investors to cast a vote” … “Institutional investors tend to be active primarily when legally required to do so.”). For recent 
efforts in the EU, see Directive 2017/828, Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-
Term Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132) 1, available at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/9b871b38-3d20-11e7-a08e-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. See generally Goshen, supra note 162 (arguing that 
corporate laws must incorporate some form of minority protection as a mandatory rule and examining various such forms 
in different jurisdictions). 
259 These reports might be somewhat misleading as some institutional investors hold individual accounts. For the relative 
number of individual and institutional accounts See SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE 
STATISTICS ANNUAL 475-6 (2014), available at 
http://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/tjnj_2014.pdf (in Chinese); INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT OF SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE MARKET FACT BOOK  




The scope of institutional investment services in China is still strictly regimented with limited 
investment choices. For example, pension funds are funded and managed by local-level provincial and 
city governments and until very recently could only invest in national treasury bonds and deposits.260 
Only in late 2015 did the State Council permit pension funds to invest in equity securities.261 Similar 
investment limitations apply to the PRC’s National Social Security Fund, which functions as the 
central government’s social security reserve fund.262 As for mutual funds, in recent years there has 
been an increase in the number of mutual funds and their total equity investments. In 2012, mutual 
funds held 7.6 percent of all shares. Yet at the firm level, their holdings are still marginal. In 2011, 
mutual funds held a median of 0.067 percent in firms.263 Scholars note a short-term investment 
horizon as one factor in institutional investors’ firm level small holdings264 and lack of influence. Their 
strategy is to invest speculatively and hold shares for short periods of time. The investment pattern of 
institutional investors is thus similar to that of individual investors, making them similarly unlikely to 
monitor. Still, there is no doubt that the institutional investment industry in China is growing.265 This 
should remain true especially after the 2015 and 2016 stock market collapses, when institutional 
investors were instructed to increase their positions. 
An additional impediment relates to competency issues in the industry, which is relatively 
young and not yet skilled enough to have a meaningful effect on managerial powers.266 The Qualified 
 
269 (2013) [hereinafter Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book], available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170722151420/http://www.szse.cn/UpFiles/largepdf/20150319145710.pdf (in 
Chinese). But see Clarke, supra note 3 , at 147, 154 (“official and unofficial investment funds often use (legally or illegally) 
individual accounts.”).   
260  See ROBERT C. POZEN, TACKLING THE CHINESE PENSION SYSTEM 3–6, 8 (2013), available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/31-reforming-chinese-pension-system-pozen.pdf. Insurance 
funds and mutual funds have other restrictions. See also Chao Xi, Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and Practice, 
17 INT’L COMPANY & COMM. L. REV. 251, 252 (2006).  
261 The new rules allow pension funds to invest up to thirty percent of their net assets in domestic equities. Guowuyuan 
Guanyu Yinfa Jiben Yanglao Baoxian Jijin Touzi Guanli Banfa de Tongzhi (Guofa (2015) 48 hao) (国务院关于印发基
本养老保险基金投资管理办法的通知 (国发 （2015） 48 号)) [State Council Administrative Measures for Investment 
Management of Pension Funds] (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 17, 2015) [hereinafter State Council Administrative 
Measures for Investment Management of Pension Funds], http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-
08/23/content_10115.htm. 
262  For general information, see QUANGUO SHEHUI BAOZHANG JIJIN LISHI HUI [NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOCIAL 
SECURITY FUND], http://www.ssf.gov.cn (last visited May 25, 2019). 
263 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 197 tbl.6, 211.  
264 Id. at 211 (pointing to an average holding period of less than six months by mutual funds in 2011). Previous research 
had pointed to even shorter holding periods (one to two months). See Clarke, supra note 3, at 154-155. 
265 See State Council Administrative Measures for Investment Management of Pension Funds, supra note 261, arts. 36, 37. 
This move was said to potentially contribute up to RMB 600 billion, managed by the PRC pension fund, into the PRC 
domestic stock markets. See Phillip Inman, China to Allow Pension Funds to Invest in Stock Market for the First Time, GUARDIAN, 
(Aug. 23, 2015, 3:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/23/china-to-allow-pension-fund-to-invest-in-
stock-market-for-first-time. 
266 Yongbeom Kim et al., Developing Institutional Investors in People’s Republic of China, (World Bank, Country Study Paper No. 
30248, 2003), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/280421468743976037/pdf/302480CHA0deve1titutional0investors.pdf. 
For a more recent and more positive analysis of institutional investors in China, see Xi, supra note 259. 




Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII)267 program was expected to bring experience and professional 
skills that would improve the quality of domestic institutional investors and their market involvement 
levels.268 The “educational” value of QFIIs, however, remained marginal. Confined by operational 
quotas and informational asymmetries due to operating in a foreign system, QFIIs have prioritized 
maintaining a strong relationship with Party-state controlling shareholders. QFIIs often entrust the 
controller’s appointees to vote on their behalf, 269  instead of opting for direct action that might 
maximize value for their unit holders and other minority shareholders.270 It should nevertheless be 
noted that in recent years the Chinese government has increased the QFII quota allotment several 
times.271  
Other recent initiatives outside the QFII system were taken in a similar direction. The 2013 
Shanghai Free Trade Zone included various experiments with a reduction of barriers to foreign 
investors’ participation in the capital market.272 At the national level, the recent China–Hong Kong 
Stock Connect initiative and the Mutual Recognition of Publicly Offered Funds between Hong Kong 
and the PRC were designed to increase investments by off-shore institutional investors and to 
introduce a wider range of investment tools into the PRC domestic market.273 These recent initiatives 
will presumably somewhat increase the activity of foreign institutional investors that are less embedded 
in business group affiliations and Party-state control than domestic institutional investment firms.  On 
the margins, increasing the scope of authorized foreign investors might, with time, bring more 
engagement by institutional investors, as hoped for. 
 
267 The program was introduced in 2002, revised in September 2009, and once again in December 2012. A separate 
program was approved in 2011 to facilitate the use of Renminbi held outside mainland China for investments in the 
domestic market – Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors. General information on the QFII and RQFII 
schemes, including summaries of important policy revisions and relevant quotas, is available on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange website. QFII & RQFII, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, http://english.sse.com.cn/investors/qfii/what/ (last 
visited May 13, 2019). For ease of reference, I will refer to these programs together as QFII. 
268  See generally Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate 
Governance, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 265, 319 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). 
269 OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES IN CHINA: SELF-ASSESSMENT BY THE CHINA SECURITIES 
REGULATORY COMMISSION 39 (2011), available at  http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/48444985.pdf.  
270See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 169, 190 (2004) (providing examples of how these considerations may have led to the generally passive role of 
foreign institutional investors in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as well). 
271 See supra note 267. See also QFII Investment Quota to be Increased by 50 Billion U.S. Dollars, CHINA SEC. REG. COMMISSION 
(Mar. 4, 2012), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/OpeningUp/RelatedPolices/QFII/201212/t20121210_217805.html.  
272 See Policy Measures for the Capital Market to Support and Promote the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, CHINA SEC. REG. COMMISSION 
(Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201311/t20131126_238765.html.  
273 The mutual stock-connect initiative allows off-shore retail and institutional investors mutual stock market access 
between the SSE and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The Mutual Recognition of Funds opened up an authorization 
process for off-shore funds to trade in the respective domestic markets, thus increasing the access of PRC and Hong Kong 
investors to asset management funds registered in the Hong Kong/PRC market, respectively. See Mainland-Hong Kong 
Mutual Recognition of Funds, SECURITY FUTURES COMMISSION, https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/faqs/mainland-hong-kong-
mutual-recognition-of-funds.html (last visited May 25, 2019).  




Given the likelihood that the market share, competency, and sophistication of institutional 
investors in China will increase in the foreseeable future, the question then arises whether the industry 
could become meaningful in corporate governance and, if so, how. Can institutional investors in China 
become actively involved in the governance of listed firms, and might they actively monitor corporate 
insiders at least to the extent that they do so in other concentrated markets? In my view, other 
impediments established in China’s political economy will continue to stand in the way of a more 
active and influential institutional investors industry.  
The following factors will likely prevent institutional investors from becoming true stewards 
of public shareholders’ interests in the Chinese capital markets. First, institutional investors in China 
are subject to close regulation, supervision, and enforcement at several administrative levels. Various 
competing central government ministry-level bodies regulate the industry: the CSRC, the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, National Council for 
Social Security Fund, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. This divided regulatory and 
supervisory system produces multiple, cumbersome, and often overlapping regulations and competing 
interests that limit institutional investors’ initiative and autonomy.274 It may also hold back policies 
that the CSRC would have otherwise promoted and that might have encouraged institutional investors 
to be more engaged. For example, it likely impedes any potential intention to require cumulative voting 
or to mandate voting by institutional investors on certain matters, as seen in other concentrated 
markets.275 
Most importantly, China’s state capitalism attributes are likely to inhibit institutional investor 
engagement in governance going forward as well. Even compared to other concentrated markets, the 
conflicts of interest experienced by PRC institutional investors are particularly acute. Firms in the 
institutional investors industry are closely affiliated with SOE groups, publicly listed firms, and their 
senior insiders through ownership and contractual arrangements, as well as with key political players 
 
274 For instance, both the CSRC and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange are responsible for the administration 
of the QFII schemes. See QFII & RQFII , supra note 267. The CSRC and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
share administrative authority over the operation of pension insurance funds that are also securities investment funds. The 
authority of the China Banking Regulatory Commission to regulate and supervise the entire banking industry includes 
some authority interface with the CSRC’s authority over mutual funds, since financial institutions often operate as 
securities companies. 
275 The CSRC requires disclosure of the votes of the ten largest public shareholders on certain issues discussed at a 
shareholders meeting. See Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi Baohu de Ruogan Guiding (关于加强
社会公众股股东权益保护的若干规定) [Provisions on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the 
General Public Shareholders] (promulgated by the Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 7, 2004), art. 1.1.(5) [hereinafter CSRC 
2004 Provisions], available at http://shlx.chinalawinfo.com/ newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=56204. Yet, there is no 
affirmative duty of institutional investors to vote (a duty that regulators in other markets, e.g., Israel, require for certain 
matters). The CSRC could, potentially, push for a corresponding mandatory vote. Without such a requirement and given 
institutional investors’ network affiliation described above, a requirement to disclose the votes is more likely to discourage 
the vote of these public shareholders altogether. 




at various levels of the Party-state system.276 Furthermore, the Party-state is strongly involved in the 
capital market not only through its control of many listed companies, but also through its control over 
the financial industry and the major players in the investment sector. Besides the state’s direct 
ownership in financial firms and securities companies,277 another way the Party-state exercises control 
over the industry is through the reshuffling of senior executives between firms in the industry and 
between firms and the administering state organs.278  
Thus, in the PRC, central organs of the Party-state have not only both administrative and 
regulatory control over the financial and investment sectors, but also absolute ownership and 
management control of the firms in these sectors. The PRC Party-state is therefore able to advance 
its interests through its controlling shareholder position in its subsidiary listed firms, through state 
regulatory agencies and the legal system, and also through its controlling ownership position in most 
of China’s fund managers, insurance companies and other public investment vehicles, securities 
companies, and banks.279  
This control model certainly poses barriers to institutional investors acting autonomously from 
the larger Party-state apparatus. The solutions applied in other concentrated markets, through which 
institutional investors are empowered and their conflicts are somewhat overcome, 280  are simply 
irrelevant in the Chinese context. For example, the institutional investor industry embedded in the 
Party-state system will not exercise even a formally granted minority veto against Party-state 
 
276 See Firth et al., supra note 198 (providing an interesting insight into institutional investors’ decisions during the split-
share structure reform, when mutual funds were pressured politically to accept compensation schemes to rush the 
implementation of the reform even when not in the best interests of their unit holders); Xi, supra note 260, at 258–63. 
277 See, e.g., LARDY, supra note 31, at 20–23 (measuring state control over the financial industry by asset-holding ratio, 
finding that private bank assets account for only seventeen percent of all bank assets, and ascribing a more limited scope 
to institutional investors). 
278 For example, transfers of executives between the central bank, commercial banks, and branches of the administration 
such as China Banking Regulatory Commission and the CSRC. See Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial 
Banks—The Old Nomenklatura System Serving New Corporate Governance Structures?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL 
MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123 (Martha Avery et al. eds., 2009). 
279 Kim et al., supra note 266. See also HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN MAINLAND CHINA 
(2004), available at https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/research/rpaper/Documents/IIMC.pdf. 
280 Such as negative veto rights, super majority requirements, mandatory participation of minority public shareholders in 
certain business decisions, minority public shareholder involvement in directors’ elections, and their right to submit 
governance proposals to the board. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 163, at 30–37 (listing countries that have adopted various 
forms of minority negative veto rights). Israel is one example of a highly-concentrated market where the state regulator 
sought to increase institutional investor participation and power by addressing the passivity of institutional investors and 
their co-option within a larger, dominated group and the potential conflict of interest resulting therefrom. Israel’s Company 
Law requires that an “extraordinary” transaction between the company and its control party (including affiliates) be 
approved by the shareholders’ general meeting, provided that the approving majority votes will include a majority of 
disinterested (minority) shareholders participating in the meeting (abstentions not counted). The minority approval 
requirement is in addition to an approval by an audit committee and by the board of directors. See Company Law, 5759-
1999, § 275(a),1 LSI 44 (1999). At the same time, various financial laws and regulations mandate that institutional investors 
cast a vote in certain matters, thereby leveraging shareholder consent into a regulatory device. Hamdani & Yafeh, supra 
note 255, at 696–700. 




controlling shareholders, such as the one provided for in the CSRC 2004 Provisions.281 Likewise, an 
effort like the one recently taken in Israel in which business groups were structurally and actively 
required to disentangle—separating institutional investors from industrial firms—is not a viable 
option in the Chinese case. 282  Separating the affiliation of asset management institutions from 
corporate groups in China will not suffice to eliminate their complex conflicts of interest. Real 
autonomy and independence of institutional investors from the corporate groups would require their 
detachment from the Party-state. This scenario is unlikely. Such an overhaul would contradict the 
reasons for which the Chinese state capitalism system was established in the first place and maintained 
thus far. Hence, even if the market share and proficiency of domestic institutional investors in China 
grows, that increase will not translate into any reduction in control by corporate insiders or any 
increase in real stewardship and governance engagement by institutional investors in the cases where 
it is needed the most. 
 
ii. Coalition-Building Shareholder Monitoring 
 
  Nongovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, and other social organizations are 
emerging as significant stakeholders in several concentrated markets. 283  These players are often 
involved in governance indirectly, by instigating broad public attention that puts pressure on 
controlling shareholders and directors and by lobbying regulators for public shareholder–friendly 
corporate governance mechanisms. In some systems, social organizations may facilitate coalition-
building share-ownership for public shareholders, especially where institutional investors are less 
prominent. In this capacity, they may actively participate in governance by exercising their associated 
governance rights through voting, submitting shareholder proposals, and taking advantage of ex-post 
legal claims. 284  Their involvement can discipline corporate insiders and control parties, expose 
problems, and push firms and their management to act in a socially responsible manner.  
 
281 CSRC 2004 Provisions, supra note 275, art. 1.1.(5). The ownership-market structure and the network of conflicting 
interests make it more reasonable to assume that institutional investors, when involved, will take informal private 
negotiations as their preferred method. 
282 In a novel regulatory step, the Israeli legislature adopted “The Law for the Decrease of Concentration and Increase of 
Competition.” It aims to strengthen competition and curtail the excessive clout of a relatively small number of business 
groups over the Israeli economy by limiting pyramid groups to two holding layers and separating ownership of financial 
institutions from non-financial corporations. See Ido Baum et al., What Is Israel’s New Business Concentration Law and Why 
Should We Care?, HAARETZ (Dec. 29, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/1.565986.  
283 See, e.g., Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund 
Activism in Italy and Germany, and Its Evolution, 10 EUR. FIN. L. REV. 328, 350–54, 370 (2013) (describing a decline in hedge 
fund activism in Italy and the rise of the “Assogestioni”—a nonprofit association that serves as a facilitator for minority 
shareholder minimum board representation and advocates stronger engagement of intermediaries in corporate 
governance); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29 
YALE J. INT’L L. 169 (2004) (discussing NPOs governance participation as shareholders as one of the most important 
corporate law enforcement agents in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan). 
284 Emma Sjöström, Translating Ideologically Based Concerns: How Civil Society Organizations Use the Financial Market to Protect 
Human Rights, 6 INT’L J. ENV’T & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 153 (2007). 




In the French capital market, for example, associations d’actionnaires ([public] shareholders’ 
associations) have become influential institutions able to coordinate minority shareholder action, 
despite significant ownership concentration in French firms long supported by the government. The 
French Commercial Code permits public shareholders with at least five percent of the voting rights 
and that have held their shares for more than two years to form associations d’actionnaires to act in concert 
to further public shareholders’ collective interests.285 Scholars have argued that coalition-building 
efforts enabled by these associations have meaningfully strengthened minority public shareholder 
engagement in the governance of French firms.286 
It is unlikely, however, that a role comparable to the one played by the French shareholders’ 
associations is possible for Chinese social organizations in the capital markets governed by the PRC’s 
authoritarian, single party regime. The need for social organizations to be able to rely on law and legal 
institutions to enforce their rights, as well as an ability to publicly critique corporate misconduct 
through a relatively free financial press, are functions that are not readily available in China. The 
Chinese People’s Courts are not an independent branch of government and are part of the Party-state 
bureaucracy. This means that the Chinese judiciary is weak and, in many cases, lacks the technical 
competence, bureaucratic autonomy, or political independence necessary for it to act against far more 
powerful Party-state actors.287 
Furthermore, one must understand the current state of civil society in China in order to assess 
the possibilities for Chinese social organizations, even as shareholders, as corporate governance 
participants in the PRC. The emergence of civil society, including citizens’ access to rights-enforcing 
institutions, is a matter of some complexity in China, but clearly the Western notion of freedom of 
association is absent. Civil society and social organizations, as well as the financial press, are largely 
confined to areas that do not threaten central Party-state interests or that can help the center keep 
local power in control.288  
In addition to these limitations on the judicial system, the financial press, and civil society at 
large, there also exists in China an embedded traditional cultural perception that the legal system is a 
coercive instrument of control and that administration is to be reserved to the state.289 As Clarke puts 
 
285 See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] arts. L.225-103, L.225-105, L.225-230-L.225-233, L.225-252 
(Fr.). See also Yaron Nili, Missing the Forest from the Trees: A New Approach to Shareholder Activism, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 
197-98 (2014) (discussing relevant sections of the French CODE DE COMMERCE). 
286 Girard, supra note 255. See also Nili, supra note 285, at 199, n.229. 
287 Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts, supra note 142, at 327-356. I discuss the People’s Courts more 
extensively below. 
288  See, e.g., BRUCE J. DICKSON, WEALTH INTO POWER: THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S EMBRACE OF CHINA’S PRIVATE 
SECTOR (2008); Donald C. Clarke, The Private Attorney-General in China: Potential and Pitfalls, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 241 (2009); Benjamin L. Liebman, Changing Media, Changing Courts, in CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA 150, 
151 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011); Benjamin Van Rooij, People’s Regulation: Citizens and Implementation of Law in China, 25 COLUM. 
J. ASIAN L. 116 (2012); Benjamin Van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action against Pollution in China, 19 J. 
CONTEMP. CHINA, 55 (2010). 
289 See, e.g., Derk Bodde, Basic Concepts of Chinese Law: The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Thought in Traditional China, 107 PROC. 
AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 375 (1963); Liang Zhiping, Explicating "Law": A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, 




it, “The notion that private citizens should be involved in law enforcement for public goals does not 
find a ready home in… [the] Chinese political culture. The state jealously guards its control over the 
machinery of coercion….”290 Thus, law and legal institutions operate so as to restrict any non-state 
institutions, especially social organizations, from taking the lead on the enforcement of private rights 
of any kind. This is certainly the case when they are asked to enforce private shareholders’ rights 
against superior forces of the PRC Party-state.  
The exclusion of private rights holders from effective use of the formal legal system, coupled 
with a strong concern about the maintenance of social and political stability, are evident in the 
constraints applied on private enforcement through group litigation. These constraints deny securities 
law class actions outright and radically minimize the number of corporate law derivative lawsuits, 
especially those involving Party-state controlled companies or their management.291 Thus, while some 
Chinese social organizations may now operate legally, they are extremely unlikely to be permitted any 
meaningful role in disciplining and monitoring corporate control parties.292  
 
2. Other Internal Governing Bodies  
 
i.  Board of Directors 
 
The board of directors plays a central role in corporate governance and is defined as the main 
internal governance body in many modern corporate laws.293 The board appoints senior managers, 
makes major policy decisions and approves others, and generally oversees the operations of the firm. 
Elected by the firm’s shareholders, the directors’ oversight replaces a more costly and harder-to-
coordinate monitoring by shareholders.  
In controlled firms, however, and more generally in concentrated markers, board 
independence and its commitment to all shareholders is challenged on both operational and normative 
levels. The firm’s controlling or dominant shareholders dictate the election of board members in 
controlled firms. This is clearly the case in China. The Company Law requires listed firms, as well as 
other CLSs in the PRC, to have at least five directors on their board and no more than nineteen.294 
 
3 J. CHINESE L. 55 (1989). Both sources emphasize the punitive and coercive aspects of the Chinese traditional legal system 
through an analysis of China’s legal culture and the meaning of “Law.” 
290 Clarke, supra note 288, at 242–43 (concerning private litigation, but applicable to other private enforcement channels). 
291 Howson & Clarke, supra note 181, at 254-257. 
292 A possibility remains that some form of a quasi-public institution will be established with the endorsement of the party-
state. A party-state-sanctioned institution is vastly more likely to be permitted greater latitude to promote minority public 
shareholder interests. For my previous exploration of this option, see Groswald Ozery, supra note 101. 
293 For examples in the United States, see, e.g., Delaware General Corporation Law, Del. Code tit. 8 § 141. See also Model 
Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2002). Conversely, according to the PRC corporate law, the shareholders’ 
assembly is defined as “the company’s organ of power.” 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 98.  
294 2005 Company Law, supra note 147 art. 108. Articles 46-48 stipulate the board’s powers. See id. arts. 46-48.   




The shareholders’ meeting elects and dismisses the directors, and also has the power to decide on 
matters regarding their salary and other compensation.295 Majority rule – and thus decisions by the 
controller or by dominant shareholders – generally determines the results of the shareholders’ 
meetings, including decisions respecting directors..  
Most board members, and the board of directors as an organ of internal governance, therefore 
lack independence and are largely captured by the controlling shareholders who appointed them. This 
weakness of oversight by boards of directors in controlled companies is especially significant when 
corporate malfeasance is done by the controlling shareholders or their affiliates in the firm. To address 
this concern, some systems have opted to guarantee minority shareholder board representation 
through different means, such as cumulative voting.296 China’s Company Law, however, includes only 
an optional cumulative voting provision.297 The Code of Corporate Governance actually does require 
listed firms with a dominant shareholder that owns more than thirty percent of the votes to have 
cumulative voting for the selection of directors and supervisors.298 However, as mentioned earlier, the 
Code is rarely enforced and merely offers a standard setting. Surprisingly, a recent study found that a 
large majority of PRC listed firms have included cumulative voting in their articles of association. Yet, 
the formal adoption of cumulative voting in these firms had only limited implication in practice.299  
Firms either did not exercise their cumulative voting mechanisms or the implementation did not bring 
more independence to the board through minority shareholder representation for other reasons.   
In sum, board members in China often turn a blind eye or even cooperate with insiders’ 
misconduct when it occurs under the cover of the controlling shareholder’s support or acquiescence. 
When board members do monitor management, they do so to protect the interests of controlling 
shareholders. Their incentives and ability to represent all shareholders are undermined. Such weakness 
emphasizes the importance of having other strong internal monitoring governance bodies, such as 
independent directors and audit committees, as well as a strong ex-post accountability regime.  
 
ii.  Independent Directors 
 
Over the last two decades, particularly following the wave of corporate scandals of the early 
2000s, independent directors have become an important element of corporate governance and the 
 
295 Id. arts. 37, 99. 
296 Non-controlling shareholders’ board representation is required in Italy. See Erede, supra note 283, at 350–54. 
297 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 105. (“A shareholders’ assembly may adopt a cumulative voting system to elect 
the directors or supervisors according to the bylaw or its resolutions.”) (Emphasis added.). 
298 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission and the State Economic and Trade Commission, Jan. 7, 2001), art. 31 [hereinafter Code of Corporate 
Governance], available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.html. 
299 Chao Xi & Yugang Chen, Does Cumulative Voting Matter? The Case of China: An Empirical Assessment, 15 EUR. BUS. ORG. 
L. REV. 585, 585-613 (2014). 




focus of corporate legal reform in many countries.300 While legal systems use different terms and 
definitions for this internal governance institution,301 independent directors in all systems share a 
prescribed capacity to monitor corporate control parties (either generally or with respect to specific 
transactions).  
This development in corporate governance did not bypass China. China’s Company Law 
contains a general and obscure provision about independent directors, leaving the matter to secondary 
regulation.302 Among the various relevant rules,303 the most pertinent and comprehensive set of rules 
is the CSRC-issued 2001 Independent Directors Guidance for Listed Firms (here, Independent 
Director Guidance, or the Guidance).304 Per the Guidance, one-third of the total number of directors 
on the board of any listed company should be independent, with at least one independent director 
being an “accounting professional.”305 Listed companies are required to include independent directors 
in their articles of association.306  
The Guidance imposed on independent directors “a duty of good faith and due diligence and 
care to the firm and all its shareholders.”307 They “shall protect the overall interests of the company 
 
300 In the United States, the main relevant governance reforms include the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 2003 revisions in 
NYSE and Nasdaq listing rules, and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. See generally Ronald W. Masulis et al., Directors: Older and 
Wiser, or Too Old to Govern? (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 584/2018, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284874. A greater role for independent directors is reported in the United Kingdom 
following the release of the Cadbury Report, and similar trends are observed in Japan in the same period. For a review of 
this trend, see Clarke, supra note 71, at 150-175. 
301 For a complete analysis, see Clarke, supra note 71. 
302 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 122. (“A listed company shall have independent directors. The concrete 
measures shall be formulated by the State Council.”). This provision applies specifically to publicly listed firms and not to 
joint stock companies more generally.  
303 For the current legal framework, see id.; Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors 
of Listed Companies, (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n., Aug. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Independent 
Directors Guidance],  http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.html; Code 
of Corporate Governance, supra note 298, which includes “best practices” guidance with no specific number of 
independent directors nor specific powers prescribed for conflicted transactions); CRSC 2004 Provisions, supra note 275; 
CSRC Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies (2016 Amendment) (promulgated by China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n, Sept. 30, 2016), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/DepartmentRules/201804/P020180427331974952658.pdf (which in 
article 96 limit the number of “inside directors” to no more than fifty percent of all directors, but define them as those 
who concomitantly serve as executives or employee representatives—therefore opting not to refer to their independence 
from other controlling parties); Shangahi gongsi duli dongshi luz hi zhiyin ([上市公司独立董事履职指引) [Guidelines 
for the Performance of Duties by Independent Directors of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Association 
for Pub. Companies (CAPO), Sept. 12, 2014) (a national self-regulatory nonprofit organization, supervised by the CSRC, 
that issues recommended best practices to listed firms). 
304 Independent Directors Guidance, supra note 303. The Guidance was, and still is, the most detailed effort to establish 
the institution of independent director in Chinese listed companies, but it was not the first. There had been prior initiatives 
at various administrative levels—local governments, central ministries, stock exchanges, and the CSRC itself—of various 
scopes and varying degrees of commitment. For a complete review, see Clarke, supra note 71, at 175-201. Clarke’s review 
shows how the CSRC in its draft and prior efforts actually aimed to establish a far more rigorous independent director 
mechanism that would have had broader and more specific powers in the firm than those finally established by the 
Guidance.   
305 Independent Directors Guidance, supra note 303, art. I.3. 
306 Id.  
307 Id. art. I.2.  




and shall be especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders from being 
infringed.”308 To that end, the Guidance limits the number of firms in which an independent director 
can hold a similar concomitant position to five, and emphasizes their independence from the 
“influence of the company's major shareholders, actual controllers, or other entities or persons who 
are interested parties of the listed company.”309 From this it seems clear that the CSRC took the 
position that an independent director should serve the interests of the company while protecting 
particularly public shareholders and being free from the influence of any interested party.  
Various powers are formally conferred upon independent directors. They are given a role in 
the auditing, nomination, and compensation board committees, of which they should constitute at 
least half of the members “when such committees are set up.”310 They are given the power to approve 
major related party transactions before such transactions are submitted to board discussion.311 They 
can propose engagement with an accounting firm to the board and propose that the board of directors 
call a special shareholders’ meeting or a meeting of the board. Independent directors can appoint 
outside auditors and consultants, and they can solicit proxies before a shareholders’ meeting is held.312 
None of these powers are binding except perhaps the power to approve major related party 
transactions. The binding effect of that approval is also questionable considering that non-compliance 
requires merely a disclosure. 
Independent directors are also required to offer an opinion on certain matters, including 
decisions on the appointments, dismissals, and remunerations of other directors and senior managers. 
An opinion is also required on any event that the independent director considers to be detrimental to 
the interests of minority shareholders.313 Where the matter is subject to public disclosure by other laws 
 
308 Id.  
309 Id. The “Independence Requirement” is further made clear, in article III: 
“III.  Independent directors shall meet the "independence" requirements: 
A person may not hold the position of the independent director in any of the following circumstances: 
1. a person who holds a position in the listed company or its affiliated enterprises, their direct relatives and major social relations (direct 
relatives refer to their spouse, father, mother and children etc.; major social relations [these are also based on familial ties] 
refer to their brothers, sisters, father-in-law, mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, spouse of their brothers, sisters, 
and their spouse's brothers and sisters etc.); 
2. a person who holds more than 1 percent of the outstanding shares of the listed company directly or indirectly, or the natural person 
shareholders of the 10 largest shareholders of the listed company, or such shareholder's direct relative; 
3. a person who holds a position in a unit which holds more than 5 percent of the outstanding shares of the listed company directly or indirectly, 
or of the unit which ranks as one of the 5 largest shareholders of the listed company, or such employee's direct relative; 
4. a person meeting any of the three above-mentioned conditions in the immediate proceeding year; 
5. a person providing financial, legal or consulting services to the listed company or its subsidiaries; 
6. a person stipulated in the articles of association; 
7. a person determined by the CSRC.” 
Id. art III. (Emphasis added.) 
310 Id. art. V.4. 
311 Id. art. V.1.a (defining “Major related party transactions” as transactions with related parties in whose “total value 
exceeds RMB three million or 5 percent of the company's net assets audited recently”). 
312 Id. art. V.4.1.b-f. 
313 Id. art. VI. 
(“1. Apart from carrying out the above-mentioned duties, the independent director shall provide the independent opinion 
on the following matters to the board of the directors or to the shareholders' meeting:  




and regulations, their opinion should also be disclosed, and where consensus was not reached, their 
opinions should be disclosed separately. 314  While these disclosure provisions seem relatively far 
reaching and might lead independent directors to perform their role in earnest, they might also cause 
them to suppress their judgment, side with their peers to reach a consensus, or simply default to a no-
comment opinion for fear of retaliation by the interested parties. 
Existing evidence shows that most companies have followed the Guidance with respect to the 
appointment of independent directors and made relevant bylaw amendments.315 This fact alone, 
however, does not say much about the directors’ performance of the above roles in practice or the 
practice the institution brings to shareholders and corporate governance more generally. Given that 
the Guidance has been in effect for almost two decades, these aspects can now be tested.316 The 
empirical studies on this subject have produced vague and often conflicting results.317 There is general 
theoretical skepticism about the ability of independent directors to effectively perform their oversight 
 
a. Nomination, appointment or replacement of directors;  
b. Appointment or dismissal of senior managers; 
c. Remuneration for directors and senior managers;  
d. Any existing or new loan borrowed from the listed company by or other funds transfer made by the company's 
shareholders, actual controllers or affiliated enterprises that exceeds RMB three million or 5 percent of the company's net 
assets audited recently, and whether the company has taken effective measures to collect the amount due;  
e. Events that the independent director considers to be detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders;  
f. Other matters stipulated by the articles of association.”) 
314 Id. arts. VI.2, VI.3. The Guidance does not make clear whether the identity of each independent director should be 
disclosed along with her/his opinion. 
315 Clarke, supra note 71, at 200. 
316 Clarke’s review includes the limited empirical research that was available at the time, which mainly examined the 
characteristics of independent directors (educational and professional background and their salary).  
317 Here is a sample of relevant empirical studies:  
Juan Ma & Tarun Khanna, Independent Directors' Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed Companies in China, 37 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 1547 (2016) (examining 24,212 independent directors’ opinions disclosed between 2001 and 2010 and identifying 
scarce instances of dissent (only in 119 individual cases). The study concludes that independent directors would generally 
defer to top management and that dissent is more likely when there is an “end game” situation in the firm); Xuesong Tang 
et al., The Effectiveness of the Mandatory Disclosure of Independent Directors’ Opinions: Empirical Evidence from China, 32 J. ACCT. & 
PUB. POL’Y 89 (2013). (suggesting that independent directors’ “NO” opinion, signals negatively to public shareholders, 
affecting firm value); Lihong Wang, Protection or Expropriation: Politically Connected Independent Directors in China, 55 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 92 (2015) (based on 7,487 firm observations between 2003 and 2012, the author suggests that politically connected 
independent directors—an independent director who is a former government official or a current or former member of 
the People’s Congress / CPPCC— enlarge the magnitude of related-party transactions with the controlling party in both 
listed privately controlled firms and listed local SOEs. Notwithstanding, the author also concludes that a large fraction of 
politically connected independent directors increases firm value in Chinese-listed, privately controlled firms but is 
detrimental to firm value of listed SOEs, especially those under local-government control); Karen Lin et al., Voice or Exit? 
Independent Director Decisions in an Emerging Economy (Oct. 22, 2012) (SSRN paper), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2166876 (examining independent directors’ opinions and 
resignation notices by Chinese listed firms between 2005 and 2009. The authors find that the likelihood of an opposing or 
dissenting opinion by an independent director is low (only 179 of a sample of 47,052 opinions, or 0.38 percent of all 
opinions). In contrast, the authors also find that voluntary resignation by an independent director is a more common event 
(1.8 percent of independent directors resigning before the end of their appointment each year). The authors conclude that 
independent directors are more likely to resign than to dissent when they have private information about adverse corporate 
events.). 




role, particularly where controlling shareholders exist.318 Similarly, the debate around the practical 
contribution of this institution to corporate governance and firm performance is unsettled elsewhere 
as well.319 With respect to China, the value brought by independent directors to shareholders and the 
functional efficacy of this monitoring mechanism are questionable.  
Upon inspection of the Guidance and other related legal frameworks, 320  three major 
impediments clearly stand in the way of making independent directors effective monitors in China. 
First, controlling or dominant shareholders can ultimately elect the independent directors.. According 
to the Guidance, the board of directors, supervisory board, and shareholders who independently or 
jointly hold more than one percent of the shares may nominate independent directors. 321  The 
shareholders’ meeting then votes on and elects the nominees are by majority vote. The very nature of 
the independence of independent directors is therefore dubious, particularly with respect to future 
decisions when they might feel that they owe their election to a particular shareholder. The complex 
network of business, social, and political ties surrounding listed firms in China, and the identity of the 
controlling shareholder, commonly a state body,322 only make the availability of true independent 
directors more scarce.323 For example, despite the procedures set in the Guidance, a recent study found 
that the chairman of the board in firms, usually the representative of the controlling shareholder, 
“handpicks” nearly all independent directors from his or her own social network.324 
Second, under the current legal framework, there seems to be no positive motivation for 
independent directors to fulfill their intended roles, nor are there any legal consequences for directors 
or firms that violate the Guidance. While the general fear of liability under fiduciary duties and 
procedures established in the 2005 Company Law may motivate independent directors, 325  these 
general incentives are the same as those of inside directors. Nothing is provided to make them act 
differently.326 In addition, the binding power of the Guidance is unclear. As a matter of black letter 
 
318 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271 (2016) 
(noting that both the election and retention of independent directors largely depends on the controlling shareholder). 
319 See generally Ronald W. Masulis & Emma Jincheng Zhang, How Valuable are Independent Directors? Evidence from External 
Distractions, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 22, 
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/22/how-valuable-are-independent-directors-evidence-from-external-
distractions/ (“empirical assessments of the value of independent directors are decidedly mixed, leaving the value of 
independent directors an important unsettled question in the literature”). 
320 See supra note 303. 
321 Independent Directors Guidance, supra note 303, art. IV.1. Before elections, proposed nominees should first be 
approved by the applicable branch of the CSRC. Id. art. IV.3. 
322 The independence criteria are focused on independence from natural persons, not institutions. See id. art. III. 
323 A striking example of this can be seen in a statement of the dean of Changjiang School of Business about his service as 
an independent director. Clarke, supra note 170, at 43 (“I have never thought that the independent director is the protector 
of medium and small shareholders; never think that. My job is first and foremost to protect the interests of the large 
shareholder, because the large shareholder is the state.”).  
324 Ma & Khanna, supra note 317, at 1549. 
325 On the firm’s right to sue on violations of fiduciary duties, see 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 151. For 
shareholders’ standing with respect to violations of any law, administrative regulation, or bylaws that damaged shareholders’ 
interests, see id. art. 152. 
326 Clarke, supra note 71, at 209-210. 




law, the failure to comply with the Independent Directors Guidance (or any other provision pertaining 
to independent directors under the relevant legal framework327) does not seem to constitute illegality 
or lead to any specific formal enforcement by the CSRC. The CSRC may pressure companies to 
comply in various soft power-ways, and the general fear of delisting might also encourage compliance, 
but the Guidance itself does not prescribe any administrative sanctions. This ambiguity concerning 
enforcement practically renders the implementation of the Guidance selective and leaves it in the 
hands of firms and their controlling insiders.  There is no reason to assume that dominant or 
controlling shareholders would selectively appoint truly independent supervisors over their heads, 
particularly given the mixed evidence on the effect of the mechanism on market value. 
It is still possible that the pressure of the reputation market could incentive independent 
directors, once selected, to monitor on behalf of public shareholders.328 The market for independent 
directors is likely much sounder today than it was when the Guidance was established, and reputation 
can play a significant role. However, a recent study that examined independent directors’ dissents 
found that dissent rates dropped drastically after 2006. Independent directors thereafter generally 
deferred to top management.329 While the authors did not offer any causal inferences, it is possible 
that this was a result of a regulatory change. The inclusion of the independent director mechanism in 
the 2005 Company Law, or possibly the parallel reform that exposed previously-untradeable state 
shares to market forces for the first time, could have pushed independent directors to be less 
confrontational, perhaps fearing retaliation by corporate control parties. The evidence of their 
decreasing dissents might thus reflect that gaining the support of internal corporate control parties 
substitutes for reputation in the external labor market for future appointments.  
Finally, nothing since the Independent Directors Guidance was established has changed the 
fact that the “requirements” in the Guidance are not mandatory. Firms can still avoid being considered 
“violators”—and thus avoid repercussions—simply by disclosing their failure to implement. A failure 
to comply with any of the provisions does not automatically invalidate a decision.330 
Given the above, it seems that despite the adoption of the institution itself in most listed firms 
in China today and regardless of its potential effects on market value, independent directors generally 
do not function to secure the interests of public investors or monitor against corporate malfeasance 




327 See supra note 303.  
328 I discuss the reputation and managerial labor market as external monitoring institutions below. 
329 Ma & Khanna, supra note 317, at 1550. 
330 Independent Directors Guidance, supra note 303, art. V.3 ; Clarke, supra note 71, at 194. 




iii.  Supervisory Board 
 
  The PRC’s dual board structure combines an Anglo-American style board of directors and a 
German style supervisory board. In addition to the board of directors, any joint stock company must 
have a board of supervisors with employee electors. At first glance, it seems that the structure is a 
transplant of Germany’s two-tiered board and co-determination mechanisms. 331  However, the 
Chinese dual board structure is very different from Germany’s mechanism and is widely considered 
to be a failure. China’s 2005 Company Law does mandate that firm employees elect one-third of the 
supervisory board members and the general shareholders’ meeting elects the rest.332 However, unlike 
its German inspiration, not only is there no hierarchical relationship between the PRC’s supervisory 
board and the board of directors, but these two supposed monitoring bodies also lack independence 
from the controlling shareholder. The supervisory board has no power whatsoever with respect to 
appointing the board of directors, who are elected by the general shareholders’ meeting—which is, 
again, dominated by the controlling shareholder.   
Legal reforms and various regulations that have been instituted over the years concerning the 
governance of PRC listed firms did not even try to correct the sheer irrelevance of the supervisory 
board. Some options that could have made the supervisory board more relevant to firm governance 
include granting negative veto rights or requiring the approval of the supervisory board for certain 
board decisions. Any attempt to empower this institution, which theoretically is supposed to have a 
supervising function, is entirely missing from both laws and regulations. 333  Thus, instead of 
constraining the power of control parties or providing any kind of monitoring mechanism that would 
benefit employees or public shareholders, the Chinese dual board structure further entrenches the 
power of those dominating the firm.334   
 
iv.  Audit Committee and/or Other Special Committees 
 
Some legal systems have installed special committees to address intrinsic power imbalances in 
the ownership structure of firms in their market. These committees are often involved in the approval 
 
331 I discuss the German board structure further below under both the Creditors and Employee Monitoring subsections.  
332 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 53, 117, 188. Moreover, article 108 enables the board of directors in CLSs to 
have employees-elected representatives as well. Id. art. 108.  
333 The supervisory board is authorized: to examine the financial affairs of the company; to propose the removal of 
directors and senior managers who violated their duties, laws, regulations, company bylaws, or shareholders’ resolutions, 
and under certain conditions initiate a derivative lawsuit following such violation; to demand that the violators rectify their 
actions; to propose a shareholder meeting or to assemble one where the board of directors fail to do so; and to put forward 
proposals at a shareholders meeting. The supervisory board members may also observe the meetings of the board of 
directors as non-voters. Id. arts. 52-54, 117-118, 152. 
334 Especially since cumulative voting is currently not mandatory. Supra note 297 and the accompanying text. See Clarke, 
supra note 71, at 161–62, 173–75 (discussing the supervisory board in Germany and the failure of the supervisory board 
mechanism in China). 




process for suspicious transactions, in which conflicts of interests are inherent and the independence 
of traditional governing bodies is compromised. In Israel, for example, the company law mandates 
the creation of an audit committee with both independent directors and a majority of outside directors, 
as well as a compensation committee, in every listed firm.335 The audit committee is entrusted with 
auditing the conduct of management and with approving certain related-party transactions. When the 
transaction is essential or an extraordinary transaction, as defined in the law, the approval process is 
more stringent, and the audit committee basically receives power to veto the transaction even before 
it is brought to the board. The same committee is also charged with ensuring that a competitive pricing 
negotiation process was followed in related-party transactions. Israel’s recently-introduced 
compensation committee is tasked with creating compensation guidelines as well as with approving 
the compensation of high-ranking company officers. It is required to re-evaluate its guidelines and 
update them as need be, at least once every three years. All outside directors are required to serve on 
the compensation committee, and they must comprise the majority of the committee’s members.336 
The Israeli regulator designed these mechanisms to handle the inherent conflicts and power 
imbalances within Israel’s capital market, in which firms’ ownership reflects strong controlling 
shareholders and, until recently, concentrated business groups. In contrast with this regulatory action, 
China’s company and securities laws and regulations do not mandate the creation of similar audit 
committees or other special committees. As mentioned earlier, independent directors are given a role 
in the board’s auditing, nomination, and compensation committees “if such committees are set up,” 
in which case they should constitute at least half of the members.337 Thus, internal auditing, including 
scrutiny of related-party transactions, is left in the hands of the internal governing bodies and is 
therefore tainted with the problems pertaining to those bodies.338  
 
3. Third-Party Corporate Constituents  
 
  In many concentrated markets, corporate governance accommodates a role for stakeholders 
who do not own any equity interest in the firm. Such non-shareholder constituents have some 
disciplinary power over corporate insiders. While these constituents monitor in their own interest, 
their interests sometimes coincide with those of public shareholders.  
 
 
335 See Company Law, 5759-1999, § 114, 115, 117, 118(a), 118(b) 1 LSI 44 (1999). 
336 For further details on these committees, see Itai Fiegenbaum & Amir Licht, Corporate Law of Israel, in THE LAW OF ISRAEL 
10 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2019) (noting that, “In addition to these statutorily mandated committees, recent court 
decisions have facilitated the adoption of ad-hoc ‘Special Independent Committees’. Purporting to rely on customs and 
precedents from Delaware courts […].”). 
337 See supra note 310. 
338 External institutions (such as the CSRC and the Stock Exchanges) scrutinize related party transactions and financial 
auditing but the review in this section refers only to the role of intra-firm governing institutions. 






  Creditors are perceived to have both the ability, through contractual loan covenants, and 
incentive to monitor corporate conduct. Since their earnings are based on interest rates and on the 
firm’s residual assets upon liquidation, which both depend on the firm’s financial stability, they would 
like to see the firm maximizing its value. Therefore, conventional wisdom goes, creditors monitor 
corporate conduct toward this goal. This aligns their interests with those of shareholders to some 
degree as long as the firm is not facing insolvency. By the same logic, high leverage is known to 
discipline managers since high levels of debt lead to close monitoring by creditors.339 In addition, 
political economies in different systems have created an institutional setting in which creditors own 
shares in listed firms, thereby aligning the interests of creditors and shareholders more directly.  
It is important to distinguish between various types of creditors, which can be roughly 
classified into external debt providers, such as banks and other loan-providing financial institutions, 
and corporate bond holders. While the interests of these creditors are similar, their characteristics 
differ in ways that affect their ability to monitor. For example, corporate bond holders’ access to 
information largely depends on the efficacy of information disclosure in a given market. Widely 
dispersed corporate bond holders’ ability to monitor often depends on third-party intermediary 
institutions, such as trustees, underwriters, and credit rating agencies. In addition, in order for 
corporate bond holders to have any disciplinary effect on corporate conduct, they need a well-
functioning, liquid debt market through which they can trade their bonds.  Finally, since bond issuance 
agreements are mainly based on boilerplate provisions and rarely provide covenants that involve bond 
holders in the governance of corporations, corporate bond holders largely depend on ex-post legal 
enforcement to have their rights protected.  
On the other hand, external debt providers, such as banks can establish effective information 
disclosure processes in their loan agreements and are less dependent on other intermediaries. They are 
better positioned to negotiate for loan covenants that will require their consent for certain corporate 
acts, thus giving them more direct monitoring capacity. Banks typically also have enough incentive 
and means to monitor without the need for coalition building. Finally, while banks do sometimes 
require the help of enforcing institutions (especially for liquidation proceedings), they are less 
dependent on them and can rely on their financial position and reputation market sanctions in a repeat-
transaction environment.   
The best-known examples of systems that have encouraged corporate monitoring by financial 
institutions as external debt providers are those of Japan and Germany. In both systems this was 
achieved through parallel equity stakes that large financial intermediaries held in firms. Furthermore, 
in both systems, the role of financial intermediaries in corporate governance was guided by certain 
 
339 Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARV. BUS. REV. 61 (1989) (concerning the governance power 
of debt through LBOs). 




industrial organizational structures and the local political economy that buttressed their preferred 
monitoring position. In Japan, cross-holding ownership structures within Japanese post-war 
conglomerates, the horizontal Keiretsu, relied on a main bank to provide each business group with 
credit, while holding concomitant shares in the borrowing firms. This has historically positioned the 
main banks at an informational advantage to monitor poor performance in industrial firms.340  
In Germany, despite some decrease in ownership concentration,341 there is still a continued 
emphasis on the interests of third-party stakeholders, including creditors, which are given a path for 
direct involvement in the affairs of the corporation. This is achieved mainly through the two-tier board 
system and the mechanism known as “co-determination.”342 As part of this corporate governance 
institution, employees and shareholders elect equal numbers of representatives to the supervisory 
board of large corporations. The supervisory board then appoints the members of the firm’s 
“management board.” 343  Since banks in Germany function not only as creditors, but also exert 
influence as direct and indirect shareholders, and in addition act as something like trustees for public 
investors, banks often de facto exercise the public shareholders’ voting power by proxy. 344 This 
includes the vote on the selection of supervisory board members and, by extension, management 
board members. Consequently, the banks’ monitoring role as creditors is enhanced through a parallel 
shareholder (and proxy) position, 345 which gives them access to information and positions them to 
engage, and sometimes even control, the decision-making process. 
As one of the richest economies in the world set in a social democratic political system, which 
has historically strong banks and weak securities markets,346 Germany offers an interesting model for 
comparison with China. Indeed, in China too, while shareholding by financial institutions is slowly 
being liberalized, capital financing is still overwhelmingly led by bank lending rather than by equity 
capital markets.347 As opposed to Germany or Japan, however, China’s state-owned commercial banks 
 
340  Masahiko Aoki, Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 3 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark 
J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, YALE L.J. 871, 871-
906 (1993) (yet suggesting an alternative, more complex analysis in which bank monitoring is one component of a complex 
contractual governance system that monitors the production process); Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the 
Main Bank System and Other Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 425 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in 
Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).  
341 Marc Goergen et al., Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 175, 178-79 (2008). 
342 John W. Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European 
Union, 24 L. & POL’Y 355, 362-68 (2002) (revealing how the choice to preserve a “stakeholder” oriented corporate 
approach, rather than adopt a pure shareholder wealth one, despite growing dispersion in the capital market, emanated 
from various political power struggles and continued social obligations). 
343 Goergen et al., supra note 341, at 184–86. 
344 The proxy-vote system in Germany provides banks with effective voting powers. Id. at 178-186 (noting that historically 
the bank that owns shares in the listed firm is also the firm’s main creditor). 
345 But see id. (noting some regression in the scope of monitoring by large banks). 
346 See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE 
IMPACT 71 (2003). 
347 Zhiwu Chen et al., The Asset Management Industry in China: Its Past Performance and Future Prospects, J. PROF. MGMT., SPECIAL 
CHINA ISSUE, 2015, at 12 (showing continuing dominance of bank financing over equity financing, whereby equity 
financing stayed below five percent of total bank loans in quantity (measured 1991–2013)). See Christian Edelmann et al., 




act exclusively as creditors of listed companies because direct equity investment by commercial banks 
in nonfinancial business enterprises is generally prohibited.348   
Historically, and to a large degree today, Chinese banks have been conduits of the state and 
based their lending decisions on political guidance rather than on sound financial considerations. Being 
connected to the state, therefore, China’s main banks lack a “monitoring culture” as well as incentives 
to monitor.349 One result is the low default rate of distressed companies, which distorts the market to 
not reflect risk properly.350 In fact, an important critique of the design of China’s company law is that 
it emphasizes creditors’ protection against “their own misguided lending decisions” rather than 
enlisting the help of banks in monitoring corporations.351 Even more striking is the finding that banks 
continue to lend to firms even in the face of clear cases of continuous tunneling by controlling 
shareholders.352  
There are some recent signals that the Party-state is now willing to consider direct equity 
holding by commercial banks in nonfinancial business enterprises. The Chinese government looks to 
solve onerous debt burdens seen in many of the PRC’s large listed companies, and the central 
government encourages further rounds of debt-for-equity swaps through various schemes.353 While 
China enlisted asset management companies (AMCs) to recapitalize the banks’ non-performing loans 
 
Asset Management in China, OLIVER WYMAN (Aug. 2014), http://www.oliverwyman.com/our-
expertise/insights/2014/aug/asset-management-in-china.html#.VmTbPa6rRE5 (noting that in 2014, the bulk of China’s 
$145 trillion financial assets were either bank deposits or low risk securities).  
348 See Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (商业银行法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 10, 1995, last amended Aug. 29, 
2015), art. 43 [hereinafter Law on Commercial Banks], available here: 
https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/c42fffd534ac8f10bdfb.html (prohibiting such equity investment by commercial banks 
unless otherwise provided by regulation). Exceptions to the general prohibition were implemented by a debt-for-equity 
swap scheme during the late 1990s that allowed indirect equity holding through AMCs. See infra note 354 (based on 
Howson, supra note 182). A similar scheme intended to handle non-performing loans and extreme corporate leverage was 
in the making in recent years. See Lingling Wei, China is Set to Allow Banks to Swap Bad Loans for Equity in Borrowers, WALL 
STREET J. (Apr. 15, 2016, 12:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-plans-debt-for-equity-swap-program-to-help-
reduce-corporate-debt-1460649581. See also infra note 353. 
349 Clarke, supra note 115, at 175-176. 
350 By the late 1990s, the financial system was insolvent due to an extreme level of bank lending to failing SOEs and 
consequent levels of non-performing loans. GREEN, supra note 104, at 22. Yet, despite several efforts to rehabilitate and 
restructure the system, the phenomena of “bad debt” and “soft budget constraints” continue to threaten China’s financial 
strength and resilience (especially from the provincial level down).  
351 Clarke, supra note 115, at 176, n.17. 
352 Meijun Qian & Bernard Y. Yeung, Bank Financing and Corporate Governance, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 258 (2015). 
353 Evidence of this includes Premier Li Keqiang’s announcement concerning an expected reform of the financial system 
that would, among other aspects, employ market-oriented debt-to-equity schemes to reduce the leverage in enterprises. 
Lei Ying, Li Keqiang: Yao Gaige Wanshan Jinrong Jianguan Tixi, [Li Keqiang: Reform and Improve the Financial System], CHINA 
NETWORK (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.china.com.cn/lianghui/news/2016-03/16/content_38038507.htm. See also 
Guanyu Shenhua Tourongzi Tizhi Gaige de Yijian (关于深化投融资体制改革的意见) [Opinions on Enhancing the 
Reform of Financial Investments System] (promulgated by the CCP Central Committee and St. Council, July 5, 2016), art. 
10, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-07/18/content_5092501.htm (mentioning pilot projects in which financial 
institutions will hold equity in enterprises).   




in the past,354 the AMCs were not found to be effective monitors, since they suffer many of the 
weaknesses found in the banking system itself—the political clout of the debtor’s business group and 
their own government ownership.355 But now, for the first publicly celebrated time, direct bank equity 
holdings were implemented through a debt-equity swap in China Huarong Energy Ltd.356   
It will be interesting to see if the set of incentives directing the banks’ role will change following 
the expected increase in their direct equity holdings. If applied on a large scale, this could better align 
the interests of Chinese banks, as creditor-shareholders, with those of public shareholders. It might 
push banks, as equity-investing creditors, toward real financial monitoring, thus leading to more 
disciplined management of distressed assets and better risk allocation. 
The obvious caveats in this scenario should be noted. Due to the clashing power hierarchy 
between national firms and leading banks, it is unlikely that the banks will be permitted to have a 
dominant equity position in firms where a strong central or local state controlling shareholder already 
exists. Without a dominant position, marginal bank holding will most likely not create enough 
incentives for the bank to monitor against existing powerful, often politically connected, corporate 
control parties. Furthermore, and paradoxically, since most banks belong to the state, even if permitted 
to hold a dominant equity position in firms, there is no reason to believe that the bank will be any 
different than other state-affiliated controlling shareholders. Thus, theory aside, financial institutions 
are still instruments of the Party-state and continue to be guided by interests that are different from 
those of public minority shareholders. 
As for the corporate bond market in China and its potential monitoring capacity, there is a 
similar if not identical political factor. While China’s bond market is currently the third largest bond 
market in the world, trailing only the United States and Japan in 2014, most of the bond market is 
comprised of government bonds and financial institutions’ bonds. Only ten percent of the entire bond 
 
354 Four AMCs were created in 1999, carved out of the big four banks to purchase the respective bank’s non-performing 
loans. Organized as wholly state-owned corporations held by the Ministry of Finance, these “non-bank financial 
institutions” issued their own bonds to the banks to fund the purchase of the non-performing loans, which were then 
converted to equity. The Ministry of Finance directly guaranteed the AMC bonds. It was intended that AMCs would act 
to discipline the poorly performing corporations and push for their restructuring when needed. For further review, see 
Howson, supra note 182. 
355 Clarke, supra note 115, at 177. 
356 The first publicly announced case of a debt-to-equity swap that resulted in direct bank equity holdings in an industrial 
company was approved in March 2016, whereby a total of RMB 17.1 billion (USD 2.6 bn) worth of debt in China Huarong 
Energy Ltd (a shipbuilding company) was converted to shares and distributed among various banks and financial-
institution creditors, resulting in the issuance of fourteen percent equity shares to the Bank of China, which became the 
dominant shareholder in the company after the issuance. See Lingling Wei, China Regulators Speed Up Help for Banks on Bad 
Loans, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 13, 2016, 8:23 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-regulators-speed-up-bad-loans-
1457871782. See also Angela Yu, Bank of China to Become Largest Shareholder in Huarong Energy, FAIRPLAY (Mar. 10, 2016, 10:43 
AM).  
To the best of my knowledge, however, article 43 of the Law on Commercial Banks was not yet amended, and neither 
were other regulations issued to formally enable direct equity holding by commercial banks. See Law on Commercial Banks, 
supra note 348, art. 43.  




market were corporate bonds in 2014.357 While this does not necessarily preclude the monitoring 
capacity of corporate bond holders, it does suggest that considering the large scope of debt financing 
versus equity financing and the sheer size of bank loans within it,358 the influence of bond holders is 
marginal.  
In addition, recent data suggests that the main corporate bond holders in China are 
commercial banks holding sixty-three percent of corporate bonds as of 2014, while individuals 
represent only two percent of corporate bond holders.359 If this is correct, then the common bond 
holders in China are the same credit financiers that provide corporate loans—China’s banks, sharing 
the same characteristics and facing the same impediments to monitoring. Here too firms are shielded 
through implicit or explicit guarantees by the state.360 In a cyclical manner, the failure of the general 
debt market to default distressed firms causes bond holders, as other creditors, to price their risk on 
the basis of other considerations, such as political connections, rather than on the financial stability of 
the debtors. This low-risk environment lowers the cost of debt financing and erases creditors’ 
motivation to monitor. 
 
ii.   Employees  
   
  The embrace of co-determination in China reflects an ambivalent approach toward employee 
board representation. On the one hand, employee board representation has been an enduring feature 
 
357 In 2002, the corporate bond market represented only 2.8 percent of the total bond market. See Kim et al., supra note 
266, at 27-30. But see HONG XIE, A CHANGING BOND LANDSCAPE IN CHINA  (2014) [hereinafter S&P 2014 REPORT], 
available at 
https://www.spindices.com/search/?query=landscape+china&Search=Go&sortType=Relevance&resultsPerPage=25&
ContentType=Research (pointing out that government bonds and policy bank–issued bonds comprised seventy percent 
of the entire bond market as of September 2014, corporate bonds comprised ten percent, and various financial institutions–
issued bonds comprised twenty percent). But see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 236, at 2, 7, 15-16 (noting that the measures 
for “corporate bond” in China include different types of debt instruments, including those issued by local government 
financing vehicles, therefore reducing the actual size of true corporate issued bonds even further. According to the authors, 
in 2016, there was a substantial spike in the issuance of corporate bonds after a more lenient approach by the CSRC that 
started permitting issuance of corporate bonds by unlisted firms. Yet, the authors measured corporate bonds in 2016 to 
account for nineteen percent of the outstanding balance of the bond market.). 
358 See supra note 347. 
359 The remainder is held mostly by non-bank financial institutions. See S&P 2014 REPORT, supra note 357, at 3. However, 
note that Lin and Milhaupt present different classification ratios for bond holders as of 2016: 32.2 percent of all outstanding 
corporate debt instruments are reported to be held by trusts and other non-financial institutions—the vast majority of 
which are owned by local governments or by SOEs, while the national commercial banks hold 25.4 percent of all 
outstanding corporate bonds according to the authors. The ratio of individual bond holders and other instruments within 
the shadow banking system is less clearly differentiated. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 236, at 23-24. 
360 The first bond default was recorded in 2014. The number of firms (mainly private) allowed to default has grown since 
but is still small due to implicit guarantees mostly from local governments. For an analysis of recent default and near-
default cases, see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 236, at 37-47 (suggesting that the “no-default norm may begin to unravel as 
the Chinese economy slows”). 




of Chinese company law and survived throughout its various legal reforms.361 China’s Company Law 
still mandates that firm employees elect one-third of the supervisory board members of CLSs and the 
general shareholders meeting elects the rest. Thus, without any share-ownership requirement, China’s 
co-determination legal provision could presumably give rise to engagement in governance by 
employee-constituents.362 While the interests of employees and public shareholders might not always 
align, both share a general interest in maximizing firm revenue. For employees, it provides job security 
and can lead to higher salaries; for shareholders, it offers higher profits through dividends or share 
price increase. Both constituent groups should therefore strive to minimize value-reducing activities 
through monitoring against management waste, abuse, and corruption.363 
On the other hand, as mentioned in the context of the supervisory board, the law takes only 
an enabling approach concerning representation of employees on the board of directors itself. 
Moreover, absent a hierarchical relationship between the supervisory board and the board of directors, 
the Chinese dual-board structure is largely failing, and with it, the co-determination mechanism loses 
its bite. Even within the supervisory board, while employees have a voice in the election of one-third 
of its members, the reminder two-thirds are appointed by the same body that appoints the regular 
board members: the shareholders’ assembly—thus, the controlling shareholder. Therefore, instead of 
monitoring the controllers’ power, the Chinese dual-board structure, and the employees-constituent’s 
representative within it, further enhances it.364  
One might expect to see in the PRC, as a “workers’ state,” some empowerment of labor as a 
non-shareholder constituency, even separate from the co-determination role. Labor unions are given 
a formal participatory role in every PRC firm notwithstanding the lack of any share-ownership.365 
However, labor union representatives at PRC firms are actually hired by firm management and are 
paid by the firm and therefore invariably have a close relationship with incumbent management. 
Furthermore, the labor union organization itself is entirely subordinated to the CCP 366 and thus 
promotes the interests of the PRC Party-state, as do the board of directors, the party committee 
behind the board of directors, the supervisory board, senior management, the controlling shareholder, 
 
361 Compare 1993 Company law, supra note 66, art. 52 leaving the ratio of worker’s representatives to be determined in the 
articles of associations, with the 2005 Company law and its various amendments, supra note 147, art. 51. 
362 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 18, 108, 117. 
363 Pargendler et al., supra note 123, at 585.  
364 Especially since cumulative voting is currently not mandatory. 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 105. See Clarke, 
supra note 71, at 161–62, 173–75 (regarding the supervisory board in Germany and the failure of the supervisory board 
mechanism in China). 
365 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 18, 108, 117 (establishing the grounds for union involvement and presence in 
every China domiciled company). Article 18 states the following “…when making a decision on restructuring or any 
important issue relating to business operations, or to formulate any important bylaw, a company shall solicit the opinions 
of its labor union, and shall solicit the opinions and proposals of the employees through the assembly of the representatives 
of the employees or in any other way.” Id. art. 18.  
366 The unions are members of the “All-China Federation of Trade Unions,” which is the official union organization of 
the Chinese Communist Party. See generally Mary E. Gallagher & Baohua Dong, Legislating Harmony: Labor Law Reform in 
Contemporary China, in FROM IRON RICE BOWL TO INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS, WORKERS, AND THE STATE IN A 
CHANGING CHINA 36, 41-5 (Sarosh Kuruvilla et al. eds., 2011). 




and the firm itself. Labor unions and their representatives in firms are thus exceedingly unlikely to 
advocate an agenda that is supportive of oppressed minority shareholders, much less one that goes 
against the control parties of the firm. 
 
iii.   Consumers  
 
Here I consider customers as constituents of a firm, while putting aside questions of corporate 
social responsibility367 and related normative claims about the purpose of the corporation.368 The 
underlying assumption here is that the consumer-base of a firm can potentially monitor corporate 
insiders. This is the case simply because consumers are able to push firms to produce more value, e.g., 
reduce costs or improve quality, through consumer behavior and litigation. 
Theoretically, the performance of the stock market and consumers’ behavior and consumption 
levels are mutually related. Research conducted in Western, liberal markets found that an increase in 
overall market share prices boosts consumer confidence in the economy, leading consumers to spend 
more. 369  In turn, consumers’ behavior in various forms, including quality monitoring and social 
criticism, affects the profitability of firms and induces further growth. 370 
When looking at the Chinese consumer market, it becomes clear that consumer power is 
increasing along with shifts in the sources and scope of economic growth. With the increase in average 
wages and the economic shifts from low-income manufacturing industries to higher-earning services 
and technology-based industries, Chinese consumption is expected to continue to grow at an annual 
 
367 For shareholder value maximization, see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of a Business to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), available at http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 
244. For critiques of this premise, see LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Steve Denning, The Origin of ‘the World’s Dumbest Idea’: 
Milton Friedman, FORBES (June 26, 2013, 11:37 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/06/26/the-
origin-of-the-worlds-dumbest-idea-milton-friedman/#751ddb18870e. 
368 Some recent analysis calls for an alternative “costumer capitalism,” whereby managers should be first and foremost 
concerned with increasing costumers’ satisfaction. This claim holds as a way of creating shareholders’ value as well. See 
Roger L. Martin, The Age of Customer Capitalism, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan-Feb 2010, https://hbr.org/2010/01/the-age-of-
customer-capitalism. See also Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, The Case for Consumer-Oriented Corporate Governance, Accountability and 
Disclosure, 17 PA. J. BUS. L. 227 (2014) (calling for an expansion of the scope of corporate law and firms’ accountability 
towards the inclusion of consumers interests as corporate stakeholders). 
369 For empirical research on EU countries, see W. Jos Jansen & Niek J. Nahuis, The Stock Market and Consumer Confidence: 
European Evidence, 79 ECON. LETTERS 89 (2003) (referring also to previous empirical research regarding the U.S. market). 
The opposite direction—that is, the correlation between consumer behavior to stock market price—is far more established. 
See, e.g., Gerard J. Tellis & Joseph Johnson, The Value of Quality, 26 MARKETING SCI. 758, (2007) (examining changes in 
stock market return following consumers’ quality review). See also infra note 370. 
370  Elizabeth Demers & Baruch Lev, A Rude Awakening: Internet Shakeout in 2000, 6 REV. ACCT. STUD. 331, 331-59 (2001) 
(finding that nonfinancial measures, such as the products’ reach to costumers, explain the share price of Internet 
companies); Sunil Gupta et al., Valuing Customers, 41 J. MARKETING RES. 7, 7-18, (2004) (suggesting a model in which value 
based on costumers is a strong determinant of firm value). 




rate of nine percent during the coming few years.371 Commentators have predicted that this level of 
increase in China’s consumer market will continue even considering an overall economic slow-down 
of GDP growth to 5.5 percent below official targets.372 More importantly, the characteristics of China’s 
consumer base are changing toward the upper-middle-class household and more sophisticated 
consumers.  
Despite this continuous growth in China’s consumer base, the limited available research on 
the relationship between the stock market and consumption in China shows a weak link between 
capital market performance and consumer behavior. 373  This might suggest that the level of 
consumerism is not influenced by market trends and share performance. It may partially derive from 
the small number of investors relative to population. Unofficial estimates show that less than seven 
percent of urban Chinese invest in the capital market.374 Or perhaps the limited scope of available 
income that retail investors put into the capital markets (four percent of household assets) might 
explain the attenuated relationship between consumerism and capital markets in China.375  
Still, the change in the characteristics of consumers suggests that Chinese consumers will 
become more sophisticated, demanding more value, and therefore perhaps start being more engaged 
with firms and their products. Provided there is an institutional framework that would enable such 
engagement, consumer activism could be on the rise. A rising volume of consumers’ complaints either 
on social media, other press, or through formal courts proceedings would inflict reputational harm on 
a company and its managers, and may reduce profits and market price.376 The main impediments to 
consumers’ activism effectuating a disciplinary mechanism for better firm and managers’ performance 
are intertwined with the current institutional setting of the press and group and representative 
litigations in China.377 
 
 




374  See Arthur R. Kroeber, Making Sense of China’s Stock Market Mess, BROOKINGS (July 13, 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/making-sense-of-chinas-stock-market-mess/ (whereas, according to the same 
source, in the United States estimates go up to fifty percent of the population). 
375 Only four percent of private household asset allocation in China is invested in stocks and mutual funds. See Evelin 
Cheng, Chinese Investors are Putting Their Money in a Lot of Places: That Rarely Means Stocks, CNBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2018, 1:00 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/15/chinese-investors-are-picking-other-assets-over-stocks.html.  
376 Mushrooming lawsuits following the introduction of consumer-rights laws even allowed press reports to be submitted 
as evidence of the merits of a case. Craig S. Smith, Chinese Discover Product-Liability Suits, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 13, 1997) 
(also stating that "In the three years since China's consumer-rights laws took effect, liability lawsuits have risen to more 
than half a million annually.”). 
377 The weaknesses of the media in contemporary China are discussed below as part of the discussion of market gatekeepers. 
The court system and specifically the status of group and representative litigations will be discussed as part of the legal 
system.  




iv.  Managers (ownership and compensation incentives) 
 
Allocating shares to managers and setting performance-based incentives378 are designed to 
optimize managers’ performance and better align their interest with those of shareholders.379 These 
methods were used extensively during various stages of corporate reform in China to incentivize 
managers to increase firm productivity and profitability.380  
Nonetheless, recent empirical research found that managerial ownership in China is relatively 
insignificant, and managerial ownership plays a limited governance role.381 Managers’ small percentage 
of ownership in China, it is argued, leaves ample incentives for the insiders to expropriate, as the value 
from expropriation is greater. Higher levels of managerial ownership exist in situations where the 
managers are also the dominant or controlling shareholders, which entrench managers and give rise 
to the tunneling of value through their shareholding capacity. 
Concerning performance-based incentives, empirical research shows that until 2007 managers 
in SOEs were not better compensated than managers of other types of firms, even though SOEs were 
much larger and continuously growing corporations.382 This started to change in 2007. The scholars 
conducting the research suggest that the change derived from the fact that many large SOEs went 
through IPOs in the mid-2000s, subsequently raising their managerial compensation, which was tied 
to salary levels in the government before the offering.383 In addition, the authors point to a CSRC 
document that was released in December 2005 calling for SOEs to adopt incentive mechanisms to 
motivate managers’ performance. Despite these changes, performance incentive measurements 
remained limited due to explicit and implicit caps on the compensation of managers. Such caps are in 
place presumably to avoid social unrest over individuals’ capital accumulation (the issue of rising 
crony-capitalism), as well as to reduce the undisciplined use of operational costs that bite into the 
 
378Jensen & Meckling, supra note 244. 
379 Philippe Aghion et al., The Behaviour of State Firms in Eastern Europe, Pre-Privatisation, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 1327 (1994) 
(pointing to the importance of reforming the managerial incentive system for successful economic transition in former 
socialist economies); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS (Orley 
Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (surveying relevant empirical literature). See also Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, Executive 
Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 945 (2006) (referring to both pieces). 
380 For empirical research on various methods of managerial incentives in China (such as profit responsibility contracts 
and profit retention methods) see Kato & Long, supra note 379, at 948 (providing references). 
381 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 197 table 5, 206 and the references therein.  
382 Chong-En Bai & Lixin Colin Xu, Incentives for CEOs with Multitasks: Evidence from Chinese State-owned Enterprises, 33 J. 
COMP. ECON. 517 (2005).  
More generally on lower incentives for bureaucrats, see Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction 
Cost Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (1999). 
383 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 199 table 8, 203. (specifically mentioning the Industrial Commercial Bank of China, Bank 
of China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank, China National Petroleum Corporation, China Railway, 
Shenhua China, and Aluminum Corp of China). 




profitably of SOEs.384 Moreover, despite a dramatic increase in managers’ compensation in recent 
years, the authors find that compensation is still modest in China compared to other countries.385  
Other incentives for managers in China are informal pay benefits, 386  such as on-the-job 
consumption that was found to exceed the average executive pay by two to fifty times,387 hidden 
payments, and nonpecuniary benefits. The latter includes particularly the prospect of professional 
advancement to higher ranking positions in the government or the Party.388  
The evidence of the power of such benefits to incentivize better performing managers is 
inconclusive. Some studies show that certain nonpecuniary benefits and “hidden payments” with no 
specific disclosure obligations,389 such as travel allowances, business entertainment expenses, housing, 
office expenses, and overseas training, correlate with better firm performance in SOEs.390 These 
findings suggest that in Chinese state-controlled listed firms, nonpecuniary benefits and the hope for 
future promotions in the Party-state system substitute for managerial ownership and compensation in 
terms of their incentivizing power.391 Another study found that hidden on-the-job consumption does 
not correlate, or has a significant negative correlation, with company earnings in SOEs.392  
Either way, while these components influence managerial conduct one way or the other, they 
do not align their interests with those of public shareholders specifically. Thus, while they may have a 
disciplinary effect on managers to conform with the goals of the supervising Party-state authority or 
controlling state-shareholder, it is not necessarily a goal that increases firm value or otherwise serves 




384 Xuequan Mu, China Ties SOE Employees' Salaries to Profitability, CHINA DAILY (June 4, 2015, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-06/04/content_20907244.htm.  
385 See Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 203 (reporting that in 2012 the median compensation for top managers of SOEs was 
470,000 RMB, which was equal roughly to USD 77,000). 
386 Li-Wen Lin, Behind the Numbers: State Capitalism and Executive Compensation in China, 12 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 140 (2016) 
(discussing informal pay practices and how they are detached from formal pay disclosures by listed firms in China, 
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2002 and 2009).  
388 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 207; Kato & Long, supra note 379. I discuss this elaborately in Chapter 3. 
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B. External Monitoring Institutions 
 
1. External Markets  
 
i.  The Market for Corporate Control 
 
For widely-held firms, the market for corporate control is considered one of the strongest 
monitoring corporate governance mechanisms. 393  The market for corporate control is generally 
understood to function as follows. Managers who run the corporation poorly or systematically 
disadvantage equity investors will cause shareholders to sell their shares, with a resulting decline in 
share price. This will in turn increase the cost of raising new capital and will make the firm a target for 
takeovers by those who believe they can run it better. These potential insurgents will use the 
opportunity to acquire shares cheaply, gain control, and oust the existing management.394 Where there 
is a market for corporate control, inefficient behavior or self-dealing by incumbent managers therefore 
jeopardizes the position of these insiders, so that the market functions as an ongoing discipline and 
accountability mechanism. 
In concentrated markets, however, there is usually no active market for corporate control.395 
In such markets, the controlling shareholder elects its own nominees to the board of directors and is 
able to direct management absolutely. If the controlling shareholder is unsatisfied with the 
performance of its appointees, it will simply replace them. There is no possibility for other 
shareholders to oust the controlling shareholder’s strong ownership position in the controlled firm.396 
Any change in corporate control in these markets will have to obtain the consent of existing 
controlling parties. This also implies that when inefficient management stays in place, maximizing 
performance is presumably not the primary goal of the controlling shareholder. Alternatively, in this 
 
393  The market for corporate control was first described in the seminal article by Henry G. Manne. Henry G. Manne, 
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965). 
394 The change of control can be affected in various ways: via a direct purchase through mergers or acquisitions or by the 
purchase of shares in the open market, or by replacing incumbent directors through proxy contests. In any of these ways, 
control over the firm shifts, and incumbent insiders will be replaced. Id. 
395 But see John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical 
Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 273–85 (2011) (examining the prospect for hostile takeover regimes in China, Brazil, 
and India); Goergen et al., supra note 341 (discussing block trades as a market for partial control in Germany). 
396 See John Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds 12 (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 136, 2009), 
http://papers.ssrn.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1489336 (asserting that “influence-driven 
activism is unlikely to be deployed where dispersed ownership is lacking,” yet, providing examples of how such influence 
is nevertheless possible in certain cases despite an existence of a dominant shareholder (albeit within the U.S. market)).  




scenario, the controller has other means to maximize her returns on investment that are not shared 
with all shareholders. 
As in many other markets evidencing similar concentration, there is currently almost no hostile 
takeover activity, and thus no market for corporate control, in China. Nevertheless, there is some 
evidence that the Chinese market is developing a weak form of a market for corporate control, as 
limited takeover activity is surfacing in recent years. I hypothesized elsewhere on the possibility that a 
partial market for corporate control is currently underway within China’s controlling apparatus—that 
is, between groups of powerful and politically connected firms.397  
Fracturing within the political controlling apparatus might set the stage for an economic 
disentanglement in the current structure of firm ownership in the PRC in a way that will have implications 
for a market for corporate control. In the current Chinese market, business groups are still mainly 
clustered in specific industries and face a host of impediments regarding investment or business 
activity outside of their specific industry or sector. Such impediments include strict regulation of 
permitted “business scopes”; specific franchising grants that create monopoly-like opportunities; path 
dependency resulting from the corporatization without a privatization process that produced firms 
tied to specific ministries and thus specific industrial sectors;398 PRC listed firms’ historic dual share 
structure before 2006 that allowed “state shares” to be transferred only to other state shareholders;399 
the personnel appointment system for senior management with reshuffling of senior managers within 
the same industry; 400  and finally, Party-state direction and heavy regulation of M&A and takeover 
activity.401  
Notwithstanding these constraints and the resulting limited competition between corporatized 
SOEs across sectoral lines, the Chinese Party-state is not monolithic, and neither are the firms that it 
has established and controls. In fact, the PRC Party-state has a myriad of internal conflicts, expressed 
in competition between government agencies at the central and local levels, and between party and 
state institutions at all levels.  Nor does the Party itself lack contradictions, as conflicts exist as well 
within the various levels of the Party organization and among its individuals. These conflicts reduce 
the capacity of the PRC Party-state to act in a unified manner with respect to policy generally, or 
 
397 Or, in firms in which the party-state has no interests, mostly within the SME market. See Groswald Ozery, supra note 
101, at 56-62. 
398 See Chapter 1, Section I.A.2.i supra  
399 See Chapter 1, Section I.A.2.i supra, and note 78 supra.  
400 See Howson, supra note 278; Chih-shian Liou & Chung-min Tsai, Between Hierarchy and the Market: Managerial Career 
Trajectories in China’s Energy Sector, in CHOOSING CHINA’S LEADERS 124 (Chien-wen Kou & Xiaowei Zang eds., 2013).  
401 Mainly through: 1) required review by the Ministry of Commerce and its approval related to acquisitions and mergers 
affecting market concentration (equal to an antitrust review); 2) approval by SASAC for mergers and acquisitions involving 
state assets; 3) approvals by additional ancillary authorities as required according to the industry, business scope, and the 
involvement of foreign investors (e.g., SAFE, NDRC, SAIC); and most importantly 4) a review by the CSRC, through its 
designated “M&A and Restructuring Examination Committee,” which has a broad authority to regulate and handle all 
issues related to mergers and acquisitions of listed companies (including takeovers, and dispute resolutions in cases of 
hostile takeovers and the use of defensive tactics). See Huang & Chen, supra note 179. 




through the firms it dominates. As a result, the system often serves more particularistic interests, 
whether individual, institutional, local, or across “systems” (xitong).402  
While this of course leads to rampant self-dealing by firm insiders, at the macro level it also 
gradually leads to economic disentanglement of some firms and business groups from the Party-state. 
This is especially striking in the alienation of local government-controlled firms from the central Party-
state. China’s economic success has boosted the power of local governments and local government–
promoted firms. Local officials have enormous incentives to maximize economic growth in their 
jurisdictions, very often at the expense of national Party-state interests.403  
As local government–controlled firms become ever more invested in profit maximization for 
their own benefit,404 the more they try to compete on market share with other PRC firms in their same 
region and nationally. Mergers and acquisitions activity across industries and regions has been 
increasing.405 More market-oriented competitive M&A activity can induce the sales of distressed assets, 
which in turn can contribute to competition and to firms’ efficient operation.406 The consequence of 
this form of greater market competition between local government–controlled but listed firms might 
eventually bring about a partial market for corporate control between dominant blockholders (still 
mainly among such controlling parties).407 
A limited number of hostile takeover battles provide examples that this form of a partial 
market for corporate control is indeed emerging: For instance, in October 2003, the management of 
ST Meiya (a textile company traded at the time on the Shenzhen stock exchange) applied defensive 
tactics to push against a change of control in the company,408 which essentially resulted in the transfer 
of shares from one state-owned shareholder to another. In this case, the dominant shareholder of ST 
Meiya—Heshan State Assets Management Bureau, a city-level state asset management office—had 
signed a share transfer agreement to sell a 27.49 percent stake to the private Wanhe Group. It appears 
 
402  KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND 
PROCESSES 135, 141-142 (1990) (referring to “xitong” as an organizational concept describing vertical functional systems 
of hierarchy that comprise China’s governing bodies).   
403 See Kenneth Lieberthal, China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental Policy Implementation, 1 CHINA ENV’T SERIES 
3, 4-6 (1997) (addressing the situation of conflicting interests and incentives related to the implementation of 
environmental policy). 
404 See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 262 (2011) (analogizing 
Chinese state-controlled enterprises to private equity firms). 
405  See Barry Chen, Chinese Mergers and Acquisitions: What’s Next, MANZELLA REP. (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/strategies-section/1014-chinese-mergers-and-acquisitions-what-s-next 
(reporting on a number of 1,536 M&A transactions that were closed in 2014, the majority of which (sixty-five percent) 
related to SOEs restructuring). See also Dezan Shira & Associates, Understanding Mergers and Acquisitions in China, CHINA 
BRIEFING, 166, June-July 2016, available at http://www.iberchina.org/files/2016/mergers-acquisitions-in-china.pdf 
(reviewing latest M&A market trends including proportions and distributions across industries, and reporting an increase 
of thirty-nine percent in inbound M&A deals from 2010 to 2015). 
406 Moreover, if implemented on a large scale, the debt-for-equity swap scheme that is currently ongoing will contribute to 
asset fluidity as well. See supra notes 348-356. 
407 See Groswald Ozery, supra note 101, at 56-62. 
408 See Huang & Chen, supra note 179, at 30-31. 




that this move was taken without any involvement of ST Meiya’s managers, thus presumably raising 
alarms for their jobs. Incumbent managers obtained the support of the firm’s employees (after finally 
making delayed payments),409 and together they opposed the transaction. The main justification for 
their “anti-takeover” action was that the intended transfer would be harmful to the firm’s long-term 
interests since the acquirer operated in an entirely different industry and was not competent to run the 
company.  Indeed, following these pressures, and despite its contractual obligations, the local 
government shareholder terminated the share transfer agreement. Instead, it made an agreement with 
another acquirer that was favored by the management to sell 24.99 percent of its shares. Interestingly, 
the second acquirer, Guanxin Foreign Trade, one of China’s largest import-export enterprises, is a 
state-owned company.410 In its public announcement, ST Meiya mentioned that since the new acquirer 
is state-owned, its “operational mechanisms are not so different” than those of ST Meiya, which was 
a major consideration for choosing them as the acquirer.411 
Other “hostile” efforts and defenses reflecting signs of a partial market for corporate control 
within China’s political economy are reflected in more recent cases. In 2012, locally state-owned 
Beijing Enterprise Group sharply increased its stake in China Gas Holding Ltd., a Chinese energy 
company whose shares are listed on the Hong Kong exchange, thereby challenging a prior hostile 
takeover attempt by another state-owned conglomerate, Sinopec. Sinopec, a state-controlled national 
champion, had joined with a privately owned, politically connected firm, ENN Energy Holdings 
Ltd.412 Similarly, in a more recent bidding war, Baoneng Group, an apparently private Shenzhen-based 
real estate conglomerate, gradually bought shares in China’s largest residential area developer, Vanke 
Co. Ltd.  The gradual acquisition by Baoneng Group overtook state-owned China Resources Co. Ltd. 
as Vanke's new largest shareholder. 413  Vanke’s incumbent managers have applied various anti-
takeover measures to fend off a potential takeover by Baoneng, ultimately cooperating with another 
local-government-owned SOE.414  
 
409 Id. 
410 Wanhe Group, the original private acquirer, tacitly consented to the termination of its acquisition agreement, without 
any disclosed compensation, even though their contractual rights were violated. 
411 Aibing Lu & Wenxiang Yao, ST Meiya “feichang supei” Wanhe bingbai fan shougou an [The Anti-takeover Case of Defeating ST 
Meiya and Wanhe’s “Extremely Fast Match”], XINHUANET, (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/stock/2003-
12/09/content_1220874.htm.  
412  Guo Aibing, Beijing Enterprises Group Buys More Shares in China Gas, BLOOMBERG  (May 7, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-07/beijing-enterprises-becomes-single-largest-china-gas-
shareholder. 
413 Li Xiang, Vanke ‘Ropes in Govt Help’ to Ward Off Biggest Shareholder Baoneng, CHINA DAILY EUROPE (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:27 
AM), http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-12/22/content_22769475.htm. 
414 The antitakeover tactics included Vanke’s management first initiating a trade suspension on December 18, 2015 and 
renewing the suspension repeatedly until July 4, 2016, presumably to halt further purchase of shares by the hostile acquirer. 
See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, REPORT ON SUSPENSION OF TRADING DUE TO MAJOR CAPITAL RESTRUCTURE (June 
15, 2016, available at http://disclosure.szse.cn/finalpage/2016-06-15/1202368720.PDF. In March 2016, the company 
applied a “white knight” strategy in which a strategic cooperation with an alternative friendly buyer (in this case a locally-
owned SOE, Shenzhen Metro group) was sought out to fend off a hostile acquisition. See Shenzhen Metro Group and Vanke 
Achieved a Strategic Cooperation, VANKE (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.vanke.com/en/news.aspx?type=8&id=4260. In 
January 2017, Vanke’s dominant state shareholder sold its shares to the same locally owned SOE, Shenzhen Metro Group, 




These latest events certainly signal an adversarial shift in business conduct and perhaps a more 
general market-oriented approach by the firms operating in China’s capital markets. Yet, for a 
corporate control market to have a disciplinary effect on managers, it must cultivate enough competing 
control parties. The examples above illustrate how a potential hostile acquirer will find it difficult to 
acquire control (or a significant block) without the cooperation of an insider, either management or a 
dominant blockholder. 
An attenuated market for corporate control between dominant blockholders is bound to face 
a challenge from China’s legal framework. Current regulations provide dominant shareholders with 
the power to block acquisitions in certain circumstances even without equity control. A supermajority 
(two-thirds) shareholder approval is required for certain corporate decisions, such as the approval of 
mergers or major asset restructuring.415 The CSRC 2004 Provisions apply this two-thirds approval 
requirement to additional issues, including the sale of major assets, restructuring, and share issuance.416  
Perhaps even more relevant in this context are China’s 2006 Securities Law and the CSRC 
2006 Takeover Measures that subject takeovers to a mandatory bidding mechanism.417 Under this 
regulatory framework, creeping acquisitions are substantially restricted by a disclosure requirement at 
the five and twenty percent thresholds.418 Furthermore, any acquirer of a listed company (outside 
investor or inside shareholder) exceeding a thirty percent ownership threshold must undergo a 
mandatory tender offer to further increase its stock ownership.419 Another significant provision is 
Article 33 of the Takeover Measures, which prohibits the use of certain takeover defenses without an 
approval by the shareholders’ meeting.420 This provision gives dominant stockholders a veto power 
 
which acted as the white night under the initial management’s anti-takeover strategy. See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, 
REPORT ON REGISTRATION OF TRANSFERRED SHARES (Jan. 25, 2017), available at 
http://disclosure.szse.cn/finalpage/2017-01-25/1203052214.PDF.  
415 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 103, 121. 
416 CSRC 2004 Provisions, supra note 275, arts. 88, 96. 
417 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengchuan Fa [Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nati’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, amended Oct. 27, 2005, last amended Aug. 31, 2014), arts. 88, 96 
[hereinafter 2006 Securities Law], available at https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/e3a5d596aa075797bdfb.html. 
The CSRC 2006 Takeover Measures elaborate the bid process. See Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa (上市公司收
购管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of the Acquisition of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n., July 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006, amended Aug. 27, 2008, amended Feb. 14, 2012) [hereinafter 
CSRC 2006 Takeover Measures]. See also CSRC Decision on Amending Article 62 and Article 63 of the Measures for the 
Administration of the Acquisition of Listed Companies (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Comm., Dec. 29, 
2011) (amending the CSRC 2006 Takeover Measures).  
418 See CRSC 2006 Takeover Measures, supra note 417, Part II (“Disclosure of Interests”) (particularly articles 12-17). 
419 2006 Securities Law, supra note 417, arts. 88, 93, 96. See also CSRC 2006 Takeover Measures, supra note 417, arts. 22, 23 
(stipulating the same). These provisions also distinguish between a “general tender offer”—when a purchaser intends to 
acquire all of the shares of a company—and a “partial tender offer” – when a purchaser intends to acquire only part of 
the shares. See also id. arts. 26, 35 (stipulating the “equal treatment” and minimum price consideration for all shares of the 
same class sold). Interestingly, the acquirer can ask the CSRC for an exemption form the bidding process. See id. arts. 62, 
63. 
420 See id. art. 33 (“During the period between the issuance of the alert by the acquirer and completion of the takeover 
offer, … the board of directors of the target company may not, without the approval of the shareholders' general meeting, 
materially affect the company's assets, liabilities, interests or business results through the disposal of company assets, 
investment in third parties, adjusting the company's core business, providing security, taking out loans, etc.”). What the 




over the adoption and employment of anti-takeover defenses and turns any possible control battle 
into a battle between powerful existing blockholders.421 
Taken together, even if a supply of competing dominant blockholders is developing and can 
form an attenuated market for corporate control, the existing regulatory framework increases the cost 
of acquisitions and has a chilling effect on potential acquirers, likely limiting them to China’s biggest 
or most politically connected firms. The development of a partial market for corporate control in 
China, if it is indeed underway, can have some disciplinary effect against managerial misconduct. It is 
possible that even a weak and partial market for corporate control will open up greater investment 
alternatives that are currently completely missing from the PRC capital markets, which would in turn 
empower public shareholders to at least vote with their feet. 
 
ii. The Capital Market (Debt & Equity Markets) 
 
a. Debt Market422 
 
The theory of the benefit of debts in reducing agency costs suggests that the use of debt in 
the capital structure of a firm can discipline managers. 423 Creditors, concerned about the firm’s 
financial stability, will require high interest or stringent covenants in their loan agreements. Once debt 
is granted, failure to pay off the debt will push the firm into bankruptcy quicker. Alternatively, creditors 
might refuse giving credit to the firm altogether. In that case, the cost of capital for an inefficient or 
poorly run firm becomes higher. Debt financing, therefore, keeps managers on their toes to ensure 
enough cash flow exists.  
Many Chinese listed firms have high debt financing ratios,424 and yet debt is not likely to have 
a strong disciplinary effect on managers. Chinese banks tend to lend to state-owned firms, large firms, 
and politically connected firms regardless of their financial stability.425 It is assumed that central and 
local governments, which rely on employment by listed firms for social stability, will come to a firm’s 
aid before it reaches bankruptcy. Banks commonly prefer to have nonperforming loans on their 
statements rather than initiate bankruptcy proceeding. As Clarke summarizes, “because banks are still 
 
“etc.” at the end of the article stands for is unclear, but opens up the need to approve any material decision in this period 
with the shareholders’ meeting. 
421 For an account of the regulatory and practical impediments to takeovers in China, see Hui (Robin) Huang, The New 
Takeover Regulation in China: Evolution an Enhancement, 42 INT'L L. 153 (2008); Huang & Chen, supra note 179. 
422 In my reference to “debt market,” I do not differentiate between credit and bond-based debt. As mentioned, most 
bond holders in China are typically the common loan providers—China’s commercial banks. 
423 Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986); Jensen, 
supra note 339. 
424 Recent estimates suggest a median debt ratio of fifty percent among non-financial Chinese listed firms. See Jiang & Kim, 
supra note 80, at 203. 
425 Id. at 208. 




often required to lend for political reasons, the result is that corporate management has been subject 
to the discipline neither of the credit market when seeking a loan nor of lender monitoring after 
obtaining it.” 426  Listed firms in China, and especially state-controlled firms, have little fear of 
bankruptcy. This makes the debt market’s penalty for poor management minimal and reduces, if not 
eliminates, monitoring and the disciplinary effect of debt financing.427 
 
b. Equity Market 
 
  Current indicators of China’s capital market growth is brought in the introduction. The data 
reflects a continuous growth relative to the domestic economy as well as to other global capital markets. 
Yet an increase in market capitalization, impressive as it is, does not say much about the role the stock 
markets play in China’s corporate governance system. This is especially so since the share price of 
Chinese listed companies is not a good signal for real firm value, as many China-specific empirical 
accounts found.428 If this is indeed the case, then the monitoring effect that a vibrant stock market has 
on corporate insiders is removed, or at least significantly reduced, when it comes to the Chinese stock 
markets.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese stock market does have an attenuated monitoring capacity, albeit 
exercised in a very idiosyncratic way.  Some theoretical qualifications should be mentioned first on 
how equity markets are believed to discipline corporate insiders elsewhere. Stock market monitoring 
is carried through the market firm’s stock performance as reflected in the firm’s public share price. 
This stock market and firm value indication is influenced by shareholders’ exit, colloquially termed 
 
426 Clarke, supra note 115, at 176. 
427 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 208. 
428 While with respect to all markets there are various metrics to assess real firm value, stock market price being one 
indication, there is usually a high correlation and predictive power between various metrics of firm performance (e.g., P/E 
ratio, ROE, ROI indicators) and the firm’s stock price. It is widely accepted in the relevant literature, however, that this is 
not the case for China. See Gul Ferdinand et al., Ownership Concentration, Foreign Shareholding, Audit Quality, and Stock Price 
Synchronicity: Evidence from China, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 425-442 (2010) (showing higher synchronicity for firms where the 
largest shareholder is affiliated with the government, concluding that stock prices are less reflective of firms’ specific 
information for these companies); Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why do Emerging Markets 
have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000) (examining country level synchronicity and finding that 
stock price movements are more synchronous in emerging markets than in developed markets, attributing the difference 
to uninformed trade. The authors report that China has the second highest synchronicity among forty sample countries); 
Zhiwu Chen, Stock Market in China’s Modernization Process—Its Past, Present and Future Prospects 40-41 (Yale Sch. 
of Mgmt. Working Paper, 2006) (on file with author) (studying co-movement levels among individual stocks, concluding 
that Chinese investors treated every stock the same; from the investors’ perspective the stocks were indistinguishable from 
one another). See also Yujuan Zhao, The Relationship Between Share Price Gains, Corporate Performance and Risk, 5 IBUSINESS 110 
(2013); William T. Allen & Han Shen, Assessing China’s Top-Down Securities Markets, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research., Law 
and Economics Working Paper No. 16713, 2011. 
For recent evidence suggesting contesting views on the level of informational inefficiency in China’s capital market, see 
infra note 433. 




“voting with their feet” or “the Wall-Street Walk.”429 This market price mechanism has been shown 
empirically to have a disciplinary effect on firm management. In fact, even the credible threat of 
shareholders selling has a disciplinary effect on management. This function of the stock market is 
believed to provide groups of shareholders some traction in influencing management decisions, 
thereby amounting to a form of public shareholder monitoring.430 Of course, this governance leverage 
is only amplified in situations where there is a functioning market for corporate control, whereby mass 
selling decreases the price to a level at which a hostile acquirer can purchase control cheaply and then 
oust incumbent management. Still, in a vibrant stock market, the firm’s public share price operates as 
a disciplinary mechanism even without a threat of a hostile acquirer.  
There is no a priori reason why the same principle should not also apply in concentrated 
markets without a market for corporate control. Without a doubt, a share price drop from mass 
shareholder defections has consequences for firm market value in these markets as well. Similarly, the 
relative success or failure of a corporation, as measured by firm market value, will almost certainly 
affect the reputation and/or advancement of corporate insiders in controlled firms too. A controlling 
shareholder can be similarly affected by a threat of large-scale defection of public investors and the 
expected decrease in market value, especially regarding the cost of future capital. Finally, where 
ownership is concentrated but control is organized through business groups, a reduction in the market 
value of a given firm in the group and the associated reputational harm caused to the control parties 
can have negative implications at the group level and on individual firms within the group. Hence, 
under conditions where there is sufficient liquidity in the public float of a controlled firm431—meaning 
an easy availability of exit for shareholders or the credible threat of it—even firms and their managers 
in concentrated capital markets can be disciplined by standard capital markets mechanisms such as 
market share price and exit threats. 
While the theory has much to commend it, there are difficulties in this argument when applied 
to China’s capital markets. The theory about the disciplining effect of the market price presupposes a 
certain level of market sophistication and informational efficiency. It also assumes that a certain 
 
429 Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2645 (2009) (distinguishing between overt activism and a threat of exit as a form of shareholder activism). 
430 Id. (providing a model whereby the threat of exit by a large shareholder on the basis of private information can have a 
disciplinary impact on managers’ decisions); Robert Parrino et al., Voting with Their Feet: Institutional Ownership Changes Around 
Forced CEO Turnover, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2003).  
431 Most of the research on market liquidity is focused on widely held firms. See Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig Von 
Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control, 53 J. FIN. 1, 2 (1998) (asserting that “the benefits of dispersion are mainly 
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by insiders’ ownership and institutional investors’ holdings in U.S. listed firms). Some studies attempt to examine liquidity 
in concentrated markets as well. See Marco Becht, European Corporate Governance: Trading off Liquidity Against Control, 43 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 1071, 1077 (1999) (asserting that “[f]or the United States, there is extensive empirical evidence . . . that the 
number of shareholders is positively related to liquidity” and attempting to provide similar evidence for the German and 
Belgian markets); David A Lesmond, Liquidity of Emerging Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (2005) (examining liquidity of 
emerging markets on a macro level, cross-country basis). 




volume of reliable information is flowing into the market, signaling to investors the relative desirability 
of a given investment and, at the same time, reflecting investors’ assessments of past and future 
performance of a given firm. The Chinese capital markets do not function this way presently, as they 
are in many ways informationally inefficient. Share prices often seem to be driven not by economic 
considerations based on information disclosed in the market but instead by factors unrelated to firm 
fundamentals,432 suggesting that the market does not allocate capital efficiently.433  
This does not mean that movements in the share price do not influence managers, but they 
are simply one factor in the assessment of the firms’ success and in the evaluation of managers’ 
performance that are weighted by the relevant bodies of the Party-state. Although incentive-based 
compensation plays a marginal role in motivating managers of state-controlled firms to perform 
better,434 this does not mean that these managers are not penalized for poor performance. The 
advancement of nomenklatura appointees within the management ranks of China’s corporatized and 
listed SOEs is directly influenced by the success of the firms they manage. While in the past empirical 
research showed a low correlation between managers’ turnover and firms’ market performance, this 
has been changing. There is greater consideration today for market price monitoring in the assessment 
of SOE managers.435  Of course, the prospect for advancement in the CCP hierarchy motivates 
successful performance as well. While not much is known about the details of this internal monitoring 
mechanism, it is known that the public share price of a corporatized SOE is taken into account for 
Chinese Communist Party personnel system evaluation. A drop in the share price of a PRC issuer, 
whether or not reflecting actual economic performance, may block firm managers’ future 
advancement within the Party.436  
Despite this link between public share price and the evaluation of managers and their 
professional and political advancement, it is important to emphasize that there are also other non-
market criteria used to measure the firm’s success and managers’ performance.437 More importantly, it 
is not the stock market per se that disciplines managers. Public shareholders in PRC firms in many 
 
432 See supra note 428. See generally Khanna & Palepu, supra note 268 (citing Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of 
Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000)). For more 
recent claims for poor capital market performance, see Allen et al., Dissecting the Long-term Performance of the Chinese 
Stock Market, supra note 7 (positing that China’s domestic stock market performs poorly and is disconnected from the 
overall economic growth, and suggesting several institutional explanations for that, mainly inefficient IPO mechanisms 
and corporate governance problems). 
433 Importantly, new research suggests that this view of the Chinese capital market is outdated. See Jennifer N. Carpenter 
et al., The Real Value of China’s Stock Market (Bank of Fin. Instit. of Econ. in Transition, Discussion Paper No. 2/2018, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106656 (arguing that since the reforms of the mid-2000s, 
China’s stock market became informationally efficient. Stock prices, they argue, reflect future firm profits and are linked 
to firm fundamentals in ways that are consistent with other large economies). 
434 See supra Chapter 2, Section III.A.3.iv. 
435 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 207. 
436 I elaborate on these mechanisms further in Chapter 3. 
437 Other evaluation criteria include contribution to GDP growth, tax compliance, reduction in environmental footprint, 
and the amount of social unrest created around corporate conduct (reflected, for example, through shareholder complaints 
and derivative suits). I elaborate on the various evaluation criteria in Chapter 3. Section II. Infra.   




cases cannot effectively utilize exit, or the threat of exit, as a disciplinary mechanism. The response to 
the 2015 and 2016 stock crashes by the PRC central government, during which share prices were 
propped up through massive mandated purchase orders and blanket suspensions of trade,438reflects 
the limited impact of public shareholders’ own assessment of firms compared to the direct influence 
of government policy on market share prices.  
In addition, alternative investments in PRC listed firms that evidence better governance and 
potential for better performance are scarce. The high percentage of listed firms that are ultimately 
controlled by state affiliates leaves investors with little choice but to hold shares in those firms.439 This 
is one reason why public investors in China tend to invest alongside dominant Party-state shareholders, 
even if performance is lackluster or a corporate governance violation becomes apparent. Instead of 
relying on information for performance evaluation and voting with their feet accordingly, many prefer 
to rely on the inside knowledge and relationships of the Party-state control party. 
Hence, the factor of share prices through the capital market creates an attenuated monitoring 
mechanism, but it functions mainly through the Party personnel management system, while the 
disciplinary effect of massive sales (or threats of a “Wall Street Walk” exit) by public shareholders is 
much more limited. 
 
iii. The Product Market 
 
According to theoretical law-and-economics accounts supported by empirical research in 
Western developed markets, inefficient firms are eventually eliminated through a natural selection 
process in the product market. Competitive pressures in the product market, therefore, restrain 
tunneling and mismanagement by corporate insiders and compensate for weak corporate 
governance.440   
In China, import-export limitations have been gradually reduced, and competition in the 
product market is constantly increasing between state-controlled firms and between state-controlled 
 
438 By July 8, 2015, 1,300 listed firms, representing forty-five percent of the market, suspended trading to hold back share 
price decrease. See Almost Half of China's Firms Halt Trading as Market Dives, FRANCE 24 (July 8, 2015, 4:19 PM), 
http://www.france24.com/en/20150708-almost-half-chinese-firms-suspend-trading-market-dives.  
439 MUSACCHIO & LAZZARINI, supra note 201 (pointing to seventy percent of overall Chinese stock market capitalization 
represented by firms that are ultimately controlled by state organs). For other sources supporting the inference of the 
absence of investment alternatives, see also supra note 428.  
440 Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices, 66 J. FIN. 563 
(2011) (suggesting that competitive pressures in the product market can mitigate the agency costs of weak governance); 
Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1983) (finding that product market 
competition reduces managerial slack); Klaus M. Schmidt, Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition, 64 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 191 (1997) (finding that in markets with increased competition there is an increased probability that firms with high 
costs will become unprofitable and reach liquidation; this “threat of liquidation effect” was found to induce managers’ 
work discipline). 




firms and private firms.441 This raises the possibility that the product market will become a significant 
external corporate governance institution in China.  
Despite the promising disciplinary role of product market competition in China, a few cautions 
should be noted reflecting a preliminary assessment of the possible directions that competition in a 
growing product market can take in China, based on past studies and current market trends.442 First, 
constant change in China’s economic and institutional infrastructure makes it harder for market forces 
to signal out inefficient firms and eliminate them fast enough. In a rapidly evolving market, it is 
possible that the disciplinary force of the product market actually becomes weaker rather than stronger, 
at least until institutions are able to adjust. Another possible path for development in the product 
market views increasing market competition as an opportunity for misconduct, rather than as a 
disciplinary mechanism. Lacking reliable enforcement institutions, corporate misconduct will be 
carried out to gain a competitive edge.443 As is often pointed out, a large number of firms in China 
operate outside the rules of the market and the legal system, at a time when violations of IP rights, 
product quality, and safety standards can still be advantageous to them. The turning point in the 
development trajectory when such violations will become more harmful to firms and their insiders 
than useful, could be rather far away. Finally, even if market competition works as the law and 
economics theory predicts and increasingly disciplines insiders’ misconduct in the Chinese market, 
some firms, particularly those affiliated with state entities, remain shielded from competition. In 
certain industries and regarding specific firms, monopoly power is intended or at least accepted.444 
The potential disciplinary effect of the product market is therefore limited at the outset to certain 
market segments and firms. 
 
iv. Managerial Reputation and Labor Market 
 
In a well-cited paper, Fama argued that career prospects induce managers to operate efficiently. 
Managers’ concerns for their reputation and future careers, as well as competition in the managerial 
 
441 John McMillan & Barry Naughton, How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China, 8 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 
130 (1992). 
442 Qiao Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional Determinants, 52 CESIFO ECON. 
STUD. 415 (2006) (product market competition is unlikely to be an important governance mechanism in China given 
institutional deficiencies). But see Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 213 (suggesting that product market competition in China 
can discipline managers because they do not want to “lose face” when compared to benchmark competitive firms and 
managers).  
443 Hongbin Cai et al., Does Competition Encourage Unethical Behavior? The Case of Chinese Corporate Profit Hiding 
(2005) (conference paper - The First Asia Corporate Governance Conference, Shanghai, China, 2005), available at 
https://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/114986/1/Content.pdf?accept=1 (finding that competition encouraged Chinese 
firms to hide profits for tax reasons).  
444 For market entry restrictions that effectuate monopoly-like powers for certain firms in China, see Wentong Zheng, 
Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643, 660–663 
(2010). 




labor market, push them to perform better and eliminate unnecessary risky behavior.445 Similarly, it is 
argued that sanctions of shaming and moral disapproval by the public threaten reputational harm and 
operate as a disciplinary force in corporate governance.446 
With respect to China, with the development of the financial market and as professional 
education improves, the supply of professional managerial talent is constantly growing. The labor 
market for top managers in listed firms is no longer confined to inexperienced bureaucrats and ex-
military. Organs of the Party-state evaluate SOE managers, and the Party’s Organization Department 
dictates the appointments of senior managers in significant firms. These appointments and career 
decisions are not merely bureaucratic processes; market performance is increasingly considered in the 
appointment, evaluation, and promotion of Party-state managerial appointees. A study conducted 
during the early managerial reforms in SOEs (1980-90s) found that the allocation of managers in SOEs 
was already responding to nascent market forces. Managers were subjected to more frequent review, 
were demoted, or even fired for poor performance.447 In more recent studies, reputation through 
relation-based exchanges was found to have an important contribution to China’s economic 
development even outside communal settings.448 Another study reflects the importance of reputation 
for monitoring and disciplining managers in China, through evidence of public criticism in China’s 
stock exchanges and public shaming funneled by the media.449 Together, these studies indicate that 
reputational sanctions, and by extension the labor market for managers, bolster capital market activity. 
This is true, yet some limitations should be noted. While growing in size, sophistication, and 
experience, the managerial labor market for senior positions is still confined to a specific pool of 
people. Competition is narrow since appointments are limited to candidates with certain backgrounds 
or to those already fostered within specific business groups or state organs. In state-controlled 
companies, these are often the fortunate officials and party members whose names are listed on the 
Organization Department personnel lists.450 Political science research documents how the top of these 
lists became occupied by the children of the older generation politicians, often called China’s 
“princelings”—taizi dang, the princes of the party (or literally, the princes’ party).451 The managerial 
labor market for state-controlled firms is largely confined to this closed knit layer of cronies.  
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This should not imply that there isn’t fierce competition between the members of this class, but it 
does mean that the demand and supply for managers in many listed firms is not only quantitatively 
limited, but also that the appointments are often motivated by factors outside professional 
performance assessment. While this has not yet been examined empirically, it appears that the 
managerial labor market within the Party-state’s institutional infrastructure can incentivize managers 
to perform better and discipline their actions, but not in a way that is guided by efficiency 
considerations alone. Other political-economy considerations often guide the appointment, evaluation, 
and promotion of managers in many listed firms and particularly in state-controlled firms.452 This 
changes the traditional corporate governance function of reputational sanctions and managerial labor 
market in China. 
 
2.   Gatekeepers 
 
i. Lawyers, Accountants, and Underwriters 
 
Corporate governance theory prescribes an important monitoring role to third-party 
gatekeepers. Lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and other third-party market gatekeepers are repeat 
market players whose reputation depends on their ability to monitor effectively and expose corporate 
mismanagement. Because third-party gatekeepers have a legally reserved role in certain corporate 
activities, they have access to information that gives them the capacity, and often the obligation, to 
monitor. Moreover, since their future earnings depend on their reputation, they are presumed to also 
have an incentive to monitor even without the stick of collateral liability. It is commonly believed that 
incentives for monitoring by third-party gatekeepers (or the sanctions for failing to do so) outweigh 
the potential gains from cooperating with corporate wrongdoing and mismanagement.453  
The research on the role of third-party gatekeepers in the enforcement of China’s corporate 
governance and capital market regime is fairly limited. With respect to underwriters, pervasive state 
ownership and Party-state control over the industry place underwriters in China in a conflicted 
position and weaken their monitoring capacity.454 There is also doubt as to their professional capability 
to monitor. In a 2008 article, Clarke presents the view that the legal and accounting professions in 
 
452 While presenting the importance of reputational sanctions on firms and capital markets activity in China, Liebman and 
Milhaupt found a more limited applicability of such sanctions with regards to state-owned firms. See Liebman & Milhaupt, 
supra note 449, at 964-996. 
453 For a full account of the enforcement role played by gatekeepers in corporate governance, see Reinier H. Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986). 
454 See the discussion of underwriters as part of the Party-state’s control in the financial industry and capital markets 
generally in Section II.B. supra. See also Chao Chen et al., The IPO Underwriting Market Share in China: Do Ownership and Quality 
Matter?, 46 J. BANKING & FIN. 177 (2014); Bill B. Francis et al., Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence 
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China were not yet equipped to play an effective gatekeeper role.455 Lawyers and accountants at the 
industry level still lack the professional capability and the independence needed to expose complex 
financial fraud. A shortage of qualified accounting firms and the (albeit narrowing) shortage of trained 
lawyers shrink the potential importance of good reputation in these industries. Recent accounting 
scandals involving Chinese firms investigated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
suggest that this has not improved much since.456  
With limited reputational rewards and with little policing against wrongdoing gatekeepers, 
third-party gatekeepers are less incentivized to monitor corporate control parties. Under the current 
institutional setting in China, they often have more to gain from cooperating with corporate 
malfeasance than from monitoring and exposing it. 
 
ii.  Financial Press 
 
The financial press is known as a meaningful “watchdog” against corporate malfeasance, 
taking up an important role as an external corporate governance mechanism in many systems around 
the world. By exposing corporate wrongdoing and disseminating information, an active financial press 
also facilitates the monitoring role of other institutions, such as the stock market, reputation, and 
public and private enforcement.457 Transparency and objectivity are the cornerstone of an effective 
financial press. These are preconditioned on the financial press’ ability to be independent from various 
interested parties. 
Sources of information and media platforms in China are growing constantly, creating 
increased competition in an industry that until recently was open only to the state. This opens up 
access to information and potentially leads to competition on the quality and accuracy of the news as 
well. The academic literature points to the rise of the Chinese media as a social influencer in recent 
decades, and its growing role within the Chinese legal system. Moreover, it shows that the 
commercialization of media and expanded editorial discretion leads to some458 critical reporting.459  
The same literature also reports that these platforms are still controlled, and in many cases 
owned, by the Party-state through various means. Formal licensing and content regulation govern the 
field and impose entry barriers, while libel laws as well as formal and informal Communist Party policy 
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456 See SEC Charges China Affiliates of Big Four Accounting Firms with Violating U.S. Securities Laws in Refusing to Produce Documents, 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-
249htm.  
457 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 798-799 (2000). 
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institutions on a “supervising” authority). 
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through local propaganda departments direct content management.460 Most influential among these 
are informal rules directing editorial decision making, which are said to control the targets and the 
subject matter of reports, as well as to limit true investigative journalism to jurisdictions outside the 
location where the media is operating.461  
Thus, while the financial press is becoming more autonomous and increasingly influential, it 
still lacks independence from the most important interested party—the CCP. Media reports are still 
ultimately subject to Party scrutiny and will therefore continue to be used first and foremost to 
maintain Party-state legitimacy or advance its other priorities. Two recent examples of this can be 
viewed in the cherry-picking and timed coverage of officials accused in the anti-corruption campaign462 
and the state-promoted media campaign in the wake of the two recent stock market crashes. In the 
latter case, state-controlled media covered extensively the arrest of “disloyal” journalists for their 
contribution to market-price declines, and “foreign forces” were blamed for market volatility.463 In 
both examples, it is clear that the press assumes a disciplinary role and can bring light on corruption 
and other corporate abuse, but in a controlled and guided manner that can easily be directed to 
strengthen the current regime. 
 
3.   The Legal System 
 
i.   Public Enforcement — The CSRC  
  
  It seems that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has put the protection of 
so-called “public” (gongzhong) shareholders at the forefront of its mission. The CSRC has stepped into 
aspects of internal governance that are traditionally reserved to the Company Law. It has done so not 
only by issuing recommended best-practices, such as the 2001 Code for Corporate Governance, but 
also by enacting a number of mandatory regulations that override what is only enabled in the primary 
statute.464 
For instance, even before the 2005 amendment of the Company Law, the CSRC issued the 
Guidance for Independent Directors discussed earlier, which required listed firms to amend their 
 
460 Id. See also Liebman, supra note 458, at 845 (noting the use of libel laws as means of media control, as well as the use 
of defamation litigation to protect local interests). 
461 Liebman, supra note 459, at 41-56. 
462 This was reflected in the scope of anti-corruption investigations on which news items were published as opposed to a 
much higher number of investigations and the vast nation-wide coverage of the case of Bo Xilai, which was presumably 
to achieve populist legitimacy for the move. See Anti-Corruption by the Numbers, CHINA LAW TRANSLATE (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/corruption-by-the-numbers/?lang=en.  
463  China Is Trying to Blame Its Stock Market Crash on Journalists and Businessmen, VICE NEWS (Aug. 31, 2015), 
https://news.vice.com/article/china-is-trying-to-blame-its-stock-market-crash-on-journalists-and-businessmen.  
464 Howson, supra note 143 (offering reasons as to why the CSRC was allowed this position). 




bylaws and appoint independent directors to their boards.465 Around the same time, it enacted rules 
that were designed to make the decision-making process with respect to the sale, exchange, or 
purchase of major assets independent from the controlling shareholders of the firm.466 Perhaps most 
reflective of the CSRC’s investor protection orientation are the CSRC 2004 Provisions, which 
promoted minority shareholders participation in governance through a public- shareholders’ negative 
veto on certain corporate decisions.  
The 2004 Provisions required approval by the shareholders’ assembly (with the support of at 
least fifty percent of the “general public shareholders,” understood to mean holders of publicly-listed 
shares not affiliated with the controlling parties) for the following matters: issues that would have a 
material impact on public shareholders; any new issuance of stock or convertible debt to the public; 
rights offering; major asset reorganization; repayment of a debt by a shareholder; and any overseas 
listing by a significant subsidiary of the listed company.467 This negative veto conferred on non-
controlling shareholders in listed firms outside primary law is a meaningful mechanism for minority 
shareholder protection and provides an opportunity for their participation in governance. The CSRC 
2004 Provisions also urge (not require) firms to proactively increase the presence of public 
shareholders in shareholders’ meetings and to enhance their participation by enabling solicitation of 
voting proxies and cumulative voting. 
The rules set forth in the CSRC 2004 Provisions are only one example of how China’s capital 
markets regulator is increasingly intent on responding to broad investors’ expectations in order to 
encourage the flow of capital to the market. 468  However, granting protections and guaranteeing 
protections are two separate things.469 While the CSRC was allowed leeway for regulatory action, its 
power to enforce its policies has been curtailed by design. Many CSRC rules do not set forth any 
enforcing mechanisms and leave remedial measures to be set by primary laws.470 Without prescribing 
administrative sanctions or remedies for violations of these rules, CSRC enforcement is largely 
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discretionary. In that endeavor, the CSRC has to navigate the myriad of tensions and power conflicts 
within the PRC political economy.  
Public enforcement by the CSRC, particularly against insiders and other controlling parties in 
state-controlled firms, is not welcomed by powerful Party-state organs and is often held back. 
Consequently, publicly listed state-controlled enterprises enjoy more lenient enforcement of facially 
uniform legal standards. 471  The CSRC, like other state agencies, is more likely to enforce laws, 
regulations, or policies (or enforce them more rigorously) against violators that are unaffiliated with 
the Party-state apparatus than against those that are affiliated, even in clear cases of oppression or 
fraud.472 One example is the fraud case involving Nanjing Textile Import Export Corp., Ltd. The firm 
was an SSE-listed company with the Nanjing Municipal branch of SASAC as its controlling 
shareholder (at 35 percent). The company falsified and publicly declared a total of RMB 350 million 
(approximately USD 54 million) of profits for five consecutive years. The fraud was designed to 
conceal losses that would have forced the company to de-list. In response, the CSRC merely issued 
an administrative penalty and minor fines against the company and several of its managers. This was 
despite broad public calls to apply delisting norms and to enforce more rigorous sanctions, as was the 
case for other, presumably less-politically connected firms.473 
Pressures on the CSRC are bound to come from other sources as well. As mentioned, the 
CSRC is but one state-organ with an authority over the variety of firms that are active in the capital 
market. It shares the same hierarchical position as some of the most powerful listed groups and also 
with other ministry-level state organs that take part in regulating and supervising some of the same 
firms. Overlapping authorities, as well as regulatory competition, make it difficult for the CSRC to 
enforce its own prescribed shareholder protections in conflicted cases.474   
Finally, while the norms and mandatory provisions of the CSRC sometimes result in the 
empowerment of public shareholders to receive fairer treatment, their overall contribution depends 
on the relative power of the CSRC within the political infrastructure at any given time.  The position 
of the CSRC within China’s administrative and political hierarchy has weakened since the 2015–2016 
market crash. Subsequent legal enforcement and Party disciplinary procedures were taken against 
CSRC leading officials. These developments have discredited the agency and wounded its authority 
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within China’s political economy. 475  Recently, the CSRC, along with other state institutions, has 
apparently pulled back from capital market governance to make way for more direct involvement by 
party institutions.476 
  
ii.   Stock Exchanges – Self Regulatory Institutions 
 
As private (or semi-private) institutions that are commonly owned by their own members, 
stock exchanges have direct incentives to have well-governed firms. Self-regulation by stock exchanges, 
therefore, commonly constitutes a meaningful mechanism for monitoring and disciplining firms and 
their control parties.477 The New York Stock Exchange, for example, promoted rules that ensured 
investors’ protection in the U.S. market at a time when formal laws and institutions were missing. 478  
Several concentrated and emerging markets have similarly recognized the potential of stock exchange 
self-regulation and allowed for the emergence of designated exchanges with higher disclosure and 
minority protection requirements, alongside their traditional and path-dependent listing arrangement. 
In Brazil, the “Novo Mercado” segment of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange was developed to enable 
companies to voluntarily commit to better minority shareholder protections. The Brazilian 
arrangement reduced pressures for comprehensive legal reforms and enabled the adoption of 
governance mechanisms that otherwise would have been thwarted by existing interest groups. 479 
Additionally, some systems – including China’s – allow firms to cross-list their shares in other markets, 
which presumably offer better corporate governance. Cross-listing in these markets, the argument 
goes, enables firms to commit themselves voluntarily to higher investor protection standards in 
exchange for broader reach to capital and tapping new markets.480  
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In terms of promoting investor-friendly norms through “private regulation,” China’s stock 
exchanges have been relatively active. The two national stock exchanges produced rules for disclosure 
and voting procedures that preceded regulatory efforts. Furthermore, they were the first to offer 
comprehensive corporate governance guidelines. Indeed, in October 2000, preempting the CSRC 
Code for Corporate Governance, the Shanghai Stock Exchange released a draft set of corporate 
governance guidelines for all listed companies.481 Anglo-American corporate governance norms482 
heavily influenced these guidelines, which set forth shareholder rights, high disclosure standards, and 
duties on directors and managers. Perhaps most notably, in 2006, both SSE and SZSE created a 
detailed chapter in their listing requirements on the approval and disclosure process of related-party 
transactions in all listed firms,483 something that the national regulators have still failed to do. A year 
later, the SSE launched its SSE Corporate Governance Board (CG Board). The CG Board is a special 
listing index with governance rules that seek to prevent public shareholder abuse. Firms included in 
the index are required to disclose conflicts of interest relating to controlling shareholders, including 
with respect to dividend distribution, related-party transactions, and board appointments. This 
resembles the efforts of some stock exchanges in other markets, which enable firms to signal 
commitment to more stringent investor protection norms within the same capital market.484  
In terms of the sanctions applied by the stock exchanges for violations of their rules and their 
overall disciplinary power, the research is limited. The 2006 amendment of the Securities Law 
broadened the authority of the stock exchanges and granted them powers that until then had been 
reserved to the CSRC alone: to accept listings, suspend trade, and delist companies. Despite the 
amendment’s defining them as self-regulatory organizations, the stock exchanges are still in fact 
conduits of the CSRC. The traditional view of stock-exchanges as self-regulatory bodies that rely on 
private, member-run, independent governance is not applicable to China. 485  Nevertheless, 
commentators believe that China’s stock exchanges have an important enforcement role through 
various reputational sanctions.486 Observing and analyzing a total of 109 cases of public criticism 
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issued by China’s stock exchanges against 89 different companies between 2000 and 2006, Liebman 
and Milhaupt found that public shaming initiated by stock exchange sanctions has significant effects 
on firms and their insiders (measured by abnormal stock price returns). Interestingly, it was also found 
that the majority of all sanctioned companies (58 percent) were private listed firms, in contrast to the 
higher ratio of state-ownership of listed firms in the market as a whole at that time.487  The authors 
conclude that China’s “stock exchanges have carved out a meaningful, if limited, self-regulatory role 
for themselves despite severe institutional constraints on their independence.”488  
As meaningful as the stock exchanges may be for corporate governance, they are in no way 
autonomous institutions. They can exercise their regulatory role only within the confines allowed by 
the CSRC, which in itself is restrained by the various elements within China’s political economy.  
China’s stock exchanges, therefore, while no doubt important to market discipline, do not have 
enough influence on firms and the corporate governance culture on their own. 
 
iii.   Private Enforcement —The People’s Courts System 
 
The most shareholder-empowering legal standards and even explicitly mandatory provisions 
can be easily evaded absent reliable enforcement institutions. I have reviewed the main challenges for 
administrative enforcement by the CSRC and the limited latitude of self-regulatory institutions. The 
situation with respect to China’s People’s Court system is unsurprisingly similar. 
The approach to private securities litigation in China has not been particularly welcoming, 
despite some positive shifts since the turn toward law in the early 2000s. As in many other systems 
around the world, an American-style securities law class action is not recognized under the current 
legal framework in China.489 A private right of action based on a securities law claim can take the form 
of either an individual action or a joint action.490 The latter is available for claims in which the number 
of plaintiffs is fixed at the time of filing or when the court decides to adjudicate several individual suits 
together for particular reasons.491 Individual actions also do not have a free pass to courts. In the early 
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2000s, from a complete rejection of private litigation claims based on securities law, courts moved to 
accepting some claims, but subject to substantive and procedural limitations.492 Primary among these 
limitations is the narrow scope of underlying claims accepted, which is limited to misrepresentation-
based claims, as well as a requirement that a claim will be heard only following an adverse finding in 
public enforcement procedures (administrative penalty or a criminal procedure).493  
This narrow path has been available to injured investors since 2003, under a Supreme People’s 
Court (SPC) internal policy that was issued to guide lower People’s Courts on the adjudication of civil 
securities claims pertaining specifically and only to misrepresentation claims. 494 Policy statements 
issued by the SPC as well as its judicial interpretations are non-binding and are formally considered to 
be guiding in nature. Still, scholars have noted that in practice these documents have been accepted 
as authoritative within the judicial system. 495  Practically, this means that without an SPC-issued 
guidance, lower courts will not hear claims based on other securities law claims. A formal legal basis 
for private securities litigation was acknowledged in the 2005 Securities Law revision, but there as well 
private litigation seems to have been limited to misrepresentation-based claims.496  In an informal 2007 
statement, the vice-president of the SPC guided lower courts to also accept cases based on insider 
trading and market manipulation claims. 497 This is similarly implied in a more recent SPC and CSRC 
joint opinion on matters related to disputes in securities.498 Yet, as Huang pointed out, very few such 
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cases have since been brought based on these claims, and most cases are rejected or withdrawn due 
to lack of SPC guidance on how to adjudicate them.499Furthermore, the recent SPC and CSRC joint 
document and subsequent provincial courts’ opinions reflect that the People’s Courts system is ever 
more intent on pushing securities claims away from courts into alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms.500 
With respect to a private right of action based on governance claims established in the PRC 
Company Law, the 2005 revision took an important step to protect the rights of shareholders with 
judicial remedies. These included the enactment of several liability provisions and shareholder access 
to courts: liability for shareholders that abused the interests of the company or of other shareholders, 
with compensation set as a remedy for the company and other shareholders’ losses;501 shareholders’ 
standing to enforce their legally-granted preemptive rights in courts;502 an access to a type of appraisal 
by the court in certain cases where shareholders are bought out by the company;503 an option to ask 
the court to revoke certain decisions for legal and procedural violations;504 standing rights against 
directors and managers for violations that have injured shareholders;505 and finally, the ability to file a 
derivative suit on behalf of the company. 506  In August 2017, the SPC issued the No.4 Judicial 
Interpretation of the Company Law507 to clarify some of these provisions and guide lower courts when 
adjudicating claims based on violations of the Company Law. Although it remains to be seen to what 
extent the No.4 Interpretation will help facilitate adjudication in these cases, prima facie at least, it 
seems that it did not resolve many of the most criticized hurdles that stand in the way of potential 
derivative suit plaintiffs.508 
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Shielding the rights of public shareholders with liability provisions and access to courts are of 
course significant and vital steps in any system that aims to protect investors, but it can hardly ensure 
implementation. The first impediment to overcome in applying the remedies formally granted to 
shareholders is the absence of a body that can act on behalf of dispersed investors as a group. 
Institutional investors in China are captured within a network of state ownership and control, and 
other coalition-building efforts are restricted.509 In prior work, I have discussed the option of Party-
endorsed organizations that could act on behalf of minority public shareholders. Other Asian 
countries provide for similar forms of government-backed shareholder coalitions.510 Scholars in the 
PRC, Greater China, and abroad have raised the possibility that China would adopt a mechanism 
similar to Taiwan’s Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center (SFIPC).511 Similarly, one of 
the recently considered draft amendments to China’s Securities Law included a proposal to establish 
a government-sanctioned organization—the Securities Investors Protection Agency—to support the 
rights of public shareholders. It was postulated that the institution would hold minimum shares in 
PRC listed firms, through which it could exercise standing rights in its own name to bring civil claims 
for securities law violations on behalf of defrauded public investors.512 Other proposals in the draft 
amendments contemplated a National Securities Investor Compensation Fund, which would help 
compensate public investors for unrecovered damages from securities violations and consequent court 
proceedings.513 Given the current and historical wariness in the PRC regarding civil society and 
autonomous institutions, I believe that shareholder-representative institutions endorsed by the Party-
state are vastly more likely to overcome the barriers that private coalition-building efforts face than 
private efforts would be.514 These draft amendments of the Securities Law, along with any state-backed 
form of shareholder coalition-building, however, are currently stalled.  
Perhaps the most serious barriers that limit the formally granted access to courts are 
institutional impediments within the judicial system itself. Three main impediments are frequently 
mentioned in the literature: the professional inadequacies of judges, particularly in commercial and 
business law matters;515 the courts’ lack of authority to develop “case law” due to various reasons, 
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including their relative position within the administrative hierarchy, a general social distrust in the 
courts’ system,516 and the limited role historically reserved to courts as a legal institution; and finally, 
the court system’s capture within the existing political economy, which leads to its complete lack of 
independence. Howson’s noteworthy analysis distinguishes between the People’s Courts’ competence; 
their institutional autonomy, defined in the PRC context as “the ability of the judicial institution to act 
with its own institutional authority”; and their political independence, defined as “the ability of courts 
and judicial officers to act independently from, and against the interest of, political or military 
power.”517 Gu adds an additional, valuable layer of analysis that distinguishes between the institutional 
independence of the judiciary as a whole and the independence of decision making by individual judges. 
The former is compromised due the way courts are administratively accountable to the corresponding 
level of the People’s Congress and funded by the corresponding local People’s Government, while 
the latter is compromised due to individual judges’ job insecurity that stems from their terms of office, 
the political nature of their appointment, and the politically-infused structure of their professional 
evaluation.518 
These barriers are felt particularly when controversial cases arise. These are cases that pose 
potential threats to the legitimacy of the Party-state system, based not only on their substantive matter 
but also on the identity of the litigants. Cases in which investors’ claims are against state-controlled 
companies and affiliated defendants, claims potentially pertaining to a large number of litigants, or 
simply those that reflect badly on either the Party or the state (central or local governments) are often 
pushed away by the courts. Howson and Clarke have shown that derivative lawsuits involving listed 
PRC companies are almost completely absent from the People’s Courts. They attribute this (among 
other barriers to derivative litigation519) to the fact that cases involving publicly-listed firms commonly 
include large plaintiff groups and often seek the accountability of Party-state actors and institutions. 
Thus, according to the authors, these cases are potentially sensitive because they may affect social 
stability in politically related contexts, and they are therefore discouraged or prohibited:520  
In most cases, it [the controlling shareholder] either is or is closely connected to a 
governmental entity or Party organization. This means that there is a higher likelihood that a 
shareholder lawsuit or a derivative suit involving a corporatized entity, especially a politically 
privileged one that has been allowed to access the public capital markets, will, in substance, be 
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directed at a Party group, the state, a state-affiliated agency, or the agent of any of these. The 
claim will therefore be politically sensitive—something that is likely to affect the willingness 
and ability of judicial institutions to accept the lawsuit and hear the underlying claim.521  
On the other hand, a recent study by Ang and Jia found that disputes relating to politically-
connected firms are primarily those that do reach the courts’ doorsteps.522 The research was conducted 
on disputes involving private firms but might still suggest that connected parties rely (and know that 
they can rely) on their political connections to influence the court to rule in their favor. Either way, 
whether cases involving connected listed firms are likely to be rejected by the courts or to be decided 
in the connected party’s favor, it is not good news for public investors. Both options clearly show that 
political economy has a determinant effect on the operation of legal institutions and supplants the 
enforcement of legal rights.  
A non-independent court system imbedded within the Party-state bureaucracy cannot work 
to check and balance the power of corporate control parties over minority investors. Given that the 
court system is formally and functionally a branch of government enmeshed within the broader 
hierarchical network, it has an even a greater impartiality challenge when the control parties are at an 
equal or higher position within the Party-state hierarchy—exactly the occasions where checks and 
balances on abuse of power are most needed. 
There have been efforts in the past few years to reform the People’s Court system.523 The 
institutional structure was changed so as to centralize the management and funding of local courts at 
the level of the provincial governments (rather than by lower-tier local authorities) and to create cross-
jurisdictional courts.524 Yet, to my understanding, these efforts focus on centralizing control over the 
judicial system, not reducing it. The reforms focus on increasing professionalism and curbing local 
protectionism, and most changes are limited to curbing courts’ dependence on immediate local 
governments. These efforts may result in more autonomy in some lower-level cases, but nothing in 
these efforts aims to increase the independence of the court system from the Party-state apparatus 
more generally, nor to strengthen the autonomy of judges.  
The institutional setting, legal framework, and academic research overall portray the People’s 
Court system as a weak legal institution that is unable and unwilling to enforce legal rights against the 
various elements in China’s controlling apparatus, be they the listed units of China’s national 
champions and their corporate control parties, or the local governments as shareholders and their 
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appointees. The courts’ pronounced reluctance to adjudicate in such cases curtails the system’s ability 
to restrain corporate control parties ex ante and to hold them accountable ex post as well. 
   
*   * * 
This chapter has presented the institutional setting within which Chinese listed firms are 
embedded and showed how this, along with China’s continued embrace of state capitalism, has 
resulted in a structured predicament for public shareholders. There is a broad range of conventional 
corporate governance mechanisms that are commonly entrusted with monitoring and disciplining 
firms and their control parties, and China’s corporate governance framework appears to include many 
of these traditional mechanisms, implying an investor-friendly approach. When examined up close, 
however, the internal governance mechanisms are clearly captured by institutional barriers and 
conflicting interests. Market institutions are similarly weak or altogether missing. Taken together, 
corporate governance institutions in China are not designed to monitor insiders and protect investors 
against abuse, nor to promote efficient allocation of capital. Rather, they are clearly aimed at ensuring 
other goals: entrenching existing controllers and guaranteeing the continuous flow of outside capital 
to state-controlled and otherwise politically affiliated PRC listed firms.





CHAPTER 3: THE GREAT REVERSAL: POLITICIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
CHINA 
 
Considering the rise of public firms in China and the corporate governance framework 
described in chapters 1 and 2, China’s capital market growth conundrum can be stated thus: China 
succeeded in fostering the growth of appealing and globally competitive firms, and its capital markets 
advanced to take a spot among the world’s biggest and most meaningful markets, despite weakly-
functioning “good” corporate governance institutions and strong “bad” ones.  
What can explain this law and development conundrum? The answer lies within; the growth 
of China’s public firms and the domestic capital markets within which they operate did not happen 
despite bad institutions, but because of them. This is not to say that concentrated state ownership and 
political control did not produce costs. Rather, along with its many obstructions, China’s political 
economy also motivated the development of governance mechanisms that are perhaps idiosyncratic 
but are apt to overcome its own growth-impeding elements. Thus, alongside the formal embrace of 
weakly-functioning traditional corporate governance institutions, a parallel and much stronger political 
governance system operated in the shadows. This system, rooted in China’s unique governance 
structure, monitored corporate control parties, was perceived to hold them accountable, and often in 
fact did so. The political governance system combatted theft, asset stripping, and corruption, and 
thereby fulfilled some of the functions of traditional corporate governance institutions. This 
alternative governance system provided assurances that helped firms grow and kept the cost of capital 
sufficiently low for capital markets to develop.  
China’s capital markets developed to function in different ways than expected compared with 
capital markets elsewhere. Corporate control parties were perhaps effectively monitored by political 
governance, but they were incentivized to abide by standards that are not necessarily the maximization 
of firm value. Capital markets flourished, but with efficient allocation of capital as a marginal directive. 
The political economic explanation still stands today, when side by side with the continuous 
growth of public firms, the threats to Party-state unity have now intensified and again destabilize the 
political-economic equilibrium. Facing rising concerns about its legitimacy, the Party-state is ever more 
reliant on its ability to sustain growth. Yet, instead of aligning with global best practices and 
development assumptions, its institutional response still goes against conventional law and 
development predictions. China’s policy makers are opting for intensified political governance. 
Perhaps most strikingly, this shift is occurring through the formal institutionalization of political 
control. The Party is exercising an ever more expansive and transparently direct role in market 
economic activity, through what some may view as a cynical use of the legal system. Public firms in 
present day China are progressively being governed by what I call a politicized corporate governance. 




Conventional internal-governance institutions are undermined by political institutions that are 
imported into firms, and the disciplinary role of markets is being supplanted in a similar fashion. 
Legalized into corporate governance, this recent shift toward a politicized corporate governance 
reflects a formal retreat from outwardly conventional, arguably convergent, corporate governance, 
back to a loose form of the old divergent planned economy, now openly and “legally” declared.  
The legalization of CCP institutions and political measures under the law perpetuates a path-
dependent instrumentalist view of the role of law in China. Yet it also illuminates a meaningful fact—
the importance of law, that is, even within its utilitarian function, has evolved. Despite justified reasons 
for alarm about these recent developments, perhaps in its institutionalized and legalized form, a 
politicized corporate governance may still offer some benefits.525 
 
I. POLITICAL-ECONOMY AND FIRM GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 
 
  Symbiotic interaction between the business sector and the polity is a well-recognized element 
within any regime’s political economy. Businesses impact governments through lobbying and other 
forms of political participation.526 In the opposite direction, geopolitical affairs, domestic politics, and 
the political views of individuals inside the firm exert influence on the internal governance of firms, 
and perhaps even on their performance.527 At the same time, ironically, the prevailing legal analysis 
about corporate organization and capital market development still largely disregards political-
economic conditions. 528  Institutions of corporate governance and political economy are treated 
distinctively, detached from one another.  As observed in criticism by Milhaupt and Pistor, the legal 
 
525 A quasi cost-benefit analysis of a politicized corporate governance is offered below. See infra Chapter 3, Section III.   
526 Ike Mathur & Manohar Singh, Corporate Political Strategies, 51 ACCT. & FIN. 252 (2011) (offering a literature review 
discussing corporate political participation); Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth, 43 
J. ECON. LIT. 655 (2005) (discussing economic entrenchment in markets held by elite groups as a political-economy 
problem that creates functionally inefficient capital markets); Pierre-Yves Néron, Business and the Polis: What Does It Mean to 
See Corporations as Political Actors?, 94 J. BUS. ETHICS 333 (2010). 
527  M. K. Chin et al., Political Ideologies of CEOs: The Influence of Executives’ Values on Corporate Social Responsibility, 58 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 197 (2013); Joseph P. Kalt & L. Adel Turki, Political, Social, and Environmental Shareholder Resolutions: Do They Create or 
Destroy Shareholder Value?, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(June 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/17/political-social-and-environmental-shareholder-
resolutions-do-they-create-or-destroy-shareholder-value/; Dimitrios Gounopoulos et al., The Consequences of Political 
Donations for IPO Premium and Performance  (Nov. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3181171. 
528 For notable exceptions, see Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1005 (2005); Mark J. Roe & Massimiliano Vatiero, Corporate Governance and Its Political Economy, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 56 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018); Ben Ross 
Schneider, A Comparative Political Economy of Diversified Business Groups, or How States Organize Big Business, 16 REV. INT’L POL. 
ECON. 178 (2009). For other works by Mark Roe that analyze the determinant role of political economy in corporate 
organization and capital market development in the United States and in social democratic systems, see MARK J. ROE, 
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2002); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 
(1994); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000).   




system is viewed in these endeavors as “a fixed and politically neutral institutional endowment.”529 
The prevalent clean divide between law, markets, and politics that have guided legal harmonization 
efforts around the world throughout the last decades seems perplexing, almost naïve, when confronted 
with the Chinese context. A political-economic explanation for China’s capital market growth removes 
any doubt about the interconnectedness between politics, law, and economic development outcomes. 
In doing so, it challenges yet another paradigm thought about the determinants of corporate 
organization and capital market development.  
Surprisingly, however, even the relevant literature on China, while not overlooking the role of 
politics in corporate governance and capital market development, tackles political economy only 
narrowly. The studies so far have explored particular attributes within the political-economic system, 
but no study provided a political economic framework. For example, financial studies have paid 
significant attention to the potential effects of relational business exchange and of political 
connections on firm performance. 530  Franklin Allen and coauthors attributed much of China’s 
business growth to the role of non-bank financial intermediaries and their reliance on relationship 
networks and reputation. While relational incentives, according to the authors, substitute for poor 
legal mechanisms and support finance in the private sector, the authors reject a similar conclusion for 
the public market (mainly because they reject the notion that the capital market in China is successful 
to begin with).531 A few law scholars explored similar directions. Milhaupt and Zheng attribute the 
success of large firms in China, regardless of their ownership, to their fostering of connections to the 
state. Capturing the government by their growth potential, these firms were able to extract economic 
rents while preventing the state from enacting rules that would limit their advantages.532 Howson’s 
work on China’s publicly-listed but state-owned and managed commercial banks addresses the 
political accountability system in firms. Based on a collection of media interviews with industry 
officials and senior managers of China’s state-controlled commercial banks, Howson unveils a 
corporate governance regime that takes form through the Party organization, despite the formal 
powers bestowed on traditional governance institutions.533 
To the best of my knowledge, however, no previous study so far has offered a systemic 
account of China’s political economy and its determinant role in corporate organization and capital 
 
529 See generally MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 12, at 1-14.  
530 See, e.g., Joseph P. H. Fan et al., Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China's Newly 
Partially Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 330 (2007) (treating political connections as a proxy for government interference 
in firms and examining the effect on post-IPO market performance); Joseph D. Piotroski & Tianyu Zhang, Politicians and 
the IPO Decision: The Impact of Impending Political Promotions on IPO Activity in China, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 111 (2014) (examining 
the effect of provincial-level political promotions on the pace and scope of IPO activity in China). 
531 Franklin Allen, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (2005); Franklin Allen et al., (2018) 
Understanding Informal Financing, J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3369996. 
532 Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 5.  
533 Howson, supra note 278, at 145 (“It is not—as the corporate form might make us think—directors and senior officers 
held accountable to shareholders. Instead, China’s banks (and other SOEs) evidence nomenklatura accountable to the Party 
system, the same system that governs the nominal controlling shareholder of the banks: the state.”). 




market development. Additionally, my analysis moves away from treating political configurations as 
constant. Taking a view that economic development, and particularly capital market development, is 
a continuous, iterative process, my political-economic framework accounts for the shifts and 
movements that not only shaped the process of development upon initial economic reforms but 
continue informing it still. In so doing, my analysis explains the growth of firms and capital markets 
throughout China’s transition and perhaps into the future. 
  
A. Baseline Configurations 
 
Known as China’s “Fragmented Authoritarianism,” the unique political structure of the 
Chinese Party-state has been a focus of extensive research. The governance structure in China is that 
of a unified, single Party-state with Party institutions shadowing formal state structures, and a 
devolution of power from the center to local actors at various levels.534 Lieberthal’s analysis is the most 
recognized description, positing that “authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is 
fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform 
policies…”535  
The fragmented authoritarianism analysis on its prolific progeny describes the Chinese Party-
state system as a network of power hierarchies within which administrative and economic decision-
making authority is allocated. Authority and responsibility in the system are delegated from the central 
state downward vertically to provincial and lower levels of government, as well as horizontally between 
state ministries with different, often competing, functional responsibilities.536 Each level within this 
complex network of administrative state organs is duplicated by a Party organization that operates in 
tandem. The Party exercises ultimate control over the entire Party-state system in various ways, 
including its control over China’s main armed forces (the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and, more 
recently, the People’s Armed Police), its control over the appointment and promotion of Party and 
state officials (through the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China), and finally 
through party education and discipline (enforced among other organs by the Central Commission of 
Discipline Inspection).  
Several commentators have relied on the dynamics within China’s fragmented 
authoritarianism network to explain the country’s overall economic development. 537   Whether 
 
534 See generally LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 402 (describing the hierarchical horizontal (territorial) and vertical 
(from central level down to localities) levels of authority within the Chinese government). 
535 Lieberthal, supra note 41, at 8. 
536  Paul Hubbard, ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ and State Ownership, EAST ASIA FORUM (Jan. 23, 2017), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/01/23/fragmented-authoritarianism-and-state-ownership/.  
537 From the 1990s, following the fragmented authoritarianism analysis, a prolific body of literature emerged to explain 
how components within China’s Party-state network were incentivized to promote economic growth. For a synopsis of 
the wealth of theories, see ANG, supra note 36. 




describing these dynamics as the practice of “market-preserving authoritarianism,”538 “Chinese-style 
federalism,”539 “experimentation under hierarchy,”540 local governments’ “directed improvisation,”541 
or “local states’ corporatism,”542 commentators share the view that since economic reforms began, 
sub-national government levels and the state officials appointed on their behalf have become invested 
in their local economies as direct economic actors. This shift in the political-economic equilibrium — 
the allocation of administrative and economic decision-making power within the Party-state system—
resonated across the entire network and brought counterbalancing measures. It impacted the direct 
incentives that different components (organizations and individuals) within the network had to 
promote economic growth. The levers that facilitated this shift were primarily administrative: the dual-
track pricing and the fiscal contracting mechanisms, the cadre evaluation system, and management 
contract responsibility arrangements, mentioned earlier.543  
The same political-economic reasoning, so far applied generally, can explain the rise of firms 
and capital market development specifically as well. Bearing responsibility for the economic success 
or failure of the enterprises under their administrative and political authority, local government organs 
and individuals guaranteed property rights and created the assurances needed to attract investors 
during the first decades of economic transition.544 Thus, as seen in Chapter 1, changes in China’s 
political-economic equilibrium when economic reforms ensued, enabled locally-developed 
governance solutions that have functioned in lieu of the institutions traditionally entrusted with capital 
market development (mainly, certain investor protections founded in legal rules). 
Further changes in the equilibrium may also affect the incentives of Party-state organs and 
individuals to continue to provide these assurances. Indeed, as seen in the previous chapter, the 
attempts to reconsolidate economic authority with the central state during the second transition phase 
 
538  Shuhe Li & Peng Lian, Decentralization and Coordination: China’s Credible Commitment to Preserve the Market under 
Authoritarianism, 10 CHINA ECON. REV. 161 (1999) (positing that economic decentralization and autonomy for local 
governments, on the one hand, and coordination and political control by the center, on the other, operated in tandem. 
This promoted competitive market behavior at local levels, while mobilizing resources and institutions by the center to 
support the market and the legal system.). 
539 See, e.g., Yuanzheng Cao et al., From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style, 7 ECON. TRANSITION 103 (1999) 
(observing economic decentralization and local experimentation as elements of federalism, a form of “federalism Chinese 
style”); Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis of Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50 
(1995). 
540 See supra note 35 (providing various sources by Sebastian Heilmann) (Enabling local experimentation under the confines 
of hierarchical political control, tensions and political conflicts were avoided, and consensus was built on the main 
directions of economic reform.). 
541 ANG, supra note 36, at 49-89 (“directed improvisation,” achieved through feedback loops between vague central 
command that produced adaptive response at the localities and fed back to the center, was a key in China’s ability to adapt 
effectively; market-supporting institutions evolved from local improvisation, while the central leadership empowered (as 
opposed to controlled) ground-level actors). 
542 Jean C. Oi, The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy, 144 CHINA Q. 1132 (1995) (suggesting that Chinese 
local governments operate as a corporate-like group organization. Local officials in each hierarchy manage the enterprises 
within their jurisdiction like directors and executives. A meaningful role is reserved to the Party secretary at each level to 
overhead operations and assess performance.) 
543 See supra notes 40-46 and the discussion of economic decentralization therein. 
544 Clarke et al., supra note 44, at 400-422. 




(1992–2007) directly affected ownership structures, firm governance, and the use of the legal system. 
In turn, during the last decade, the incentives to promote economic growth and the explicit allocation 
of economic (and to some extent even administrative) decision making authority are shifting within 
the Party-state system once again. Increasingly, the element within the system that is best incentivized 
to push for investment and growth is the Chinese Communist Party itself and its functionaries.545 The 
explanatory power of China’s fragmented authoritarianism is therefore very much alive, but the focus 
is now changing. Relatedly, the use of functional corporate governance substitutes has not receded 
but only shifted away from local governments’ initiatives with central states’ balances, to overt political 
governance.  
 
B. Political Equilibrium Shifts Focus  
 
A key premise in the fields of financial economics and corporate governance is that incentives 
matter for the behavior of economic actors. If in early reform eras, the organs within the political 
structure best incentivized to exercise and guarantee property rights in firms were local governments 
and their officials, in later stages this shifted to the central government, which had vested interests in 
its emerging national champions and other industrial policies. Efforts were made to reconsolidate 
authority regarding the growth of firms and capital market development within the agencies of the 
central state. However, in recent years, power tensions and shifts in the interests of the polity, driven 
in part by the CCP’s intensifying legitimacy crisis, have caused the Party to assert economic (as well as 
administrative and social) control more directly and transparently over firms and the market. 
As a unitary political leadership body, the central Chinese Communist Party organization 
strongly pronounces its commitment to economic growth.546 Beyond the rhetoric, many observers of 
China believe that the legitimacy of the Communist Party rule in China today hangs on its ability to 
sustain economic growth.547 Economic growth has become the main basis for the Party’s legitimacy, 
 
545 I address the notion of separation between the Party and the State below. 
546 The Communist Party Constitution specifically lists economic development as a central task of the Party and “all other 
work of the Party subordinate to and serve this task.” Modernization and bringing the per-capita GDP to levels of 
“moderately developed economies” are also mentioned as strategic objectives. See Zhonggua Gongchandang Zhangcheng 
(中国共产党章程) [The Constitution of The Communist Party of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l Cong. of the 
Communist Party of China, Oct. 24, 2017), Preamble [hereinafter The CCP Constitution], available at 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/. More generally, see Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 404. 
547  See, e.g., Zachary Keck, Chinese Elites: The Real Threat to the Communist Party,  DIPLOMAT (Jan 28, 2014), 
https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinese-elites-the-real-threat-to-the-communist-party/ (emphasizing the challenge in 
rebalancing the economy while maintaining benefits for the political elite); David Shambaugh, The Coming Chinese Crackup, 
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 6, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198 
(pointing to China’s economic “systemic traps” and Xi’s reform efforts as one of the indicators to the regimes vulnerability 
and instability); Joshua Stowell, An Economic Downturn in China is the Greatest Threat to Chinese Domestic Security—How Long 
Can the Social Contract in China Endure?, GLOBAL SECURITY REV. (May 28, 2018) https://globalsecurityreview.com/degree-
chinas-internal-stability-depend-economic-growth/; https://globalsecurityreview.com/threats-legitimacy-power-chinese-
communist-party/ (viewing “sustained economic growth” as a new mandate of heaven). 




on the one hand, and one of the main threats to its political unity and hold on power, on the other. 
The Party has direct interests in keeping employment and production levels high, building strong 
global champions, and preserving high state assets’ value. Additionally, the success of China’s firms, 
particularly its state-controlled firms, helps maintain the Party’s legitimacy both domestically and 
abroad.548 On top of that, increasing social gaps and the prominence of lavish crony capitalists among 
its members, many of them linked to corruption, generate social criticism and reduce the usefulness 
of ideology as an instrument of control,549 posing further legitimacy threats. Finally, in addition to 
these general legitimacy concerns, the ability of the CCP to exert control over the state’s administrative 
system and the individuals operating it is weakening as their economic incentive to defy unitary 
discipline increases.550 The consequences of the prior three decades of devolution in administrative 
and economic authority in the service of economic development still loom large551 and destabilize the 
central Party-state organization.552   
Bearing these complex realities in mind, the Party’s incentives to promote growth while closely 
supervising and even restraining the power accumulated by components within its own system, 
particularly at local levels, becomes clear. 553 Its control over firms and the financial system is a tool 
that checks all the boxes toward this goal. Intensifying its grip over firms and the capital market can 
ease the legitimacy concerns, facilitate monitoring and restraining potential political rivals, allow a 
controlled-growth process around preferred industrial policies, and showcase the merits (or soft power) 
of the Party-state system domestically and internationally.  
This also explains the shift in equilibrium whereby the Party’s recent reassessment of its role 
comes at the expense of state institutions. The power of central state administrative institutions—
 
548 See generally China Goes Global, 9 INT’L J. EMERGING MARKETS 162 (2014); Joshua Stowell, Global Shifts in Geopolitical 
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ed., 2004) (arguing for political decay in the Party-state system attributed to economic reforms). 
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552 See supra notes 40-46 and the discussion of economic decentralization therein. 
553 Following popular criticism against dubious investment activity by privately held Chinese companies abroad, Xi Jinping 
declared financial stability to be a matter of national security. While this can be cynically viewed as an excuse to simply 
exert control over private actors, this step seems motivated, at least partially, by a genuine concern for financial stability—
protecting public investors in highly leveraged firms operating dubious investments abroad and responding to the mass 
protests against them. Minxin Pei, Xi Jinping’s War on Financial Crocodiles Gathers Pace—Beijing Will Pass off a Politically Motivated 
Purge as Though Regulatory Enforcement, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/19810ea2-5814-11e7-
80b6-9bfa4c1f83d2. See also Lucy Hornby, Chinese Crackdown on Dealmakers Reflects Xi Power Play, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/ed900da6-769b-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691. (“The regulators’ argument that shadow 
banking posed a national risk found an unlikely ally in China’s security apparatus. Ordinary people who had lost money in 
high-interest products have taken to the streets in every province over the past few years. Nothing captured the interest 
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such as SASAC, the CSRC, and state anti-corruption enforcement agencies—seems to be declining, 
while the CCP’s involvement in various aspects of corporate governance is increasing. In the last 
decade, the CCP has been the institution that provides assurances to investors. It does so through its 
own functional substitutes for conventional monitoring and accountability. The new politicized 
corporate governance system, explained below, is also somewhat less opaque and signals the Party’s 
commitment to growth to the different constituents in the capital market. Given these circumstances, 
a degree of alignment of interests between the Party and corporate stakeholders, even public investors, 
is forming.554  
The CCP’s commitment to growth and its incentives to take a more direct role with respect 
to firms does not necessarily mean that it now has an interest in promoting changes that benefit 
investors specifically, but it is a possibility.555 This idea is certainly counter-intuitive. First, it may be 
taken to suggest that individuals within the Party suddenly prioritize the “greater good” and will forgo 
opportunities to enrich themselves for the sake of developing more efficient, deeper capital markets.  
Second, it suggests that the Party can overcome the self-capture that inhibited the state in this area 
and thus also implies that the Party and the state are distinct. 
Indeed, many individuals within the political apparatus have personally enjoyed private 
benefits from their clout or direct control of publicly listed firms556 through rent extraction, asset 
tunneling, self-dealing, and other corporate malfeasance. A path-dependent corporate control in China 
is certainly established on strong interest groups politics within the controlling apparatus. 557 
Incumbent controllers have both the incentives and the power, through direct and indirect political 
authority, to reject true reforms that could reduce their opportunities to extract rents and/or private 
benefits of control.558 This almost impels us to assume that the controlling apparatus would reject 
 
554 Mary Gallagher uses the expression “alliance of convenience” to describe the convergence of interests between the 
central government and workers in China. See MARY GALLAGHER, AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY IN CHINA: LAW, WORKERS, 
AND THE STATE 6 (2017). Here, I suggest a similar alliance is forming between the CCP and capital markets investors. 
While as pointed out by Prof. Gallagher, the alliance of the central government with workers has supported the 
mobilization of workers and their empowerment to enforce their own rights, in the capital market sphere a similar 
alignment seems so far to only shift the mandate of power from state institutions to the Party. Private individuals are still  
excluded from fully utilizing their rights. See the discussion on coalition-building shareholder monitoring supra Chapter 2 pp. 
59-61. 
555 Victor Nee & Peng Lian, Sleeping with the Enemy: A Dynamic Model of Declining Political Commitment in State Socialism, 23 
THEORY & SOC’Y 253, 273 (1994) (“analysts need to pay attention to the organizational health of the communist party”) 
(attempting to explain why communist rule initiates reform, suggesting that the increase in opportunism and decline in 
commitment to the party threatens the political organization). 
556 Cheng Li, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 4: Top Leaders of Major State-owned Enterprises), CHINA 
LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Winter 2011, available at https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-midterm-jockeying-gearing-
2012-part-4-top-leaders-major-state-owned-enterprises (tracking the top leaders of some major 130 companies in China, 
their demographic background, the fortune of their businesses, and their career path in both business and government).  
557 Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 128 (depicting a role for interest groups politics as one of many causes of path dependence). 
558  See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND 
SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982) (suggesting a theory on the resistance of the established economic and political elite to growth-
promoting reforms); Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth 
Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (for a similar interest groups theory in the financial market development context, in 
which incumbents oppose development reforms since these would breed internal competition); Lucian Bebchuk, A Rent-




reforms that would reduce its ability to extract value. 559 Nonetheless, while these individuals might 
not be motivated nor deterred by state legal institutions, they are certainly concerned about their 
political future. Since the Party organization is now creating substantial pressures to adopt market-
growth approaches, and political advancement is aligned with growth and greater efficiency goals, as 
is increasingly the case, 560 then compliance with this Party-led reform is simply a way to protect their 
vested interests.  
Of course, and as the term “the Party-state” reflects, separating the Chinese state from the 
CCP is artificial in many respects. Many of the positions in the government overlap with positions 
within the Party, and the Party directs and controls the administrative system in many ways. However, 
while 95 percent of civil servants in China (county level and above) are CCP members, there are many 
more Party members who do not serve as government officials.561 There are millions of members that 
at least theoretically (and perhaps superficially) are concerned with the political stability of the regime, 
but detached from the state’s interests. More importantly, while the overlap between the Party and the 
state is certainly present for senior positions, it does not feature as strongly among lower-level officials 
and party members. This means that while the interests of the central state and the Party align to a 
great deal, the conflicts of interests between central and local governments create a de-facto distinction 
between what is formally viewed as the state but is really mainly local governments, and the Party 
organization. At the individual level, this can create a sense of solidarity or submission to the Party-
state, even with a sense of alienation from the government (local). Party-line education contributes to 
this. This misalignment may explain why individuals could be incentivized to cooperate with the goals 
advanced through the Party organization, while not being equally cooperative with goals promoted 
through the state’s administrative hierarchy. 
More concretely, it is the Party organization, rather than the state, that controls the 
appointment and promotion of individuals in the Party-state system. Through its Organization 
Department, the Party organization at each level of the state’s hierarchy, including in corporatized 
SOEs, directs the careers, and therefore the reputation and economic prosperity, of the individuals in 
the system. Added to that are the coercive methods of the Party that induce accountability through 
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560 See Alex Bryson et al., How Much Influence Does the Chinese State Have over CEOs and Their Compensation?, in INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION 1 (Jaime Ortega ed., 2014) (finding that the State’s influence extends beyond SOEs 
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943 (2018) (arguing that the quality of monitoring in state-owned corporations became more strongly related to firm 
performance). 
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https://www.statista.com/statistics/250090/share-of-chinese-communist-party-ccp-members-in-chinese-population/ 
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discipline and fear governance. All these factors together make the Party organization stand out from 
state institutions and perhaps induce firms and their control parties to submit more easily to goals, 
growth performance or others, when these are advanced by the Party organization directly. 
 
II. THE POLITICIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE — LEVERS OF CCP’S POLITICAL 
GOVERNANCE IN FIRMS 
 
  It is a commonplace to criticize China’s political involvement in firms and the capital market. 
This dovetails with the common expectations for China’s future convergence with more market-
oriented governance standards. Instead, in recent years, China offers a complete deviation from these 
orthodox views towards further politicization of corporate governance. Especially since Xi Jinping 
rose to power, political involvement in corporate governance has been extended far beyond any scope 
seen since the economic transition began. This political involvement has passed beyond the “normal” 
overarching shadow control that the CCP has in the economy, beyond its influence over corporate 
stakeholders (managers and employees), and even beyond the puppeteering of managerial 
appointments in large state-controlled firms. An absorption (or even a takeover) of internal corporate 
governing bodies by CCP institutions and a similar replacement of external market monitoring by the 
Party’s disciplinary enforcement is now under way and already reflected in law. In these recent 
developments, the Party has claimed a mandate over corporate decision making much more directly 
and transparently. In this environment, the corporate form and the legal system itself are ever more 
easily harnessed to advance the Party-state’s agendas, whether these are national industrial policy goals, 
social and ideological targets, or sustainable economic growth.    
 
A. The CCP’s Intra-Firm Governance Capacity: Personnel Management & Party Committees  
 
  The Party has ready tools at the firm level to monitor and steer corporate control parties. Its 
ability to intervene in corporate decision making is nestled in the Party’s institutionalized intra-firm 
presence, as well as in its control over corporate management. Both routes have recently been 
formalized and broadened. 
 
1. CCP Control Over Management 
 
Authority over the management of personnel in the Party-state system was always one of the 
main mechanisms that guaranteed the CCP’s central control over the state apparatus and society at 
large. This includes authority over the appointment, promotion, transfer, and removal of leadership 




positions throughout the Party-state system. The CCP’s control over the Party and state apparatus 
thus extends from the center through provincial organizations and down to the level of deputy bureau 
chiefs in the counties. The main facilitators of this management control are the nomenklatura system, 
conducted by the CCP Central Organization Department and its local branches,562 and the cadre 
evaluation system, conducted by the administrative bureaucracy and directed by the party 
organization.563 Both of these personnel management mechanisms apply with respect to leadership 
positions in state-owned holding companies and their state-controlled subsidiaries as well, including 
some of their listed subsidiaries, whether they are traded domestically or off-shore.  
The nomenklatura system has roots in Soviet communism. It prescribes a list of Party and 
state positions and the closed group of elite political members that can potentially be appointed to fill 
these positions. The list details positions that are directly appointed by the CCP Organization 
Departments (the Organization Department of the Central Committee and the Party Committee 
Organization Department within SASAC), as well as those that can be appointed, dismissed, or 
transferred by other state bodies but with the Party’s prior approval.564 With respect to state-controlled 
firms, the list not only includes the potential appointees for the positions of party secretary and deputy 
secretary assigned at the top of the enterprise’s Party committee, but also the potential appointees for 
senior managerial positions in these firms, including the chairman of the board and president, the 
CEO, and in some firms also other senior positions, such as the chief financial officer and chief legal 
counsel.565 The appointment of the CEO in (at least) the largest fifty-three corporatized SOEs is566 
vested with Party organs despite the formal prescriptions in the Company Law and the SOE Assets 
Law that assign such authority to the firm’s internal governance bodies (the board of directors or 
SASAC, respectively).567 This appointment process explains why the general managers of some of the 
 
562 John P. Burns, Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura, 138 CHINA Q. 458 (1994). 
563 Ganbu Kaohe Zhidu (干部考核制度), commonly referred to as the “cadre evaluation system,” “cadre responsibility 
system,” “personnel appointment and evaluation system,” “target responsibility system,” and more. See Zhen Wang, Who 
Gets Promoted and Why? Understanding Power and Persuasion in China’s Cadre Evaluation System, (unpublished 
manuscript presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Chinese Studies, October 11-13 2013, New 
Brunswick, New Jersey), available at https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2013conference/Papers/Zhen%20Wang.pdf. 
564 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?, 211 CHINA Q. 624, 633 (2012). 
565 Feng Liu & Linlin Zhang, Executive Turnover in China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Government-Oriented or Market-Oriented?, 11 
CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 129 (2018). (The authors, however, find that executive turnover changes according to the level of 
direct ownership and control by the government. The reliance on bureaucratic and political appointment is weaker in firms 
with indirect state ownership, for which open recruitment is a growing trend.). See also Burns, supra note 562, at 468, 474-
491 (providing a full list of all economic enterprises). 
566  Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Can China Keep Controlling It’s SOEs?, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/can-china-keep-controlling-its-soes/. 
567 See Brødsgaard, supra note 564, at 639 (providing details from interviews on how the process of CEO selection and 
appointment is done in practice and the negotiations between the CCP Organization Department, SASAC, and the board). 
See also Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 737-743 (for how this differs from more conventional corporate appointment 
rights and procedures). For a recent example of the allocation of nomination and appointment authorities of general 
managers between SASAC and the board, see yangqi Zongjingli you Guoziwei renming gaiwei timing renming quanjiao Dongshihui 
[The General Manager of the Central Enterprise Was Appointed by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
to Be Nominated to the Board of Directors], CHINA ECON. DAILY (Jan 22, 2018), 
http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201801/22/t20180122_27848290.shtml (loose title translation). 




corporatized SOEs enjoy political clout and administrative status that is equivalent to that of a minister 
(or vice minister) or of a provincial governor in the state’s bureaucracy.568  
The cadre evaluation system has a more contemporary origin. It was created in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s to rebuild China’s shattered bureaucracy after Mao’s era and was one of the 
fundamental elements of reforms in China’s administrative system. The cadre evaluation system is 
used to evaluate party leaders and cadres in leading positions at local levels of the government.569 It is 
based on performance criteria, which are set by the CCP Organization Department and applied by the 
immediate superior level of the relevant party or government units.570 The results of the evaluation 
guide the decisions about officials’ appointment, promotion, transfer, and removal, and thus directly 
affect their career trajectories.  
This management control system also impacts the behavior of corporate control parties and 
other insiders. Howson notes how “the real powers behind the firm are not monitored by the 
shareholder at all, but instead by a separate and superior Party organization.” 571  Some of the 
implications of this political governance system extend even to firms without any state ownership. It 
operates mainly at two levels. 
 First, the performance of enterprises is inspected as an evaluation criterion. Overall economic 
development and firm performance are measured by revenue growth, total profits, operating profits, 
investments in technological innovation, environmental protection, legal disputes (for fear of social 
unrest), and more. These are taken as factors in the assessment of both officials assigned to monitor 
enterprises572 and agents appointed to manage state-controlled firms.573 This incentivizes local Party-
state officials and managers to seek good economic results, motivates them to monitor against (or 
avoid getting involved in) fraud and embezzlement, and discourages other corporate scandals that may 
 
568 Brødsgaard, supra note 564, at pp. 624-648. 
569 Prior to the introduction of the cadre evaluation system, Party and state officials were appointed and promoted based 
on loyalty to Party leaders and other political considerations. 
570 For a description of the system’s mechanics, see ANG, supra note 36, at 110 (“Through the cadre evaluation system, each 
level of government designs a report card for leaders (party secretary and state chiefs) at the next lower level. Each year, 
the higher level issues an internal formal document, typically restricted from public view, which specifies a list of targets 
that subordinated leaders are expected to deliver in that particular year. Points are assigned to each target, usually totaling 
one hundred points. To set up competitive pressures, local leaders are ranked relative to their peers annually.”). 
571 Howson, supra note 278, at 143. 
572 See Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Zanxing Banfa (中央企业负责人薪酬管理暂行办法 ) [Interim 
Measures for Remuneration Management for Central State-Owned Enterprise Executives] (promulgated by the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Comm’n of the St. Council, May 13, 2003), available at  
http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408035/c1477199/content.html; Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe zhanxin Banfa 
(中央企业负责人经营考核暂行办法) [Interim Procedures on the Evaluation of the Financial Performance of Central 
SOE Leaders] (promulgated by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Comm’n of the St. Council, Dec. 28 
2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-01/22/content_1517096.htm.   
573 Yubo Li et al., A Survey of Executive Compensation Contracts in China’s Listed Companies, 6 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 211 (2013) 
(examining executive compensation contracts in Chinese listed firms, including a description of evaluation measures for 
executive performance in government-controlled listed firms). 




lead to social unrest. By implication, to some degree this also deters against stakeholder abuse that 
could result in litigation, environmental scandals, and labor disputes. 
Second, there is a substantial overlap between China’s business elite and its political elite, and 
the career advancement trajectories in both are highly interconnected.574 SOE executives who have 
become local government and party leaders are a sizable and increasing group.575 In turn, experience 
in provincial government is a primary stepping stone to central party leadership,576  to which many of 
these individuals aspire.577 In a sense, China’s rising crony-capitalism as it is embedded in its unique 
governance structure means that corporate conduct, firm performance, and the political trajectory of 
its elite are interdependent.578 This is true even for managers who are not currently subject to the cadre 
evaluation system directly but have ambitions to enter the Party-state system. These incentives are 
therefore relevant to corporate insiders regardless of the existence of any type of state-ownership in 
the firm.579 Viewed somewhat optimistically, this element in China’s political-economy can incentivize 
corporate control parties and insiders to perform better and even to increase productivity and firm 
value.580  
The CCP’s personnel management system is thus a political institution with monitoring and 
incentivizing corporate governance functions.581 It operates outside any mechanisms provided by 
traditional corporate governance institutions or framework established in law. This Party system is 
also far more centralized than the formal state system behind which it stands.  
 
574 Bruce Dickinson’s book discusses the incorporation of China’s capitalists into the political system (terming this “crony-
communism”). BRUCE DICKINSON, WEALTH INTO POWER: THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S EMBRACE OF CHINA’S PRIVATE 
SECTOR (2008).  
575 Brødsgaard, supra note 564, at 639-641 (pointing to the representation of industrial business groups in the CCP Central 
Committee, and tracing eighteen corporate leaders who were appointed to high-rank government positions).  
576 Cheng Li & Lucy Xu, The Rise of State-Owned Enterprise Executives in China’s Provincial Leadership, BROOKINGS (Feb. 22, 
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-rise-of-state-owned-enterprise-executives-in-chinas-provincial-
leadership/ (noting that provincial governors and party secretaries appointed following their leadership roles in SOEs 
comprise sixteen percent (10 out of 62) of all provincial-level leaders, which demonstrates a rapid growth in this group 
during Xi’s regime). Within the 18th Central Committee, seventy-six percent of Politburo members served previously as 
provincial chiefs.) 
577 See, e.g., Hongbin Li, et al., Economic Returns to Communist Party Membership: Evidence from Urban Chinese Twins, 117 ECON. 
J. 1504 (2007) (examining economic return of party membership). 
578 Li & Xu, supra note 576. For a specific application of this in the energy sector, see Liou & Tsai, supra note 400. 
579 Bryson et al., supra note 560 (finding that government involvement in the appointment of senior management extends 
beyond state-owned firms into privately owned firms and across all industrial sectors). 
580 Jerry Cao et al., Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship between Pay and Performance, MGMT. SCI., May 2018, 
available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324958863_Political_Promotion_CEO_Incentives_and_the_Relationship_B
etween_Pay_and_Performance (finding that the likelihood of CEOs in Chinese SOEs to receive political promotion is 
positively related to firm performance and that CEOs with higher likelihoods of political promotion have lower pay levels, 
and concluding that political career concerns substitute for monetary incentives). 
581 Downs and Meidan suggest that part of the motivation behind the reshuffling of top executives in the national oil 
industry by the CCP in 2011 was to improve corporate governance in these firms. Erica Downs & Michal Meidan, Business 
and Politics in China: The Oil Executive Reshuffle of 2011, CHINA SECURITY, 2011, at 3. 




Having emphasized the corporate monitoring and incentivizing functions of China’s political 
governance, some limits should be recognized. First, with respect to incentivizing officials tasked with 
supervising firms, the portrayal of China’s SOE corporatization process and further organizational 
reforms under SASAC exposed the weaknesses in monitoring by the state in its shareholding capacity. 
This suggests that China’s personnel management system currently in place is not as effective at 
discouraging corporate wrongdoing as it is with more explicit performance evaluation criteria. For 
example, the system is successful at making local governments pursue research and development 
opportunities for their region or bring their GDP figures up, but not as much at promoting good 
corporate governance practices. One explanation could be that the personnel management system 
mobilizes officials to monitor firms in their region only within the narrow confines of its defined 
evaluation criteria. Corporate value maximization or production efficiency are not specifically 
enumerated but rather are ancillary to other targets.  
Second, with respect to incentivizing corporate insiders tasked with managing, to the extent 
that the personnel management system is effective in governing the conduct of corporate insiders, it 
does not necessarily follow that the direction pursued is toward firm value. It can instead direct 
managers to pursue proxies of success (e.g., growing bigger not better), avoid risks at all costs, or even 
toward fraudulent reporting. Additionally, other political concerns are tunneled through this system 
and influence business decisions.582 The managers, aspiring for careers in the Party-state system, will 
opt for business decisions that they believe serve the Party-state’s goals in each context.583  
Thus, the personnel management system functionally substitutes for traditional corporate 
governance to a degree. It does so mainly by an overall push for firms and insiders to be profitable 
and invest in innovation, as well as by deterring against undesirable conducts. However, in order to 
fully induce monitoring and incentives that lead specifically to greater operational efficiency or firm 
value maximization, these would have to be expressly advocated through the system as specific criteria 
by which officials and corporate control parties are assessed. While these specific goals are certainly 
not at the top of the CCP priority list, there is some indication for their stronger advancement recently.  
Judging by the Party-state leadership’s rhetoric, the Party’s policy emphasis is moving in this 
direction. In October 2016, a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee with several leading SOE 
leaders was dedicated to the subject of “building the role of the Party within SOEs.” In this meeting, 
President Xi stated that SOEs should become important forces in implementing CCP decisions and 
enhancing China’s national power. Beyond this, Xi stressed that the development of SOEs—including 
specifically, improved corporate profitability, competitiveness, and preserving or increasing the value 
of state assets—should become a criterion in evaluating the performance of Party organizations. Xi 
also called to better define the Party’s power and responsibilities with respect to SOEs’ decision-
 
582 See Bryson et al., supra note 560 (also finding that where the government is involved in the appointment of senior level 
managers, whether in state-owned or privately owned firms, managers have less decision making autonomy).  
583 For further discussion on these “agency-costs”-type concerns, see supra Chapter 2, Section II.A.  




making and supervision against corruption, embezzlement and other corporate malpractice.584 The 
release of the SOE Reform Guiding Opinions585 and more recently the PRC Supervision Law 586 
repackage these goals in a legal framework by giving the party-organization specific governance 
capacities with respect to firms, as both a distinct internal corporate stakeholder and an external 
disciplinary and accountability institution.587  
 
2.   Formal Stakeholder Capacity: Corporate Party Committees 
 
The Party’s presence in firms is felt through its involvement with various stakeholders in the 
firm, such as trade unions, the Communist Youth League, and other mass groups and organizations 
formed within the corporate structure.588 Yet the Party also has a distinct corporate stakeholder 
capacity of its own, which facilitates the performance of the Party’s monitoring functions and other 
goals. This capacity is addressed by several articles in the Constitution of the CCP.  
Article 29 stipulates that a primary Party Organization (also known as the Party Committee) 
will be formed in every enterprise, whether state or privately owned, where there are at least three full 
members of the Party. Article 31 grants this intra-firm political institution a designated monitoring 
role: to make sure that “Party and non-Party cadres strictly observe the law and administrative 
discipline and the financial and economic statutes and personnel regulations of the state and that none 
of them infringe on the interests of the state, the collective or the masses.”  
Article 32 further stipulates: For public-sector firms: “In a state-owned or collective enterprise, 
the primary Party organization acts as the political nucleus and works for the operation of the 
enterprise. The primary Party organization guarantees and oversees the implementation of the principles 
and policies of the Party and the state in its own enterprise and backs the meeting of shareholders, board of 
directors, board of supervisors and manager (factory director) in the exercise of their functions and powers 
according to law. … and participates in making final decisions on major questions in the enterprise.]” For 
private-sector firms: “In a non-public economic institution, the primary Party organization carries out 
the Party's principles and policies, provides guidance to and oversees the enterprise in observing the laws 
and regulations of the state, exercises leadership over the trade union, the Communist Youth League 
 
584  Xi Stresses CPC Leadership of State-Owned Enterprises, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 2016, 11:25 AM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-10/12/content_27035822.htm.  
585 Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Guoyou Qiye Gaige de Zhidao Yijian (中共中央、国务院关
于深化国有企业改革的指导意见) [CPC Central Committee and State Council Opinion on Deepening the Guidance 
of State-Owned Enterprise Reform] (Aug. 24, 2015) [hereinafter “SOE Reform Guiding Opinions,” or “Guiding 
Opinions”], available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/ 
content_2930440.htm.  
586 See infra note 654. 
587 I elaborate on the external disciplining and accountability functions of Party governance below. 
588 For the relationship between trade unions and the CCP, see supra Chapter 2, p. 75.  




organization and other mass organizations, rallies the workers and office staff around it, safeguards 
the legitimate rights and interests of all quarters and stimulates the healthy development of the enterprise.”589  
At the top of this intra-firm Party organization, the Party appoints a party secretary and deputy 
secretary as the senior political leadership roles within the firm. In many corporatized SOEs, the role 
of the party secretary often conflates with other senior corporate positions, such as the chairman of 
the board of directors or the firm’s general manager.590  
In addition to these constitutional provisions, the PRC Company Law prescribes a role for a 
Party Committee in any PRC-domiciled company591 and thus gives a legal basis for Party involvement 
at the firm level if the Party so chooses. This makes clear that a political presence in firms is not new.592 
A stakeholder capacity was long established by the CCP Constitution and was included in the PRC 
Company Law at least since its 2005 revision.593 Under this legal framework, however, the functions 
of the Party committee were undisclosed. Its relation to the formal corporate governance structure 
was opaque,594 and it was not deployed systematically beyond several meaningful state-controlled firms.   
Recently, the requirement to establish an intra-firm Party organization was reaffirmed as 
statutory, and the CCP and the State Council jointly issued a “guidance” clarifying the operations of 
this political institution. 595  Despite its somewhat misleading title, this guidance is an obligatory 
document that applies to all SOEs,596 which in this context are enterprises with state assets, including 
wholly state-owned firms and state-controlled firms, and also firms in which the state is a minority 
shareholder. Indeed, the Guiding Opinions make clear that establishing a Party organization and 
carrying out Party work is a prerequisite for enterprises with mixed ownership.597 The corporate 
governance roles of the Party organization explicated by this document extend far beyond political 
 
589  The CCP Constitution, supra note 546, art. 32 (italics added). 
590 On the overlap between Party elite and business elite, see Downs & Meidan, supra note 581; Li, supra note 556. 
591 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 19 (“The Chinese Communist Party may, according to the Constitution of the 
Chinese Communist Party, establish its branches in companies to carry out activities of the Chinese Communist Party. 
The company shall provide necessary conditions to facilitate the activities of the Party.”).  
592 This is the case even with respect to private businesses as well. In 1999, three percent of private businesses had a 
designated party organization. In 2012, the number reached thirteen percent. At the time, Zhejiang province declared that 
all private firms with more than eighty employees had established a Party organization. See How the Communist Party is Trying 
to Expand its Influence in the Private Sector, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2012) p. 43, (printed edition). 
593 Article 19 of the Company Law remained the same throughout the law’s revisions. 2005 Company Law, supra note 147. 
The article has roots in the 1993 Company Law, in which Article 17 states: “The grass roots organizations of the 
Communist Party of China in a company shall carry out their activities according to the Constitution of the Communist 
Party of China.” 1993 Company Law, supra note 66, art. 17. Note that intra-firm Party organization, however, was not 
included in the earlier 1992 Normative Opinions. See 1992 Normative Opinions, supra note 59. 
594 Howson, supra note 278, at 140-141 (extrapolating some details on the existence and operation of a Party Committee 
in China’s Bank of Communication from a media interview with the bank’s chairman).  
595 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585. For example, article 1 states: “the Party organizations of SOEs shall 
enjoy a more solid statutory position in corporate governance, and fully display their core political role...”. 
596 The title of the SOE Reform Guiding Opinions is misleading in another way. The State Council and the CCP issued 
these opinions. Thus, where the document stands as a source of formal law is somewhat unclear. However, whether it is 
viewed as an administrative regulation or a Party decree, its mandatory application as a normative document is 
unquestionable. For a review of sources of positive law in China, see Keller, supra note 136. 
597 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, art. 7(24). 




and social responsibilities that would perhaps be expected for a body of this nature. They encompass 
a direct and now explicit role in corporate monitoring and decision making, specifically addressing the 
need to raise operational efficiency through the Party organization among other goals. (As an anecdote, 
the Guiding Opinions mention operational efficiency fourteen times. Party ideology is mentioned two 
times, education two times, and corruption five times.)  
 
3.  The Party Organization Internal Corporate Governance Functions—Recent Developments 
  
The SOE Reform Guiding Opinions are full of what most Western observers would view as 
complete contradictions. The document claims to resolve some of the most acute problems in the 
management of SOEs and remove “institutional obstacles,” and identifies economic development as 
its central task. Its rhetoric emphasizes corporate autonomy and market-led governance in SOEs.598 
Yet one of the main mechanisms to achieve this, according to the Guiding Opinions, is to enhance 
Party leadership over SOEs.599 Thus, while the autonomy of internal corporate governance bodies is 
repeatedly emphasized,600 at the same time so is the utter lack of independence of these bodies from 
the Party’s intra-firm institution — the Party committee.  
This political dependence is grounded on three paths:  
1) an openly-declared and legitimized authority granted to the Party organization with respect 
to personnel management, including recommending, assessing, and nominating candidates for leading 
corporate positions (directors and managers);601  
 
598 Section 1, Article (2) Basic Principles states the goal: “to promote SOEs to become independent market players in the 
true sense where they engage in autonomous operations, make profits and assume losses independently, bear risks on their 
own, practice self-discipline and pursue self-development pursuant to the law.” Article (3) Main Objectives states: “to fine-
tune the market-oriented mechanisms featuring the survival of the fittest under which SOEs engage in autonomous and 
flexible business operations, and promote and demote internal management personnel, employ and let go staff members, 
and increase and cut remunerations according to market practices.” Id. arts. 2-3. 
599 This appears as part of Section 1, Article (1) Guiding Thoughts, SOE Reform Guiding Opinions. Id. art. 1. 
600 Article (8) states: “give full play to the decision-making role of the board of directors, the supervisory role of the board 
of supervisors, the operation and management role of the management, and the core political role of the Party organization 
of a SOE, and effectively resolve the phenomenon where the boards of directors of certain enterprises exist only in name 
and decisions are solely made by top leaders, so as to achieve standardized corporate governance. In addition, it is vital to 
effectively enforce and safeguard the lawful exercise of the rights to make material decisions, select and appoint personnel, 
distribute remunerations, etc. by the board of directors, and guarantee the operational autonomy of the management. No 
government department and agency may intervene unless authorized by law.” Id. art. 8. 
601 This authority is scattered along the provisions. Here are a few apt examples: Article (9): “It is important to combine 
the principle of Party management of cadres with the requirements that the board of directors of a SOE shall be selected 
pursuant to the law, that the board of directors shall select persons in charge of operations and management in accordance 
with the law, … Superior Party organizations and State-owned assets regulatory authorities shall strengthen the 
management of SOE leaders according to their respective scope of management, broaden the channels for personnel 
recommendation, assess and nominate candidates in accordance with applicable provisions, and go through selection and 
appointment procedures strictly as required.” Article (25): “reinforce the responsibilities of the Party organization of an 
enterprise in the selection and appointment, training and education, management and supervision of the enterprise's 
leaders, support the board of directors to select persons in charge of operations and management.” See id. at arts. 9, 25. 




2) encouraging cross-representation of board members and supervisory committee members 
with members of the firm’s Party committee,602 and setting a formal assimilation of the position of the 
chairman of the board with that of the Party secretary as the default.603  
3) setting the explicit capacity of the Party organization as one of the firm’s internal governing 
bodies, with the authority to oversee, audit, and assess major corporate decisions.604  
What is clear from this is the Party’s utilization of the corporate legal form itself and the legal 
system more generally. Corporatized SOEs are viewed not only as a ready venue through which Party 
leadership can be disseminated (upon different corporate stakeholders such as workers, investors, and 
consumers),605 but also as a legal vehicle through which the Party now legitimizes its economic 
involvement in firms. From a practical point of view, now that the Party’s corporate clout has been 
openly established, any legal requirement that procedural decision making will follow the law only 
emphasizes the weakening of traditional corporate governing bodies. Thus, the Party has practically 
hijacked corporate governance in these firms, and it has done so with the help of the legal system. 
Other institutional measures to sidestep traditional corporate governance bodies have been 
taken in the past, particularly through the SOE Assets Law. 606  Yet the Guiding Opinions offer 
something significantly different. The Guiding Opinions practically import the Party’s personnel 
management system (nomenklatura appointments and cadre evaluations) formally into corporate 
governance. 607  Moreover, the scope of involvement in internal governance that was authorized by 
 
602 Similar promotion of cross-representation and assimilation of political and corporate roles existed previously only with 
respect to central enterprises under SASAC. It was internally promoted by the Organization Department and Party 
Committee within SASAC and thus not part of the SOEs Assets Law or a formal SASAC administrative regulation. See 
Guanyu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Zhongyang Qiyedang Jian Gongzuo de Yijian (关于加强和改进中央企业党建工作的意见) 
[Opinions of the Organization Department and Party Committee of SASAC Concerning Strengthening and Improving 
the Party Construction Work in the Central Enterprises] (promulgated by the Org. Dep’t Communist Party of China & 
Party Comm. SASAC, Oct. 31, 2004), §2 art. 5, available at here.  
603 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, art. 24 (“uphold and improve the leadership framework featuring two-
way access and cross-representation, allow members of a SOE’s Party organization leadership…to be included in the 
board of directors, the board of supervisors or the management … and, engineer an appropriate cross-representation 
between members of the management of a SOE and those of its Party organization leadership. In principle, a SOE shall 
set the position of the chairman of the board of directors separately from the position of the general manager, and its 
Party secretary and chairman of the board of directors shall generally be served by the same person.”).  
604 Id. arts. 21, 23, 24. This alone can naturally lead risk-averse corporate managers to at least consult with the Party 
organization before making any corporate decision that might be considered meaningful.  
605 See id. art. 2 (Basic Principles) (“The Party's leadership over SOEs shall be upheld. This is the political direction and 
principle that must be held fast to in deepening SOE reform. It is critical to enforce the guidelines of comprehensively 
tightening Party discipline, give full play to the core political role of the Party organizations of enterprises, build up the 
leadership teams of enterprises, innovate grass-roots Party building work, carry out the campaign to build clean Party 
governance in an in-depth manner, continue to wholeheartedly rely on the working class, and safeguard the legitimate 
rights and interests of workers...”). 
606 See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 743-744 (referring to SASAC “super control rights” granted by the SOE Assets 
Law beyond any control rights SASAC otherwise has as a shareholder based on the Company Law).  
607 It should be noted that the level of intervention as well as the criteria for performance assessment vary according to 
the industry in which the business operates and not according to the level of state shareholding. For SOEs belonging to 
“major industries and key fields concerning national security or national economic lifeline,” performance evaluation criteria 
include various national interests. For enterprises outside these key fields but still with state shareholding and even a 




the SOE Assets Law was far narrower than what is now covered under the Guiding Opinions and 
entrusted to the Party committee.608 Furthermore, these two normative documents advance different 
interests. The SOE Assets Law is focused on enabling state involvement mainly in decisions that can 
have an impact on the value of state assets. In contrast, the Guiding Opinions advance Party-state 
interests more broadly, encompassing industrial policy goals, social and ideological targets, and 
sustainable economic growth.  
Most importantly, the organ authorized to engage in corporate governance is different as well. 
The SOE Assets Law regulates the state’s capacity as a shareholder. Thus, the added authority that the 
law assigns to the state in corporate decision making609 is confined to its shareholding capacity and 
exercised formally through the shareholders’ assembly following defined corporate procedures, and 
therefore subject to potential scrutiny.610 The Guiding Opinions, on the other hand, legalize the 
omnipresent authority of the Party over firms by granting it a distinct corporate stakeholder capacity 
that is otherwise not regulated and is not subject to any transparent procedural (or other) checks and 
balances. The CCP itself, beyond any traditional shareholder role the state may have, becomes a legal 
corporate constituent with unique interests and a distinct capacity to convey, direct, and monitor the 
ways these interests will be pursued:  
The core political role of the Party organizations of SOEs shall be fully displayed. It is critical 
to unify the efforts to strengthen Party leadership with those to improve corporate governance, 
include the overall requirements on Party building into the articles of association of SOEs, 
make clear the statutory role of the Party organizations of SOEs in their corporate governance 
structures, and innovate the channels and means for the Party organizations of SOEs to play 
their core political role.611  
As noted above, the open door for the CCP to have a corporate committee presence is old 
news. However, the Guiding Opinions take China’s politicized corporate governance to a new 
operative level. They clarify the goals that this political governance institution should advance in firms 
and elucidate in some detail its organization, operation, and governance relations with other corporate 
institutions. Moreover, corporatized SOEs are also required to have this inserted in their governing 
 
controlling stake, the assessment seems more market-oriented and emphasizes appreciation in the value of state-owned 
assets. See SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, § 2 art. 5, § 4, art. 14. 
608 Compare id., with SOE Assets Law, supra note 183, art. 22 (3) (whereby SASAC or similar state shareholding bodies are 
authorized with “Proposing the director and supervisor candidates to the shareholders' meeting”), and SOE Assets Law, 
supra note 183, art. 24 (“assess[ing] the candidates…to be appointed or proposed…”), and SOE Assets Law, supra note 183, 
art. 27 (“determine the standards of remuneration for the managers … appointed by it.”). 
609 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 186-187 and my reservations in notes 188-192. 
610 Articles 13, 30, and 33 of the SOE Assets Law make clear that the state in its shareholder capacity will follow shareholder 
deliberation and voting even with respect to major corporate decisions. See SOE Assets Law, supra note 183, arts. 13, 30, 
33. Only in limited circumstances, and only when the state is a sole or controlling shareholder, should the issues first be 
reported or approved by the relevant department of the local people’s congress. See id. arts. 24, 25. Moreover, monitoring 
functions are granted to the state-shareholding body itself and mentioned in the context of the right to appoint an external 
audit firm to audit the company’s financial reports. See id. arts 63-67.   
611 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, art. 24. 




documents, a change that entails public disclosure and that would have been the purview of 
shareholders under the Company Law.612 In so doing, the operation of a Party committee inside firms 
is disclosed to foreign and domestic corporate stockholders and to the market at large. It is still too 
early to tell what this will signal to investors and how it will be perceived by the market. A greater 
Party-state commitment to economic growth, greater monitoring against rampant corruption and 
expropriation, a more direct platform to advance industrial policies through the corporation, or 
political suppression are only some of the ways that investors could interpret this move, and each 
could affect the market differently.613  
While the economic effects are still to be seen, publicly-listed firms, and not only national 
champions, are complying with the requirement.614 Before the introduction of the Guiding Opinions, 
the Company Law provision on corporate Party committees was often overlooked, especially among 
corporatized SOEs that are listed in foreign markets.615 Recent reports indicate that more firms are 
now complying with the requirement and amending their bylaws.616  
The case of Tianjin Realty Development Group Co. Ltd. (Tianjin Realty)  illustrates how firms 
have treated these new Guiding Opinions in practice and the limited ability of investors in 
corporatized SOEs to resist them.617 Tianjin Realty, whose shares are listed for trade on the SSE, is 
the listed arm of the Tianjin local government’s commercial real estate development division. In 
January 2017, Tianjin Realty called a special shareholders’ meeting to approve amendments in its 
Articles of Association following the CCP and State Council’s Guiding Opinions. Among other 
 
612 According to Article 37 of the 2005 Company Law, revisions in the bylaws are under the authority of the shareholders’ 
meeting. Article 18 requires a company to solicit the opinions of its employees through their labor unions when drafting 
an important bylaw provision. 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 18, 37.   
613 I discuss these different options and the available empirical studies below. See infra Chapter 3, Section III.A. 
614 Examples include FAW Group Corp., whose Shenzhen-listed subsidiaries FAW Car and FAW Xiali Automobile Co., 
Ltd. both added a section of “Party Building” to their bylaws stating that the Party Committee in the firm will oversee 
work related to production and management of the company, and that their board of directors should consult with the 
Party Committee before deciding on major issues. Similar bylaw revisions were disclosed by Sinoma Science & Technology 
Co., Ltd. and by Zhonghang Electronic Measuring Instruments Co., Ltd., also listed for trade on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. See Greg Levesque, China’s Evolving Economic Statecraft, THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/chinas-evolving-economic-statecraft/; Mark Schlarbaum, Xi Boosts Party in China’s $18 
Trillion State Company Sector, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 7, 2016, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-07/xi-boosts-party-say-in-china-s-18-trillion-state-company-sector.  
615 The application of the Guiding Opinions extends to Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong, which previously were able to 
avoid establishing Party committees in practice and are now required to establish Party institutions in their articles of 
association. Shirley Yam, Regulators’ Silence on Communist Party Presence in Listed State Companies is Deafening, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (July 22, 2016, 5:07 PM), http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1993277/regulators-silence-
communist-party-presence-listed-state-companies. o 
616 Supra note 614. Moreover, with respect to off-shore listed firms, a Hong Kong–based media website recently 
reported that in the past eighteen months, 123 Hong Kong-listed Chinese firms amended their articles of incorporation 
to implement the Guiding Opinions and expand the authority of their Party Committees. Sun Leqi, yu 120 Zhongzigu sheli 
Dangwei quanli kong lingjia Dongshihui [More than 120 Chinese Stocks Set Up Party Committee Power to Overthrow the Board of 
Directors], APPLE DAILY (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/realtime/article/20180926/58722466. 
617 Alice Yan, Chinese Company Shareholders Vote ‘No’ to Corporate Role for Communist Party, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(Jan. 14, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2062061/chinese-company-
shareholders-vote-no-corporate-role. 




elements, the proposed amendment included the following: establishing a (apparently new to the 
company) Party committee within the firm and determining the position holders that would serve on 
the committee; adding a requirement to solicit the opinions of the Party committee and its leaders 
before making major corporate decisions; allowing the Party committee to be involved in any decision 
of the board of directors regarding the appointment, dismissal, and remuneration of senior managers; 
and allowing the Party committee to carry out additional supervisory, auditing, and disciplinary 
responsibilities.618 The proposed amendment was rejected by the shareholders after only 62.5 percent 
of shareholders present in the meeting approved the change, which required a two-thirds approval.619  
At the time of the meeting, the Tianjin local government only held approximately 25 percent of the 
shares. The company’s minority shareholders (those having below 5 percent equity) fiercely voiced 
their objection—90 percent of those present voted against the amendment. And yet the company held 
another extraordinary shareholder meeting only a few months later, at which the shareholders 
miraculously reversed their vote, and the amendment was approved almost unanimously (99.8 
percent).620  
The Tianjin Realty case is an example of the reduction in the power and relevance of traditional 
corporate governing bodies against the obligatory nature of the Guiding Opinions. Presumably, 
corporate organs within a firm will be similarly powerless against the actions of the Party organization 
once one is installed. This raises the question of whether this political institution and its members 
could be held accountable for corporate decisions that they directed but went awry, and by whom? 
Given that state enforcing institutions do not have even a formal authority over Party organizations, 
 
618 See Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) Co., Ltd., Disclosure of Information Report on the 2017 First Extraordinary 
General Meeting of Shareholders, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (Jan. 5, 2017),  
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2016-12-30/600322_20161230_1.pdf. 
619 See Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) Co., Ltd., Announcement of Resolutions of the First Extraordinary General Meeting 
of 2017, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (Jan. 5, 2017), 
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2017-01-07/600322_20170107_1.pdf.  
620 Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) Co., Ltd., Announcement of Resolutions of the Second Extraordinary General Meeting 
of 2017, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (May 6, 2017),  
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2017-05-06/600322_20170506_1.pdf. A few weeks 
before the second extraordinary meeting, the local state shareholder started increasing its holding in the company and also 
declared its intentions to increase its holding by at least three percent within the next year. Given that the local government 
only held twenty-five percent of the votes and that the vote required a two-thirds supermajority, this was likely a signaling 
move of what was to come rather than a true effort to secure the missing votes. Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) 
Co., Ltd., Announcement of the Largest Shareholder Increase Shareholding Plan, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (Apr. 5, 2017), 
http://static.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2017-04-05/600322_20170405_1.pdf.  
Although the two proposed amendments were phrased slightly differently, substantively they were the same. For the exact 
wording, compare Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) Co., Ltd., 2017 First Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, 
SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2016-
12-30/600322_20161230_1.pdf (preparatory material for the first meeting), with Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) 
Co., Ltd., 2017 Second Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (Apr. 27, 2017), 
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2017-04-27/600322_20170427_1.pdf (preparatory 
material for the second meeting).  




including in their corporate capacity,621 the institutionalization and regularization of Party committees 
only substantiates a law-based-governance approach but not legal accountability. It is safe to assume 
that Party committee members will not be subject to any review or enforcement by either the CSRC, 
the People’s Court system, or the Procuratorate. Clearly any accountability measures will be external 
to both the firm and the legal system, and would have to derive from the political organization itself. 
This could explain why the CCP’s disciplinary apparatus is now becoming more involved in corporate 
supervision, a matter that I address next. 
The obligatory nature of the Guiding Opinions and the absence of internal and external real 
checks and balances over the Party committee are certainly disconcerting. Yet there is still much that 
is unknown about how Party committees will function and how they will be accepted by corporate 
constituents. Investors, for example, might value them negatively but remain invested for the lack of 
better structured alternatives in the Chinese market. Or, it may well be that investors will be indifferent 
to this institution, the way they have been oblivious to the governance in Chinese firms many times 
before, even when facing disclosures of corporate malpractice and sheer fraud.622 On the other hand, 
Party committees might be added to the list of unconventional institutions that provide reliable 
assurances, secure investors’ confidence, and support further growth.  
 
B. The CCP’s External Corporate Governance Capacity—Monitoring and Accountability through 
Disciplinary and Enforcement Functions 
 
  Another form of the recent politicization of corporate governance in China is the substitution 
of external market monitoring and legal enforcement with another system external to the firm—the 
disciplinary and accountability institutions of the CCP. Enforcement of political and social discipline 
is one of the cornerstones of the CCP’s control over its 90 million members and 4.5 million grassroots 
organizations.623 In the last decade, and especially since Xi rose to power, the Party’s disciplinary 
inspection and enforcement efforts have been intensified, not only toward social control in general, 
 
621 See Yam, supra note 615 (taking this question further by expressing concerns about the ability of foreign regulators to 
hold these CCP corporate institutions accountable for their actions and mentioning the potential conflict of laws in cases 
of Chinese subsidiaries incorporated off-shore). 
622 GREEN, supra note 104, at 118-153; Howson, supra note 278, at 150-151. 
623 In 2016, the CCP employed approximately 26 million members as public officials or staff. Numbers are drawn from 
Cheng Li, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 - Part Five: Party Apparatchiks, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, 
Summer 2011, available at https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-midterm-jockeying-gearing-2012-part-five-party-
apparatchiks; China – Statistics & Facts, STATISTICA, https://www.statista.com/topics/753/china/ (last visited May 23, 
2019) (providing statistical information from Xinhua News Agency).  




624 but also specifically with respect to firms and their insiders.625 Corporatized SOEs and their group 
structure organization are being harnessed to facilitate the Party’s disciplinary efforts.  
Campaign-style enforcement against corruption and embezzlement of state assets is the main 
feature relevant here.626 The Party’s focus on enforcement against corporate corruption is achieved 
through two main paths. The first is aligned with the recent expansion of the CCP’s intra-firm 
corporate governance functions discussed above. Here, the corporate governance role of an intra-firm 
Party committee was formalized, specifying the discipline-inspection roles that a corporate Party 
committee should perform within its firm. The second is by intensifying the CCP’s drive against 
corporate corruption externally. In doing so, the CCP strengthens enforcement against corruption by 
harnessing corporatized SOEs and corporate governance more generally.627 The Party is utilizing the 
corporate legal form to gain access to information and to detect, punish, and prevent corruption.  
This change in discipline and enforcement strengthens the CCP’s overall market control while 
also fortifying its new legal mandate in the realm of corporate governance. The strains this may place 
on managerial discretion, risk taking, and possibly on firm performance are to be expected, but the 
positive effects this could have on firms and their stakeholders are less apparent and should be noted 
as well. Moreover, while a political disciplinary institution cannot replace external markets and 
enforcement functions completely (e.g., party discipline does little in the way of promoting efficient 
allocation of capital as external markets do, nor addresses individual stakeholders’ grievances as legal 
institutions are expected to do), still the interests of the Party and firms could be mutually served 
provided that this form of external oversight and accountability is subject to some operational 
constraints.628  
 
1. Party Discipline and Anti-Corruption Work  
 
i.   Party-Level Incentives to Combat Corruption 
 
Having change-averse individuals within the administrative and political controlling apparatus 
who have thrived economically based on their affiliation with corporatized SOEs (whether or not they 
 
624 By 2016, the anti-corruption campaign had led to 100,000 prosecutions, including prosecution of many high-level 
officials for their business conduct. On the scope related to SOEs, see infra notes 669, 679.  
625 See Samson Yuen, Disciplining the Party—Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Its Limits, CHINA PERSP., no. 3, 2014, 
at 41 (pointing out how Xi’s campaign is different from previous anti-corruption campaigns in that respect). 
626  On the rationale behind a “campaign-style enforcement,” see Andrew Wedeman, Anticorruption Campaigns and the 
Intensification of Corruption in China, 14 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 93 (2005). 
627 The causality here is hard to determine and requires empirical research. Is it that the CCP tries to detect corruption and 
happens to find it in corporatized SOEs due to, perhaps, their group structure, the high-level position suspects involved, 
or crony-capitalism? Or, is it that the Party indeed targets corporatized SOEs and their group structure, perhaps due to 
the reasons I emphasize next? I take the latter view and offer the rationale behind it but cannot support it empirically. 
628 This is discussed further below, where I address the potential contributions of a politicized corporate governance. 




themselves engaged in corruption) 629 raises the question of who would be incentivized to enhance 
external supervision over firms and their insiders. Furthermore, why would a political disciplinary 
system succeed where the legal system has failed? Here, I believe, corruption holds key answers. 
Rampant corruption in China, facilitated through China’s crony capitalists and intensified by 
corporatized SOEs and their affiliated business network, poses substantial threats to Party unity and 
legitimacy. These threats, which intensify the more growth is pursued and economic leeway enabled, 
unites Party-state leaders around a common goal—their political survival.   
Since economic reforms began, China has endured a reputation for widespread corruption.630 
Perhaps inevitable to an economic transition,631 corruption is often viewed as a major impediment to 
the growth of businesses and an unfavorable condition for development.632 This has been a common 
understanding even though the evidence for it, at least with respect to China, is inconclusive at best.633 
However, aside from a general economic motivation to minimize potential negative effects on growth 
and development, enforcement against corruption in China is highly political in nature. 634  Anti-
 
629  The People’s Bank of China estimated that between the mid-1990s and 2008, 16,000 to 18,000 Chinese officials and 
executives at state-owned companies took a total of $123 billion from companies (presumably illegitimately). And the 
Winner Is, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2012/01/21/and-the-winner-is 
(“State capitalism often reinforces corruption.”). 
630 The Corruption Perception Index, published by Transparency International, ranked China 77 out of 180 country spots 
in 2017. This is a much-improved position from the country’s rank in 1995 (when the Index was established), when China 
ranked one above Indonesia, which was the most corrupt country in the world. Importantly, this Index does not measure 
actual corruption, but rather perceptions about corruption according to various indices. For the Index, see Measuring 
Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L UK, http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption/measuring-
corruption/#.Wue3JYjwY2y (last visited May 23, 2019). Despite what may be an improvement, many still perceive 
corruption to be endemic to contemporary China, with some referring to it as an “epidemic.” Andrew Wederman, The 
Intensification of Corruption in China, 180 CHINA Q. 895 (2004) (referencing Michael Johnston & Yufan Hao, China’s Surge of 
Corruption, 6 J. DEMOCRACY, no. 4, 1995, at 80; Minxin Pei, Will China Become Another Indonesia?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Autumn 
1999, at 94; Hilton Root, Corruption in China: Has It Become Systemic?, 36 ASIAN SURV. 741 (1996)).  
631 Kim Lane Scheppele, The Inevitable Corruption of Transition, 14 U. CONN J. INT’L L. 509 (1999). 
632 Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681 (1995) (finding that corruption has a significant negative effect 
on the ratio of investment to GDP); Mo Pak Hung, Corruption and Economic Growth, 29 J. COMP. ECON 66 (2001) (finding 
that one unit increase in the corruption index reduces the growth rate by 0.545 percentage points. Also finding that 
corruption reduces the share of private investments.). 
633 This perception is rather deeply rooted even though the Chinese economy has performed remarkably well since reforms 
ensued. See supra note 630. See also Xi’s Crackdown on Corruption ‘Will Help Boost China’s Economy’, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Nov. 3, 2017, 12:04 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2118245/xis-crackdown-
corruption-will-help-boost-chinas-economy. For an exception to this view revealing empirical evidence to the contrary, see 
Chiung-Ju Huang, Is Corruption Bad for Economic Growth? Evidence from Asia-Pacific Countries, 35 NORTH AM. J. ECON & FIN. 
247 (2016) (examining corruption and growth in thirteen Asia-Pacific countries during the 1997–2013 period and finding 
a significant positive correlation between corruption and economic growth in South Korea and China). At the other end 
of the spectrum, there is also a view that it is the fight against corruption that contributes to the economic slow-down in 
China. See, e.g., Huan Jun Chan & Xueling Lin, Corruption Clean Up is Top Reason for China’s Slowdown: Former Central Banker, 
CHANNEL NEWSASIA (July 27, 2017, 8:46 PM), https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/corruption-clean-up-is-
top-reason-for-china-s-slowdown-former-ce-7928988 (citing a former PBOC policy maker); JieYang, Is Anti-graft Anti-
growth? Weighing the Economic Impact of the Anti-corruption Campaign, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2014),  
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21610316-weighing-economic-impact-anti-corruption-campaign-anti-graft-
anti-growth. For a more comprehensive overview on the complex relationship between corruption levels and economic 
growth, see ANDREW WEDEMAN, DOUBLE PARADOX: RAPID GROWTH AND RISING CORRUPTION IN CHINA (2012). 
634 MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG 
KONG (2004) (analyzing the (former) system of anti-corruption in China, suggesting that it is influenced and captured by 




corruption campaigns have been used to consolidate power by new leadership635 and to suppress 
factional power struggles between political rivals within the Party-state system.636  
In addition to these political and economic motivations in combating corruption, public 
criticism of corrupt officials also seems to fuel enforcement against corruption. Criticism against 
corrupt officials is on the rise, especially with increasing gaps in income distribution.637 Public criticism 
is a concern primarily because it reflects badly on the Party-state’s own integrity and viability,638 and 
alienates the Party from the people. Research has shown that while public opinion in China functions 
differently than it does in liberal democracies, it is nevertheless a meaningful consideration639 and has 
an impact on the design of CCP-directed reforms.640 Public opinion was found to be a major motivator 
in anti-corruption campaign enforcement specifically, and even in subsequent criminal procedures.641  
The Party itself declares that corruption is an imminent threat to the regime’s stability,642 Party 
unity, and legitimacy.643 The need to combat corruption is repeatedly emphasized by Party leadership 
 
local Party leaders, and suggesting that this led to its failure); Lin Zhu, Punishing Corrupt Officials in China, 223 CHINA Q. 595 
(2015) (arguing that anti-corruption campaigns have been applied selectively and for political purposes).  
635 A strategy taken by China’s leaders, Hu Jintao and Jian Zemin, long before Xi, to establish their new leadership 
following transitions. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is known to be a continuous but more pervasive effort that 
systematically penetrates leadership layers not touched before, including the highest ranks of the Party-state system, leaders 
of the strongest national champions and financial industry, as well as military leaders.  
636  David Barboza, Politics Permeates Anti-Corruption Drive in China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/business/global/04corrupt.html; Andrew Wederman, Xi Jinping’s Tiger Hunt and 
the Politics of Corruption, 13 CHINA RES. CTR., no. 2, Oct. 15, 2014, available at 
https://www.chinacenter.net/2014/china_currents/13-2/xi-jinpings-tiger-hunt-and-the-politics-of-corruption/; Jing 
Rong Goh et al., Force Behind Anti-Corruption: Evidence from China (January 12, 2019), available 
at  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3227368 (examining the political considerations behind anti-corruption investigations 
and subsequent political punishment). 
637  Luan, China Focus: Income, Corruption Top Concerns for Two Sessions: Polls, XINHUA (Mar. 4, 2015, 8:14 PM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180220164857/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/04/c_134037974.htm 
(reporting public polls that show corruption as the second most concerning issue in China, following income distribution.  
This news report also reveals that corruption was voted by the public among the three most concerning issues for the past 
ten years.). 
638 Wederman, supra note 630. 
639 GALLAGHER, supra note 554. 
640  Yun Sun, Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China’s Foreign Policy, or Shaped by It?, BROOKINGS (Dec. 13, 2011), 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinese-public-opinion-shaping-chinas-foreign-policy-or-shaped-by-it/.  
641 Ira Belkin, Justice in the PRC: How the Chinese Communist Party Has Struggled with Managing Public Opinion and the Administration 
of Criminal Justice in the Internet Age (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper Series Working Paper 
No. 18-01, 2018).  
642 China Must Root out Corruption or Communist Party Will Be Erased from History, Graft-Buster Warns, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Nov. 11, 2017, 12:03 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2119431/china-must-root-
out-corruption-or-communist-party-will.  
643 For example, President Xi Jinping’s expositions stating that corruption if not treated “will inevitably lead to the downfall 
of the party and the state” (wangdang wangguo). China’s Xi Amassing Most Power since Deng Raises Reform Risk, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Dec. 30, 2013, 10:07 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-30/china-s-xi-amassing-most-
power-since-deng-raises-risk-for-reform.  




and was incorporated in the Constitution of the CCP.644 Anti-corruption efforts and their high-profile 
results are continuously reported to the public through state-owned media.645  
ii.  Corruption and Relevant Institutions 
 
Under the existing framework, corruption is one of several offenses by officials that are forbidden 
by different PRC laws and CCP rules.646 Yet the fine lines that define corruption and distinguish it 
from other forms of economic malfeasance by officials are unclear.647 It is often interpreted broadly 
to capture many different forms of “improper” behavior by state officials and Party members.648 In 
 
644 See The CCP Constitution, supra note 546, Preamble. 
645 Daniel C.K. Chow, How China's Crackdown on Corruption Has Led to Less Transparency in the Enforcement of China's Anti-
Bribery Laws, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 685 (2015) (discussing media coverage but arguing that while new laws and media 
coverage have increased transparency, the Party’s strengthened control actually leads to less transparency in enforcement 
against corruption). 
646 For the main laws, see Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People's Cong., Apr. 27, 2005; amended Sept. 1, 2017), art. 53, available at 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=23929&lib=law; PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 4, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), available at 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=304262. The new law sets out clear parameters for commercial bribery. 
See China’s New Anti-Unfair Competition Law Redefines Bribery, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Nov. 2017), 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/158149/chinas-new-anti-unfair-competition-law-
redefines-bribery. 
See also Amendments to the Criminal Law, supra note 150, arts. 91, 163, 165-169, 385-389. Section 3 is dedicated to 
“Offenses Against Companies and Enterprise Management Disorder” and includes various actions within the context of 
enterprises and other institutions, including companies, that result in improper demand of receipt of gains. In particular, 
article 163 addresses, among others, situations whereby personnel performing public duties in state-owned companies and 
enterprises, and personnel assigned by state-owned companies and enterprises to non-state-owned companies gain 
personal benefits in the course of their affiliation with an enterprise. Article 165 handles the use of enterprise for personal 
gain by corporate insiders (directors and managers) in SOEs. Article 166 is focused on situations within SOEs whereby 
work personnel used their position for private gains and caused harm to state interests. Articles 167-169 focus on the 
criminal accountability of “people directly in charge of state-owned companies” for events that caused great damages to 
national interests. Articles 385 – 389 connect these actions with the crimes of embezzlement and offering or accepting 
bribes. Interestingly, with respect to corruption in the form of embezzlement (appropriating, stealing, or swindling public 
money or property, article 382 of the PRC Criminal Law), article 91 defines “public property” as property owned by the 
state, including private property that is being managed, used, or transported by state-organs, and state-owned corporations 
and enterprises. This means that embezzlement in joint ventures or in corporatized SOEs where the state has only a 
minority stake (or even no ownership, apparently), is still considered embezzlement of public property.   
The connection between the use of public authority for private gains and the bribery offense was made clearer by Notice 
No. 33 of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Issuing the Opinions on Issues concerning the Application 
of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases of Commercial Briberies (Nov. 20, 2008). Furthermore, the 2011 amendment to the 
Criminal Law amended Article 164, which penalizes employees of PRC companies who bribe foreign officials and is 
known as China’s own foreign corrupt practices act. 
See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa (中华人民共和国监察法) [The Supervision Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., Mar. 20, 2018) [hereinafter PRC 
Supervision Law], http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/21/content_2052362.htm, art. 11(2), listing corruption 
among the “duty-related violations” that a Supervisory Commission is entrusted to investigate and enforce against, together 
with “bribery, abuse of power, neglect of duty, power rent-seeking, tunneling, practice of favoritism and falsification, as 
well as the waste of state assets.”).  
647 As clearly reflected from the variations in the provisions of the various laws and regulations above. See supra note 646. 
648 Wederman, supra note 630, at 897, 901-903 (pointing out how the authorities assigned to handle official malfeasance 
(including corruption) extended their authority in practice beyond the list of actions defined in Chinese law and Party rules 




the context of corporatized SOEs, I treat corruption as the illicit use of public authority (by either 
Party member or state official, or their employees and assignees) for private gain, in the course of their 
formal or informal affiliation with corporatized SOEs.  
Until recently, corruption cases involving corporatized SOEs typically resulted in separate 
administrative and criminal enforcement proceedings through the various agencies of the state 
(including the People’s Procuratorate, and SASAC and CSRC in embezzlement cases),649 as well as in 
parallel Party disciplinary enforcement measures applied to Party members. 
The Party’s oversight and enforcement, often considered “extra-legal,” is directed by the 
Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI), which performs both oversight and 
enforcement roles, following a framework established in various inner Party norms and disciplinary 
codes of conduct applicable to Party members.650 Inner Party disciplinary methods are known to be 
harsher than investigative and enforcement devices under the legal system. The methods applied by 
the Party’s extra-legal system do not have to comply with transparency and predictability standards 
nor with due process required under the law. Known as Shuanggui, the CCDI is authorized to perform 
undeclared inner-Party detentions, involving investigations techniques that are often undisclosed and 
for prolonged durations (forced disappearances) with no ability for legal representation. The Shuanggui 
system is widely criticized for being opaque and brutal.651 
The state’s supervisory system has formal authority to oversee state institutions and civil 
servants, including with respect to corruption, following the framework established under the legal 
system.652 The monitoring functions were until very recently led by supervisory bureaus under the 
State Council (the executive government), including the Ministry of Supervision and its local 
supervisory bureaus, as well as various Bureaus for Corruption Prevention at the national and local 
 
to also include categories such as “privilege seeking” or the “use of authority for private gain.”). Notably, however, the 
recently enacted Supervisory Law seems to provide the necessary legal basis for authority over these offenses as well. 
649 For examples of cases pursued by SASAC and the legal system, see Wei Chen, 1 ge yue 12 wei Gaoguan Luoma—shangshi 
Gongsi neibu jianguan lingren danyou [The Fall of 12 Senior Managers in One Month—Insider Supervision of Listed Companies is 
Worrisome], CAIJING DAILY (Feb. 5. 2005, 10:19 
AM),  http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/stocktalk/20050205/10191351494.shtml.  
650 President Hu Jintao promulgated the primary normative framework on January 12, 2004. Zhonggong Zhongyang banbu 
Dang nei jiandu tiaoli he jilu chufen tiaoli [The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of China Promulgated Inner-Party 
Supervision and Disciplinary Regulation], PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE  
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/8198/32062/index.html ;http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2
346251.html. Earlier versions of inner Party supervision regulations are documented for early stages of reforms as well. 
See Dongmei Xu, Dang nei jiandu tiaoli chutai qian qian hou hou [Regulations on Inner Party Supervision Came before and after], 
PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Jan. 4, 2004), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2278488.html (tracking the 
various stages of trial inner party supervision regulations since 1987). Most recently, following the 18th Party Congress, 
the CCP Central Committee issued new disciplinary regulations that are considered much stricter and more comprehensive. 
See infra note 675. 
651 See generally Flora Sapio, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, 22 CHINA INFO. 7 (2008). 
652 For the main relevant laws, see supra note 646. 




levels.653 The legal system (People’s Procuratorate and the People’s Courts) carried out enforcement, 
subject to the rules of procedural justice. 
Recently, however, these institutions went through a fundamental structural reform, which 
stands as additional indicia of the political-economic equilibrium shift I identified earlier. In this 
reform, the various state institutions assigned to battle corruption in the state sector were merged and 
are now centralized under the National Supervisory Commission and its local-level commissions, 
whose operations are now established under a new law—the PRC Supervision Law.654 The new 
Commission also integrates the National Audit Office, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s anti-
corruption unit, and the CCDI. The new commission thereby has an all-encompassing authority to 
not only supervise and investigate, but also sanction misconduct of both Party and state agents.655 This 
new agency is a Party-led state organ. In the administrative governance hierarchy, it is situated directly 
under the National People’s Congress, but the new Commission’s chief sits on the CCP Politburo 
Standing Committee. Thus, a new enforcing legal institution656 was created with an administrative 
position in the state-hierarchy that is equal, and some argue higher, to that of the Supreme People’s 
Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.657 The CCDI, now under the Supervisory Commission, 
performs all investigatory powers, including with respect to violations by state functionaries. It is also 
authorized to directly apply sanctions for administrative violations and minor legal violations. At least 
formally, corruption cases involving criminal offenses (such as bribery, embezzlement, and seeking 
improper gains) still must be transferred to the People’s Procuratorate and the People’s Courts, and 
pursued according to the criminal law following a CCDI investigation and in addition to any disciplinary 
sanctions the CCDI applies. 658  
This of course sparked broad concerns among human rights groups, lawyers, and academics.659 
Commentators argued that this new legal institution was a tool through which the Party was brought 
into the law, rather than under the law, as there seem to be no real checks and balances on its powers. 
 
653 Yuen, supra note 625. 
654 PRC Supervision Law, supra note 646.  
655 Id. arts. 15-18, 41, 43. 
656 Legal positivism at least would consider the Supervisory Commission a “new legal institution.” 
657 The creation of the Supervisory Commission faced opposition by Chinese legal scholars, who argued that the new 
institution would violate the PRC Constitution since it would be a new Party body whose powers exceed those of legal 
system institutions and as such will be above the law. Chris Buckley, In China, Fears That New Anticorruption Agency Will Be 
Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-
anticorruption.html.  
658 Before the recent institutional reform, there was a similar reliance in corruption cases involving criminal offenses. For 
data from before the structural reform, see Yuen, supra note 625, at 45 n.35 (“The majority of officials placed under 
investigation are described as ‘having violated both Party discipline and the law (weiji weifa 违纪违法)”) (pointing out 
that of 67 cases released between May and June 2014, Xinhua reporters found that 47 cases violated both Party discipline 
and the law, 17 cases violated Party discipline only, and three cases violated the law only). For a description of authority 
under the structural reform, see Jeremy Daum, Unsupervised – Initial Thoughts on the Supervisory Law, CHINA LAW TRANSLATE 
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/unsupervised/.  
659 See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 657; Zongzhi Long, Wanhan Jiancha Fa Zhong zhiwu fanzui diaocha zhidu de ba xiang jianyi  [Eight 
Suggestions for Perfecting the System of Crime Investigations under the Supervision Law], POL. & L. (forthcoming), available at 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/oBJrzR4fWRVS_8karZtZyg.  




(For example, the rank of the new commission is higher than that of the Ministry of Public Security 
(police), and its powers apply on members of the People’s Congress—its own nominating body.)660 
There is also support for the government’s formal view, opining that such legalization in fact 
represents an enhancement of rule of law in China.661 Either way, it seems accurate to describe the 
state supervisory organs as being absorbed under a now legalized form of the CCDI, rather than the 
other way around, since the leadership of the CCDI is now assigned to lead the new National 
Supervisory Commission, and its scope of authority is in line with Party investigative powers and 
methods.662 This also means that under the new Supervisory Commission, Party investigative norms 
and methods (albeit, under the guise of the legal system with a new and now “legalized” name, liuzhi, 
“detention in custody,” traditionally applied as administrative detention outside the criminal legal 
system) is given a free rein to perform anti-corruption work.663  
This consolidation of anti-corruption powers also has direct implications on corporatized 
SOEs. The recent institutional reform expands the scope of Party anti-corruption and disciplinary 
authority and methods over additional millions of public sector organizations and individuals, many 
of whom are not party members.664  Corporatized SOEs and their state-appointed managers and other 
functionaries are now formally included as well. 665  This change also potentially subjects all employees 
of SOEs that could be viewed as civil servants or as performing public roles to CCP disciplinary 
enforcement.666 Note that the term “SOE” is interpreted broadly and often includes firms in which 
the state has even a minority equity stake, thus potentially further broadening the scope of individuals 
under CCP disciplinary supervision as well.667  
 
660 Id. See also Daum, supra note 658. 
661  See, e.g., Criminal Practice, Thoughts on Issues Related to Supervisory Committee Liuzhi, WECHAT (Apr. 16, 2017), 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4oMQiA8vshxWENRV7-mAtA.  
662 On the shift and consolidation of powers under the Supervisory Commission, thus under central CCP control, see 
Jinting Deng, The National Supervision Commission: A New Anti-Corruption Model in China, 52 INT’L J.L. CRIME & JUST. 58 
(2018). 
663 See the various threads of interpretation and discussion on this subject on the ChinaLaw blog:  
https://hermes.gwu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=CHINALAW percent3be6ee03af percent2e1711&X=D6555913969718A6F9; 
https://hermes.gwu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=CHINALAW;e753c272.1711.  
664 Jun Mai, How China’s New Anti-Graft Super Body Will Work, and Why Calling a Lawyer Won’t Be an Option, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (Nov. 17, 2017, 9:31 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120175/how-
chinas-new-anti-graft-super-body-will-work-and-why.  
665 PRC Supervision Law, supra note 646, art. 15. 
666 Id. (especially article 15 (1) & (6)). 
667 While the Supervision Law itself does not define the term SOEs, this broad interpretation is reflected in the SOE 
Reform Guiding Opinions. See id. Moreover, the SOE Assets Law refers to state invested enterprises. See SOE Assets Law, 
supra note 183. 
SOEs in many other occasions are viewed by Chinese authorities in the broader sense to include enterprises with state 
capital. See, e.g., Criminal Code, Guojia tongji ji guanyu dui guoyou gongsi qiye rending yijian de han, Guo Tong Han [2003] 44 hao 
[National Bureau of Statistics Opinions on the Recognition of State Owned Companies [2003] No. 4], WECHAT (Sept. 9, 2017), 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzIzNTg5MDU5Mg==&mid=2247483940&idx=2&sn=e5f35bf2b76b81944f841
d6000398c2a&chksm=e8e170ebdf96f9fd6c4f00093f5df8124d88c15f1dfc20dce44e368f75801695e8b539a84654&mpshar
e=1&scene=21&srcid=0925SXZAhbMNO75u65uaPVHi#wechat_redirect. By the Bureau’s interpretation, SOEs can be 
divided into: 1) (narrow sense SOEs) enterprises in which the state has wholly state-owned enterprises; 2) (broad sense 
SOEs) state-controlled enterprises (direct or indirect ownership, including by agreement, of more than fifty percent of the 




  Thus, while the personnel management system discussed earlier serves as an incentivizing 
force for corporate control parties to improve corporate performance and results, Party disciplinary 
enforcement, especially in its new, institutionalized form, plays a role of monitoring and deterring 
corporate wrongdoing by blurring the organizational lines between political enforcement against 
corruption and legal enforcement of corporate wrongdoing, and by creating fear governance 
throughout the firm and its network of affiliates. 
 
2. Harnessing Corporatized SOEs in the Battle against Corruption  
 
China’s crony capitalism, the overlap between its business and political elites,668 amplifies 
opportunities for corruption and increases the volume of cases in which corrupt conduct is exercised 
through, or simply involves, firms and corporatized SOEs, thus making corporatized SOEs key venues 
for corruption.669 Moreover, corruption through corporatized SOEs amplifies reputational damages 
to the Party-state system more than other corruption cases in several dimensions. 
 Not only is the number of corruption cases involving corporatized SOEs relatively high, but 
the “quality” or substance of these cases is alarming as well. In many of these cases, corruption also 
entails the waste of public resources and economic loss to the state through embezzlement.670 As 
opposed to other cases of corruption where officials are usually on the supply side, here the Party-
state may find itself on both sides of the corrupt conduct, perhaps even at the same time. The supply 
 
shares, or such ownership of less than fifty percent of the shares where no larger shareholder is present, or where there is 
a larger shareholder but control rights are vested with the state according to agreement); and 3) (broad sense SOEs) 
enterprises with state capital in which the state is not a controller. 
668 On the relationship between China’s private sector elite members and Party-state officials and resulted corruption, see 
China’s Graft-Busters Investigate Sinopec Chief Wang Tianpu, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1778090/chinas-graft-busters-investigate-sinopec-chief-
wang.  
669 Statistical data shows that throughout 2016 (from December 2015 to November 30, 2016), there were 1458 cases of 
criminal violations in business enterprises with 1827 individual offenders involved. Out of these cases, 203 cases involved 
state-owned enterprises and 1255 cases involved private enterprises, accounting for 13.9 percent and 86.1 percent of cases, 
respectively. 12.9 percent of cases involving SOEs also involved individual offenders. The number of individual offenders 
in these cases reached 236 individuals. 87.1 percent of the total number of cases involving private enterprises also involved 
individual offenders, for a total number of 1691 individual private offenders involved. 
The more striking and relevant figures, however, are the ones detailing the type of criminal offenses involved: the most 
common crimes committed in SOEs are corruption and bribery crimes, 229 cases, accounting for 78.2 percent of the cases 
(but 90.3 percent in 2015); while with respect to private enterprises, corruption and bribery crimes accounted for 170 of 
the cases, 9.9 percent (but 15.3 percent in 2015) only.   
Other crimes committed in SOEs (/private enterprises), were “crimes against socialist market economic order” accounting 
for 9.6 percent (/58.7 percent); and property infringement, accounting for 7.5 percent (/24.3 percent) of cases. 
(The remaining percentages seems to represent miscellaneous criminal offenses not described in the data.) 
For the full report, see Yuanhuang Zhang, 2016 Zhong guo qi ye jia xing shi feng xian fen xi bao gao [2016 Chinese Enterprises 
Criminal Risk Analysis Report], 26 J. HENAN POLICE C., no. 4, 2017, at 17. 
670 The Honeycomb of Corruption – A Little Reform in the State Sector Has Proved a Dangerous Thing, ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2000), 
https://www.economist.com/node/299621 (pointing to data on the misuse of state funds and assets generally and in 
various industries).   




side (officials using their authority to receive private gains from corporatized SOEs) and the demand 
side (corporate control parties and insiders appointed by the state, who are willing to bribe officials to 
gain advantages in transactions) are held by agents of the Party-state in one capacity or the other. As 
one commentator recently put it: “For the past three decades, the state has always been directly 
involved in running businesses. Corruption, tunneling, shirking, malfeasance, nepotism, and collusive 
or conspicuous wrongdoing—basically any type of misconduct imaginable—has occurred in the 
government’s direct or indirect business operations. As a result, anti-corruption drives have always 
been a major theme and a common expectation of the public.”671 These cases often involve high-level 
Party-state figures and glorified crown jewel firms. Corruption at these levels reinforces public 
perceptions against the Party-state uniformly (as body-politic). Tainting the success of these crown 
jewels with corruption inflicts doubts on the viability of China’s economic growth and the regime 
itself. 
Adding more complexity in the context of corporatized SOEs, the lines of what constitutes 
“the use of public authority” become vague (e.g., think of the corporate power of a firm’s Party 
secretary), and the illicit conduct itself is likely harder to detect. Corporate wrongdoing often requires 
coordination or at least acquiesces by top managers or board members.672 Research on corporate fraud 
has found that connectedness levels within the firm, and especially appointment-based connectedness, 
increase the likelihood of wrongdoing and helps conceal violations.673 Agents of the Party-state are 
often highly connected (if not the same person) with corporate control parties and insiders who can 
easily coordinate and conceal their actions. Given the weakness of traditional monitoring mechanisms, 
they can even do so while at the same time formally complying with corporate law and procedures, 
such as approval requirements for related-party transactions.  
Finally, corruption through corporatized SOEs amplifies threats in another dimension. The 
use of some of China’s most important corporatized SOEs for personal gains empowers the 
individuals involved and can create powerful rivals within the Party and facilitate factions.  
These reasons suggest that corruption related to corporatized SOEs is a particular threat to 
the Party-state. The motivations behind the battle against corruption are strengthened when 
corporatized SOEs are involved. At the same time, corporatized SOEs can be subjected to greater 
control and can disseminate anti-corruption detections and potentially strengthen enforcement.674 
 
671 Deng Feng, Indigenous Evolution of SOE Regulation, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND? 3, 9 (Curtis Milhaupt & Benjamin 
Liebman eds., 2016). 
672 Vikramditya Khanna et al., CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud, 70 J. FIN. 1203 (2015) (examining the implications of 
appointment-based and network ties-based CEO connectedness to senior managers and board members, on the likelihood 
of fraud and the detection of fraud in the US market). 
673 Id. Note, however, that the authors’ research specifically examines cases of corporate fraud and with respect to CEOs 
in the US market. Nevertheless, the implications seem valid in any corporate wrongdoing, including corruption, and in 
other markets with high connectedness. Here, connectedness within a Chinese corporatized SOE is especially high due to 
overlapping positions and the overall influence of the personnel management system.   
674 Statistical data shows a 12.1 percent decline in criminally prosecuted corruption cases from 2015 to 2016 with respect 
to SOEs and only a 5.4 percent decline for private enterprises. This gap may support an argument that supervision and 




This combination explains the rationales behind harnessing corporatized SOEs and the corporate 
group organization to facilitate anti-corruption efforts. 
 
i.   Anti-Corruption Work and Its Effect on Corporate Insiders 
 
Several signals suggest that the CCP is intensifying its anti-corruption enforcement efforts 
with respect to firms and corporatized SOEs specifically. The first is a change in the normative 
framework—the norms that guide the conduct of Party members and according to which its enforcing 
institutions operate. The Central Committee of the CCP revised its inner-party disciplinary norms 
twice in the last few years. 675  The revisions included specific provisions that deal with various 
misconducts by Party members and state employees in the course of their business involvement and 
positions within SOEs.676 The CCDI as well formally dedicates a specific section of its “investigative 
work plan” to central SOEs and financial institutions.677   
Another signal for this recent focus is the change in practices that reflect an increase in the 
number of corruption investigations related to corporatized SOEs. Immediately after President Xi’s 
anti-corruption campaign began and over a short period of eighteen months, 124 executives in SOEs 
 
enforcement against corruption is more effective with respect to SOEs. There could be other explanations, of course, such 
as issues pertaining to the reliability of the data involving SOE, or that there was a shift to resolve such matters in SOEs 
outside the criminal legal system. 
675 The former document was in place since 2004. Supra note 650. A new comprehensive framework was revised twice 
since the 18th Party Congress. For the revisions, see Zhongguo Gongchandang jilu chufen tiaoli “Xiuding Jiedu” “Yan” zai nar?  
 [Interpretation of the “Regulations on Disciplinary Actions of the Communist Party of China”: Where is “Strictness”?], 
 XINHUANET (Oct. 21, 2015, 7:53 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-10/21/c_1116897613.htm. See also 
Zhonggong Zhongyang yinfa “Zhongguo Gongchandang jilü chufen tiaoli” (中共中央印发, 中国共产党纪律处分条
例) [Regulation of the Communist Party of China on Disciplinary Measures] (promulgated by the Central Comm. 
Communist Party of China, Oct., 21, 2015, effective Jan. 1, 2016), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/2015-
10/21/c_1116897567.htm. This was recently replaced by another normative document of the same title, effective October 
1, 2018. See Zhingging Zhongyang Yinfa “Zhongguo Gongchandang jilu chufen tiaoli” [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China Issued the “Regulations on Disciplinary Measures of the Communist Party of China”], XINHUANET (Aug. 26, 2018, 10:33 PM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-08/26/c_1123331165.htm [ hereinafter CCP Disciplinary Measures]. 
676 See id. Ch. VIII (Acts Violating the Rules of Integrity and Self-Discipline), arts. 88-101, Ch. X (Disciplinary Actions for 
Violations of Work Discipline), arts. 121-127 (articles 88, 89 (engagement in profit making activities in violations of laws 
and regulations while doing business; buying, selling, or investing in stocks and other securities; establishing a company or 
investing in shares offshore; undertaking compensated intermediary activities; holding securities of a non-listed enterprise; 
other violations related to profit making activities. Including the use of power to benefit the business activity of family and 
friends), article 90 (the wrongful influence of business activity of family and friends in the execution of officials’ duty), 
article 91 (the responsibility of “leaders” for violations conducted by state organs and enterprises under their responsibility); 
article 126(2) (violations of regulations by leading cadres during which the officials have interfered with market economic 
activity and caused a negative effect, including interference with major business activity of state owned enterprises: 
restructuring, merger, bankruptcy, asset valuation, property rights transfers, major project investments). 
677 See CCDI, http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/jdbg3/zyhgjjj/ (last visited May 23, 2019).  




were investigated for corruption through the Party disciplinary system.678 Media reports also indicated 
that SOEs and their insiders have been “targeted.”679  
A particularly interesting method taken by the CCDI to expose corrupt corporate insiders and 
Party-state leaders is its use of the business-group organization and its access to intra-firm governance. 
It appears that the CCDI has applied targeted “inspection tours,” starting with lower level enterprises 
within a business group, collecting information, and building an “evidence” line while climbing up the 
group ladder until it reaches the top leadership.680 To facilitate this tactic, it steers the group’s internal 
governance, which often means enlisting the help of Party institutions at the group or firm level.  Until 
recently, anti-corruption work and other disciplinary inspection within central SOEs were in the hands 
of internal disciplinary teams (qiye jiwei- jijian zu).681 These teams were either formally dispatched by 
SASAC (for certain corporatized SOEs) or were self-organized by firms under SASAC’s 
encouragement and guidance. Either way, SASAC trained and supervised them with CCDI guidance. 
The Party criticized this intra-firm disciplinary mechanism for lacking real powers within the corporate 
and administrative hierarchy.682 To rectify this, the SOEs Reform Guiding Opinions assign the lead 
authority over disciplinary inspection to the firm’s Party committee. This has shifted supervision and 
investigative authorities from SASAC-organized intra-firm supervisory teams to the firm’s Party 
committee, a legalized yet political corporate-institution. This recent move surely opens a more direct 
route for CCDI involvement in firms.  
The role of the intra-firm Party committee with respect to discipline inspection was reinforced 
as one of the main responsibilities of this corporate governing body.683  Meaning, aside from its new 
and expanded roles in corporate decision making discussed earlier, the Party committee is also the 
 
678  Angela Meng, A Quarter of Chinese SOEs Executives Investigated for Corruption Work in Energy Sector, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:45 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/1778702/quarter-chinese-soe-executives-investigated-corruption.  
679 Id. See also Frank Fang, Anti-Corruption Campaign Targets China’s State-Owned Enterprises, EPOCH TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.theepochtimes.com/anti-corruption-campaign-targets-chinas-state-owned-enterprises_1256832.html 
(reporting that the CCDI had marked twenty-six central SOEs as targets for next round of investigations); Lucy Hornby, 
China Anti-Corruption Drive Targets Sinopec—Oil Group Among Several State-Owned Enterprises to Face Probe, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4, 
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/f0cc6d0a-7b82-11e4-a695-00144feabdc0. See also my comment with respect to the 
decline in criminally prosecuted cases related to SEOs supra note 674, a decline that might derive from a parallel increase 
in alternative enforcement measures with respect to these firms.  
680 This is not a comprehensive empirical observation, but rather one based on my impression from CCDI investigations 
covered by media reports and CCDI pubic announcements. 
681 On the work and training of such inspection teams, see Guozi wei juxing Zhongyang Qiye jiwei shuji jijian zu zhang perixun 
bankai banshi [The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Held the Opening Ceremony of the Central Enterprise 
Disciplinary Committee Secretary and the Discipline Inspection Team Leader Training Class], SASAC (Apr. 1, 2012), 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877928/n2878219/c3747868/content.html; Guozi wei juban Zhongyang Qiye jiwei 
shuji (jijian zuzuzhang) [The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Held a Training Course for the Secretary of 
the Central Enterprise Disciplinary Committee (the Leader of the Discipline Inspection Team)], SASAC (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877928/n2878219/c3747633/content.html.  
682 See Xiangfu Meng, Guoqi jijian jiguo yaodanghao “zhuomuniao” [State-Owned Enterprises Disciplinary Inspection System Should Serve 
as “a Good Woodpecker”],   NAT’L PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC CHINA CEN. DISCIPLINE INSPECTION COMMISSION (June 26, 2018), 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/201806/t20180626_174459.html.  
683 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, art. 1(3). 




leading organ within the firm assigned to party line education, disciplinary inspection work, forming 
an intra-firm accountability system (linked to firm-assessment), investigating the conduct of enterprise 
leaders, strengthening tour inspections in SOEs, and basically facilitating the work of external anti-
corruption institutions (i.e., CCDI).684 In the context of corporate corruption, therefore, the Party 
committee therefore functions as a type of a Trojan horse or a whistleblower for the Party.  
Another factor that facilitates the work of CCDI within corporatized SOEs and their business 
groups is the corresponding roles that some high-level CCDI agents have within major firms and/or 
state institutions. For example, Chen Chaoying, a CCDI Standing Committee member, was dispatched 
by the CCDI to be the chief external inspector over SASAC. He also has a high position within China’s 
newly established National Supervisory Committee and is a member of SASAC’s own internal Party 
committee.685  
The points above reflect how the use of the corporate form and SOE group organization 
make the CCDI’s work in monitoring and enforcing against corporate corruption a highly 
collaborative network.686 Recent cases demonstrate this vividly. 
 
ii.   Recent Cases 
 
In examining the ways that the corporate group is being utilized to facilitate work against 
corruption, the following patterns seem common. The CCDI starts its probe with a “disciplinary tour,” 
during which it dispatches investigators into a specific state-controlled group and presumably activates 
the Party committees within firms in a systematic search for corruption (“crackdown” in the media). 
The “evidence” collected leads to the investigations of several subsidiaries within the group and its 
affiliates, including private firms. The investigation includes interrogations of corporate employees, 
individual business affiliates, and finally corporate insiders. The primary targets are often high-level 
public figures with parallel positions at the group organization.  
Examples of how this works are the targeted probes in one of China’s most valuable sectors—
energy. By targeting two of its most important corporate groups, the CCDI opened a hornet’s nest 
 
684 Although the CCDI is not mentioned formally. See id. art. 7(26) (“The Party organizations of SOEs shall earnestly 
perform their duties as the primary players responsible, while their disciplinary inspection agencies shall effectively perform 
supervisory responsibilities.” It includes a fanfare instruction to “keep using the thinking and methods of the rule of law 
to fight corruption, fine-tune anti-corruption institutions and systems, strictly enforce the provisions against formalism, 
bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance, and strive to build effective mechanisms where enterprise leaders dare not to, 
are not able to, and do not want to, engage in corrupt practices.”). 
685  His biography is available under the “Leadership of SASAC” webpage. See 
http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408028/n1408570/c8860160/content.html. 
686 Recent discipline and inspection work reports in both SASAC and specific SOEs also reflect this. See Zhuwei jijian 
jianchazu yaowen [News of the Discipline Inspection and Inspection Team], SASAC, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877928/n2878219/index.html (last visited May 23, 2019); Yewu Gongzuo [“Business 
Work”], SASAC, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877928/n2878221/index.html (last visited May 25, 2019).  




that led to the exposure and punishment (both disciplinary and legal enforcement) of several corrupt 
Party members and state officials at the national and local levels, as well as senior business 
executives.687 One of the cases is that of Jiang Jiemin, who rose through the ranks of the oil industry 
to head China’s biggest oil business, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 688  and was 
appointed as the head of SASAC. The pursuit of Jiang (which some opined was motivated by his ties 
with Zhou Yongkang, a political rival of Xi)689 involved the detention, investigation, and punishment 
of dozens of senior managers in the parent holding-company CNPC, its listed subsidiary PetroChina, 
and even in private affiliated firms.690 A similar inspection was taken thereafter into another of China’s 
centrally controlled energy champions, Petroleum & Chemicals Corporation (Sinopec Group) and its 
main listed subsidiary, Sinopec Corp Ltd.. The inspection into Sinopec Group led to the detention of 
managers in several subsidiary firms,691 finally reaching the president of the group, Wang Tianpu. 
Wang, who chaired the Group’s board at the time and was also the general manager of its listed 
subsidiary, was put under Party disciplinary proceedings for taking bribes and abuse of power. Wang 
was removed from his corporate positions, expelled from the Communist Party, and eventually 
prosecuted under criminal law.692  
 
687  Meng, supra note 678; Former China Energy Chief Jiang Jiemin Jailed for Corruption, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34503469 (presenting a “family tree” style illustration of the cases involved 
in this investigation into the oil industry). 
688  Jeremey Page et al., China Probes Former Oil Company Head, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 2:56 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-probes-former-oil-company-head-1378018593.  
689 Willy Lam, With Zhou’s Circle Down, Xi’s Purge May Turn to Hu, Jamestown Brief, Vol. 14, No. 13, 3 July 2014, 
https://jamestown.org/program/with-zhous-circle-down-xis-purge-may-turn-to-hu/.  
690 The proceedings against private affiliated firms are worth noting since they instigated from, and likely rely on, evidence 
obtained during the political disciplinary enforcement process, thus reflecting the high collaboration between the Party 
and state enforcing institutions. Donny Kwok & Charlie Zhu, PetroChina Supplier Wison Says Record Seized, Can’t Contact 
Chairman,  REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2013, 8:49 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-wison-cfo-
idUKBRE98I01120130919 (in which the chairman and subsidiary executives of HK listed private firm Wison Engineering 
Services Co Ltd., a major supplier of PetroChina, were investigated as part of the Chinese corruption investigation in 
PetroChina and its parent company CNPC). In March 2014, Wison’s founder, primary shareholder, and chairman of the 
board was formally arrested. He was accused of conspiracy to commit a “tender-offer fraud,” as well as for offering bribes 
for state officials. In August, 2015, he was found guilty for offering bribes. Brian Spegele, Wison Engineering Says Chinese 
Police Arrested Chairman, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 10, 2014, 11:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wison-engineering-
chairman-hua-bangsong-was-arrested-by-chinese-authorities-1394425858; PetroChina Supplier Wison Says Found Guilty of 
Bribery in China, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2015, 9:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/wison-petrochina-
idUSL3N10H08120150806.  
691 Such as the case of Xue Wandong, the vice-chairman and CEO of Sinopec Oilfield Services Corp who was detained 
and investigated by the CCDI and dismissed from his role in Sinopec immediately. See Hornby, supra note 679. 
692 Zhongyang Zhongguo Shihua Dangzu Guanyu Xunshi Zhenggai Qingkuang Tongbao (中共中国石化党组关于巡
视整改情况的通报) [Circular of the Chinese Communist Party on the Inspection and Ratification in China Petroleum 
Chemical Corporations], (promulgated by the CCDI, Apr. 30, 2015), available 
at  http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201504/t20150430_55638.html; Zhongguo Shiyouhuagong Jituangongsi Zongjingli 
Wangtianpu Shexian Yanzhong Weijiweifa Jieshou Zuzhidiaocha (中国石油化工集团公司总经理王天普涉嫌严重违
纪违法接受组织调查) [Notice by the CCDI on the Disciplinary Investigation of Wang Tianpu, April] (promulgated by 
the CCDI, Apr. 27, 2015), available at http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201504/ t20150427_55436.html; Zhongguo Shiyou 
Huagong Jituangongsi Yuan Dongshi, Zongjingli, Dangzuchengyuan Wangtianpu Yanzhong Weiji Bei Kaichudangji (中
国石油化工集团公司原董事、总经理、党组成员王天普严重违纪被开除党籍) [Notice by the CCDI on Wang 
Tianpu’s Expulsion from the Party, September] (promulgated by the CCDI, Sept. 18, 2015), available 




Similar recent probe targets include firms in the healthcare sector, commercial and investments 
vehicles operating off-shore (state-controlled as well as private),693 and currently, the financial sector. 
Some recent cases against ostensibly private firms, such as Dalian Wanda, Fosun International, HNA 
Group, and Anbang Insurance, emphasize how Party-led disciplinary enforcement influences and 
determines the operations of state enforcement actions in the private sector as well. Some 
commentators posit that these purges serve multiple purposes, including cleaning and improving the 
financial system, enforcing against dubious business practices, and “getting rid of tycoons with 
dubious political loyalties” at the same time.694 These cases reflect that a CCDI investigation has ripple 
effects throughout the investigated group and its web of affiliates. They also reflect that Party-led 
enforcement receives a high-level of collaboration from state institutions. For example, SASAC, CSRC, 
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission assisted in confiscating documents, freezing bank 
accounts, stopping the trade in shares of firms under investigation, and other measures.695  This 
assistance is given even before the case formally reaches the legal system. We can assume that this 
inter-agency cooperation will further increase after the recent consolidation of authority under the 
National Supervision Commission.   
Consequences within firms are also apparent. Once the Party’s disciplinary inspection 
apparatus has signaled that an individual is suspected of a disciplinary violation, whether this has been 
disclosed to the public or not, the individual will be removed or forced to step down from his 
corporate positions. This happens in many cases before any legal accusation has been made and 
regardless of any proof of damage to the corporation or its stakeholders. Disciplinary punishment by 
the Party (e.g., admonition, a downgrade in rank, revoking their parallel Party positions, and finally 
expelling them from the Party altogether) will also often precede criminal charges.696 In these cases, 
 
at http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201509/t20150918_62038.html. On the consequent legal criminal prosecution, see China 
to Prosecute Former Top Executives for Alleged Graft, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2016, 5:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-corruption-sinopec-idUSKCN11W0VX.  
693 One example of an investigation of a state-owned commercial firm is the case of Song Lin, the former chairman of 
China Resources, a Hong Kong based trading company and one of China’s largest state-owned enterprises, who was 
accused of power abuse in corporate dealings and was arrested in April 2014. The Party removed Lin from his positions 
in the firm and the Party. Two years later, he was charged under criminal law. James T. Areddy & Laurie Burkitt, China 
Communist Party Ousts Chairman of Major State-Owned Firm, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 22, 2014, 1:34 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/communist-party-fires-song-lin-chairman-of-china-resources-holdings-as-corruption-
fight-expands-1398187916; Choi Chi-yuk, Song Lin, Former Chairman of China Resources, is Formally Charged with Corruption, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/2052971/song-lin-former-chairman-china-resources-formally. For other examples of SOE executives 
investigated for corruption and released from their corporate role, see 9 Chinese SOEs Slammed for Discipline Violations, 
XINHUA (JUNE 17, 2015), http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-06/17/content_35840376.htm. Examples of 
investigations against private firms that seem to also entail Party disciplinary investigative work include Dalian Wanda, 
Fosun International, HNA Group, and Anbang Insurance. See Lucy Hornby et al., Big China Companies Targeted over ‘Systemic 
Risk’, FIN. TIMES (June 23, 2017),  https://www.ft.com/content/23c8ba54-5710-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f.  
694  Minxin Pei, Xi Jinping’s War on Financial Crocodiles Gathers Pace, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/19810ea2-5814-11e7-80b6-9bfa4c1f83d2.  
695 Id. Wison Engineering Services Co Ltd. bank accounts were frozen, and the trade in its shares was suspended. 
696  Brian Spegele &Wayne Ma, Wison Engineering Says Chinese Police Arrested Chairman; Hua Bangsong Is Accused of Bribery, 
According to Oil-Services Firm, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 10 2014, 11:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wison-engineering-




we can see further examples of the connection between China’s personnel management system and 
the Party’s disciplinary assessment. 
Thus, while corporatized SOEs and the web of affiliated businesses surrounding them might 
be especially prone to corruption and other corporate malfeasance, the use of the same organizational 
structure facilitates anti-corruption efforts and expands the Party’s enforcement reach into the market 
more broadly. In this process, the separation between political and legal enforcement against certain 
corporate offenses becomes blurry, so that the Party performs many of the monitoring, accountability, 
and deterrence functions otherwise provided by external markets and legal institutions. 
 
III. POLITICIZED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA—A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE? 
 
More than a decade ago, scholars lamented the “absentee principal” problem in China, due to 
which state organs as dominant shareholders of publicly listed firms seem to “either abuse their control 
or fail to exercise it entirely.”697 We have seen, however, that where dominant shareholders, legal 
institutions, and even market mechanisms fail, institutions of the Chinese Communist Party fill in the 
void. These sui generis institutions are claiming an increasingly overt role in corporate governance, 
replacing to a degree both internal and external monitoring mechanisms. The evolving nature of these 
institutions makes a full judgment of their effects impossible, but some early assessments can be made.  
Conceptually, the daylight takeover of the powers of corporate governing bodies by political 
institutions is alarming, not only for those who believe in market liberalism of any degree but even for 
those who support economic interventionism and developmental state governance. The perils of a 
politicized corporate governance go beyond those that are commonly expressed about state 
ownership.698 They include concerns about having an unruly economic control in the hands of a 
political Party and essentially in the hands of a limited number of individuals. In this case, the political 
party is above the law, and thus the powers of the individuals operating therein are bound only by 
internal checks and balances offered within the political system itself (as opposed to the common 
misconception that Party members lack any checks and balances whatsoever). As a conceptual matter, 
this politicization therefore manifests the rejection of the rule of law, as the term is normally 
understood, in the realm of corporate governance specifically.  
There could be firm-level practical concerns as well. The recent developments formally shifted 
an unrestrained power from corporate insiders to corporate Party committee members. It is possible 
that the individuals operating therein will use their powers in ways that add favoritism, arbitrariness, 
 
chairman-hua-bangsong-was-arrested-by-chinese-authorities-1394425858 (“Neither Mr. Jiang nor several other oil 
executives removed from their posts in recent months have been formally charged.”).   
697 Clarke, supra note 3, at 197. 
698 The effect of state-ownership on firm value and performance in China is still inconclusive. For various studies on the 
matter and the controversy, see Clarke, supra note 71, at 139-143. 




and simply misguided enforcement into the system, not to mention the fact that human rights can be 
easily subjugated in the process of political enforcement. Moreover, now that the Party has more direct 
access to corporate decision making and is a distinct stakeholder irrespective of the state’s role as a 
shareholder, new conflicts of interests and additional institutional costs could emerge within firms 
more markedly.699 Managers, now formally directed through Party committees (or simply being the 
same person), could continue facilitating exploitation of public shareholders for political goals, but 
now in broad daylight.  
It should be noted, however, that these firm-level concerns, while justified, are not 
substantially different from those that have materialized under corporate organization in China so far 
and before the recent overt politicization. These firm-level concerns, if they were to materialize, would 
be nothing new. 
What is different in the recent politicization is the reversal from the apparently convergent 
corporate-capitalism governance model toward a version of a planned market economy, in which 
Party institutions are openly deployed within and outside firms, ready to act on command. A tightly 
controlled corporate environment and the awareness to a closer Party presence will impact managerial 
discretion and will likely create fear governance that was less present when Party control was in the 
shadows. Fear governance could lead to risk-averse management. Concerned with political 
surveillance and retribution, managers could become paralyzed.700 If this does indeed occur, not only 
would this prevent value-increasing transactions, but it could also have a chilling effect on developing 
market forces, such as the managerial labor market, product market competition, and innovation. 
These effects would lead to further market inefficiencies, stagnation in business expansion and in 
capital market development,701 and would slow down general growth. Some would argue that we may 
already see signs of that in the lower growth rates in China during the past few years.  
These firm and market-level concerns are indeed valid, but there are also counter measures in 
the recent politicization drive, mainly the incentivizing force of the personnel management 
mechanisms. While the risks of political intervention are rather straightforward and recognized, not 
enough attention is given to a similarly possible scenario in which China’s politicized corporate 
governance could result in added value and serve the interests of firms and the market. The general 
wisdom has dismissed this possibility by the simple doubt that the Party will choose to exercise its 
power in ways that benefit firms and their stockholders,702 and by the assumption that interest group 
politics influence reforms only in one specific direction. Yet the opposite possibility should be 
 
699 The opposite could happen as well, since less opaque Party presence could facilitate better information flow. See 
further discussion infra in Chapter 2, Section III.A. Relevant empirical studies noted in infra notes 724-726. 
700 On the influence of anti-corruption enforcement on policy makers, see Daniel Bell, China’s Corruption Clampdown Risks 
Policy Paralysis, FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/293d3b2a-2f1c-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a. 
701  Jamil Anderlini, China’s War on Graft Leads to Drop in Outbound Investment, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014, 
https://www.ft.com/content/58d0cb22-421b-11e4-a9f4-00144feabdc0.  
702 But see Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 404 (providing a refreshing discussion of the possible economic commitment of 
some dictatorships and authoritarian governments to growth). 




recognized as well and is perhaps more plausible when one considers the complex interests of the 
Party and its functionaries in promoting strong and appealing capital markets. As shown time and time 
again with respect to decisions in economics,703 firm governance,704 and public policy,705 incentives’ 
alignment matters—even if these incentives are structured in idiosyncratic ways. As presented 
throughout this work, a certain alignment of interests between the political controlling apparatus and 
firms and their stakeholders (including shareholders) is forming. This alignment of interests may be 
the source for further growth-supporting, even if political, institutions. Especially given the economic 
results of unconventional governance in China so far, the possible positive effects of a politicized 
corporate governance should be explored. A politicized corporate governance could have positive 
effects for both firms and the market, and even for the role of law in China.  
 
A. Potential Positive Effects at the Firm and Market Levels 
 
As a practical matter, the level of Party involvement in corporate decision making will depend 
on the type of firm or the specific situation. The SOE Reform Guiding Opinions prescribe a different 
scope of involvement for particular industries, types of firm, and situations.706 Thus, while all firms 
with state investments are compelled to formally install political institutions into their internal 
governance system, the active political involvement in daily decision making will likely be limited in 
most firms. The daily situation for most firms would thus remain as it was; managers will be controlled 
indirectly through decisions on their career path while being relatively free to handle operations. These 
firms will continue to be operated the way their managers believe could best promote their future 
careers in the Party-state system, much as it was under Party shadow control before the recent 
politicization. 
In firms or situations where the Party committee will opt to exercise its corporate powers 
more fully—which are now likely larger in number than before the recent developments in 
politicization, but still limited—the costs of coordination would presumably decrease. Party-state goals 
will be articulated more frequently through the Party committee and will be less opaque and less open 
to managers’ interpretation. Despite the possible effects of risk-averse managers and the rising costs 
of conflicts between shareholders, this can lower the costs of monitoring insiders.  
Furthermore, and as seen throughout the development process, in its efforts to keep the value 
of state assets high and the cost of capital low, the Party has repeatedly steered capital market activity 
ex-post in order to remedy share-price declines. This has had broad market implications. Unnecessary 
 
703 Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where It Is Headed, 146 DE ECONOMIST 23 (1998). 
704 Martijn Cremers et al., Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 44 J. FIN. 
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705 Carolyn Heinrich & Gerald Marschke, Incentives and Their Dynamics in Public Sector Performance Management Systems, 29 J. 
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706 See supra note 607 and the accompanying text. 




market-level effects could perhaps be prevented through a tailored and more controlled intervention 
from within firms, ex-ante. 
Putting the uncertainties of greater involvement of corporate political institutions in daily 
decision making aside, three main changes still stand: 1) under the recent politicization, personnel 
evaluation is expressly linked with economic performance; 2) disciplinary enforcement, assisted by 
firm-internal Party committees, will increase, which will likely spill over to enforcement against 
corporate wrongdoing more generally; and, 3) the awareness among corporate constituents and 
potential investors of the presence and the roles of Party members deployed within firms will likewise 
increase. These changes point to some important contributions that a politicalized corporate 
governance offers to firms and the capital market through aligning interests, enforcement and 
deterrence, and a market-commitment-signaling mechanism. 
With respect to personnel evaluation and economic performance: The tightening link 
following the recent politicization between economic performance measures in firms and the career 
trajectory of individuals that manage or supervise them707 points to an increasing alignment of interests 
between firms, their stockholders, and corporate control parties. While studies and recent market 
volatility have shown that the Chinese capital markets are not informationally or fundamentally 
efficient, 708  and thus share price movements are not strictly determined by an issuer’s market 
performance, the public share price of a corporatized SOE will be taken into account for personnel 
evaluation and likely more now than ever before. A drop in the share price of a PRC issuer, whether 
or not reflective of actual economic performance, may deny Party members who are firm managers 
from future advancement within the Party-state. This can serve to discipline the behavior of powerful 
corporate officials and also incentivize them to increase shareholder value even in an inefficient market. 
The opposite results, in which managers are incentivized to further misconduct, whether engaging in 
false or misleading disclosure to prop up a public share price or being more deferential to political 
commands,709 are also possible, of course. Still, this development is striking, especially considering the 
starting point. Not long ago, capital market investment-based revenues were frowned upon,710 and 
only a little more than a decade ago, state ownership and the managers of state-controlled firms were 
still shielded from the disciplinary effects of the capital market.711 The attributes that were so strongly 
rejected in the past are now embraced and even harnessed by the Party.  
This aspect of a political governance in firms and the capital market illuminates how the capital 
markets themselves—even in the absence of a market for corporate control—can affect the 
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Guoping Li, China’s Stock Market: Inefficiencies and Institutional Implications, 16 CHINA & WORLD ECON., no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 
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709 See, e.g., the Nanjing Textile Import & Export Co. fraud case mentioned in note 473, infra. 
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advancement of human agents inside the Party-state personnel system and vice versa, thereby having 
a disciplinary function on corporate insiders that mitigates shareholders’ concerns.712 It also highlights 
the interdependence of political institutions and market development in China. 
With respect to disciplinary enforcement and its externalities: More stringent disciplinary 
enforcement against corporate corruption and asset embezzlement removes bad managers. It could 
also spill over to market monitoring and enforcement more generally,713 raise the overall level of 
compliance, and deter others from additional forms of corporate misconduct, such as self-dealing, 
waste, and fraud. Anti-corruption tour inspections in corporate groups could also decrease the number 
and scope of undesirable related-party transactions, which are presently extremely frequent within 
SOE business groups.714 Corporate wrongdoings not only siphon firm value and harm the state and 
other shareholders, but also raise the cost of capital in the economy and hinder growth. In these 
respects, political disciplinary enforcement and its deterrence effect would benefit firms and capital 
market growth. Enforcement has a more direct effect on firms and insiders that participate in the 
Party-state system and on those that aspire for such careers. Yet, its deterring effect also diffuses to 
the network of private affiliates surrounding them and can have implications on the market at large.715  
In terms of a market-signaling effect: While the possibility that investors will view greater 
politicization negatively cannot be ruled out, the opposite seems more plausible. Since it appears that 
investors in the Chinese market are not dissuaded by state ownership and control,716 there is no reason 
to believe that they will assess greater Party control as potentially more abusive of their rights and will 
refrain from investing. The primary concern of public investors today is not the expropriation of their 
property rights by the Party-state, but rather their abuse by corporate insiders and rogue officials. The 
politicization of corporate governance is therefore instead likely to signal to investors that the Party-
state is committed to economic growth and that self-dealing, related-party transactions, and corruption 
are now kept at bay by a strict enforcer. Particularly since the capital market in China is informationally 
 
712 This part draws heavily on my prior work in. See Groswald Ozery, supra note 101. 
713 As exemplified in recent Party-led enforcement actions against suspicious investment activities off-shore, which has 
been said to be motivated by concerns for the stability of the financial system. Tom Mitchell et al., Wang Qishan: China’s 
Enforcer, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 24, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d82964ba-6d42-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa (“The larger 
economic policy goal behind Mr. Wang’s investigations, the official explains, is to ‘stop using the financial system as an 
economic growth lever.’”) (referring to cases of speculative asset and stock pricing bubbles whereby business managers 
used the financial system and listed companies under their management to drive up share prices and enrich themselves 
and others – e.g., the allegations against private businessman Xiao Jianhua.).  
714 See supra notes 217-219 and the accompanying text. 
715 For the indirect effect of sanctions on non-punished peer firms in China, see Francesco D'Acunto, Punish One, Teach a 
Hundred: The Sobering Effect of Punishment on the Unpunished (University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics 
Working Paper No. 2019-12, 2019).  
716  As mentioned in the section “Equity Markets,” supra pp. 86-89, investors prefer investing alongside Party-state 
dominant shareholders. See also Charles Calomiris et al., Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy: Evidence from 
Chinese Asset Sales, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 399 (2010) (documenting negative market responses to unexpected announcements 
on sales of government shares in listed SOEs and conversely a positive effect following relevant policy cancellation. The 
authors argue that the benefits of political ties outweigh efficiency costs of state-shareholdings.). 




inefficient, 717  suppliers of capital look for alternative sources of information about corporate 
performance instead of stock price and accounting measures. In this sense, political institutions are 
filling a crucial signaling “intermediary” role in an environment where information is scarce and 
unreliable.718 A politicized corporate governance thus can increase market confidence and provide the 





The evidence of the economic effects of the politicization of corporate governance (intra-firm 
governance through political institutions and external monitoring and accountability through anti-
corruption enforcement) is presently very limited, as these changes are still unfolding. A few recent 
studies examine the economic effects of the anti-corruption campaign, and they largely corroborate 
my hypotheses. A 2018 study examined the characteristics of firms investigated between 2012 and 
2015 as part of the anti-corruption campaign. The study constructed a sample of 150 Chinese listed 
firms in which top executives were investigated. Eighty-seven percent of the investigated firms were 
found to be state-owned firms. The authors found that firms with characteristics that are commonly 
associated with poor governance, such as self-dealing and inefficiencies, were more likely to be 
investigated. This suggests that the anti-corruption campaign has enforcement spillovers on corporate 
wrongdoing more broadly and indeed captures firms with weak governance. The authors also found 
that the likelihood of investigation is negatively associated with managerial connections with top Party-
state leaders (less so with connections to the local-government), reflecting the parallel force of political 
motivations in place.719 Another recent study examined the effects of corruption on entrepreneurial 
activity in China. The authors found that corruption may stifle entrepreneurial activity and by 
implication economic growth by increasing the rents of a few established connected firms and 
decreasing the ability of small entrepreneurial firms to grow and compete. The study also found that 
this negative effect was mitigated by the anti-corruption campaign, concluding that the anti-corruption 
campaign is an effective “step forward towards” entrepreneurial market-entry, efficient allocation of 
 
717 See the discussion about the Equity Market as monitoring mechanism and the sources therein (including reservations) 
supra Chapter 2, pp. 86-89. 
718  Miwa and Ramseyer discuss how in twentieth century Japan, monitoring and quality certification by reputable 
industrialists recruited to the boards of Japanese firms compensated for informational inefficiencies in the market. See 
Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 124. 
719 John M. Griffin et al., Is the Chinese Anti-Corruption Campaign Authentic? (Dec. 19, 2018) (paper presented at the 
29th Annual Conference on Financial Economics & Accounting 2018), available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2779429 (Despite these results, the authors also found that anti-corruption campaign 
enforcement did not result in greater information transparency nor increased foreign direct investments.).  




resources, and ultimately sustained growth.720 A third study linked the anti-corruption campaign with 
an additional aspect of increased competition—the availability of credit. According to this study, 
CCDI investigations improve the access of non-SOE firms (defined by the authors as firms in which 
the largest ultimate shareholder is neither a central nor local government entity) to credit. The authors 
posit that anti-corruption enforcement reallocates credit from less-productive SOEs to more 
productive non-SOEs.721 
With respect to the signaling effect I alluded to above, two recent studies performed an event-
study methodology that tracked cumulative abnormal returns of Chinese listed firms following 
different announcements in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. The results show that the overall stock 
market responses to announcements of CCDI inspections were significantly positive.722 One of these 
studies looked at firms that are listed both in China and on the Hong Kong stock exchange, concluding 
that the expectation of reduced corruption adds value to listed firms overall in both markets.723 A third 
study examined the effect of the anti-corruption campaign on market reaction concerning what the 
authors call “relational spending” (measured by business entertainment expenses). The authors found 
a weaker effect of relationship spending on share-price crash risk following the anti-corruption 
campaign. They posited that the anti-corruption campaign reduced information opacity and 
minimized investors’ perception of risks from relationship spending and concluded that the campaign 
contributes to monitoring. 724  
The possible effect on information flow in the capital market is controversial, however. One study 
has found that firms in inspected provinces are more likely to withhold negative information during 
anti-corruption inspections, suggesting that the information environment is weakened.725 Conversely, 
another study found that when the anti-corruption campaign is carried out against government 
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officials in a certain municipal level, firms in the same jurisdiction experience a long-run decrease in 
risks associated with share-price crash. The authors posit from this that the information environment 
in which businesses and the capital market operates has improved.726 The contradictory results about 
improved information only add validity to the signaling effect of political enforcement. Whether or 
not the anti-corruption action improves information availability, this form of enforcement by political 
institutions signals commitment to the market and substitutes for limited or questionable information.  
The anti-corruption campaign as an element in the recent politicization of corporate 
governance has another, more unexpected, result. It seems to have a direct effect on the corporate 
conduct of multi-national U.S. firms.727 A recent U.S. SEC report found a surge in China-domiciled 
whistle-blowers with respect to misconduct in multinational and U.S. firms, which is presumably 
related to China’s anti-corruption efforts.728 Strikingly, a politicized corporate governance in China is 
contributing to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform!. This effect on foreign 
domiciled firms and on investors outside of China indicates the possible positive externalities of a 
politicized corporate governance in China, even when the consideration of investors’ interests and 
market efficiency were incidental among the many motivations behind its development.   
 
B. Legalizing Political Institutions—Contribution to the Role of Law 
 
  As we have seen, Party monitoring and accountability institutions are embedded into the 
corporate legal system rather than being kept in the realm of extra-legality. This reaffirms the 
instrumentalist role law and jurisprudence play in contemporary China, no doubt, but it also reflects 
the rising significance of law in Chinese society and for Party functions specifically.  
The CCP certainly did not need the legal system to grant it influence and even control over 
firms and the market. Similarly, the CCP could certainly handle corporate corruption outside the legal 
system, just as it had previously. Unlike the practical necessity that guided the establishment of legal 
institutions during the first and second stages of economic transition, which was motivated by the 
need to attract capital to the SOEs, reconsolidate economic and administrative control, and satisfy 
commitments in the global market, the current choice to enshrine political governance in law must 
find an explanation elsewhere. The use of a legal framework here provides a layer of protection that 
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stabilizes the Party and normalizes it as a legitimate governance system.729 As the CCP has no intention 
to situate itself under the law, it has found another legitimatizing path using the law to establish its 
political governance upon firms and the market.730   
The implications of this for the legal system itself and for the role of law are controversial. 
Some view it as a second-best beneficial step. Having a clearer and out-front framework for Party 
influence can be a positive development for legality in China.731 Here, for example, enforcement 
against corporate corruption by political institutions under the guise of law adds transparency and 
popular trust not only in the Party but also in the legal system. Others, in contrast, see these 
developments as merely window dressing, pointing to the underlying fact that the Party is still above 
the law. Lacking any real checks and balances on Party power, there will always be room for extra-
legality, protectionism, and abuse of power. Some, such as Minzner, have even opined that these 
developments represent a step back from legality: “This removes the fig leaf of a divide between the 
party and the state. … Instead of it being a step toward imposing greater legal constraints, I think it 
arguably represents the partial absorption of the legal system by the party apparatus.”732 
In my view, the concerns about having a certain apparatus above the law are justified but they 
should not overshadow the importance of the recent legalization of political influence, which I believe 
go beyond positivists attitudes. Establishing a rule of law as perceived in Western liberal democracies 
was never on the agenda. The legal system in China cannot be expected to advance the functions 
prescribed to it in liberal societies. It can only be expected to advance the functions designed for it in 
the Chinese context. Pointing at the recent steps as a retreat from the ideals of rule of law does not 
add much and is blind to the true meaning of these developments; the importance of law is increasing 
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even as it retains its instrumentalist role. This should not be viewed as a step backward, rather, as a 
step in a different direction. From a law and development perspective, these recent developments 
stand as the most contemporary affirmation of the iterative dynamics between law, economic 
development, and political economy.






With modern, successful firms that operate globally and a capital market that is the second 
largest in the world, corporate governance in China has long passed the point of an “adjust or perish” 
prognostic. Yet its firm governance and capital market functions maintain strong idiosyncrasies that 
go against many fundamentals in economics and legal thought. These idiosyncrasies are products of 
the underlying configurations of China’s political economy and the shifts within it. Political economy 
in China has a determinant role on the ways corporate ownership is organized, firms operate, and the 
capital market functions. It is responsible for many of the infirmities in the Chinese market, yet at the 
same time also holds the key for China’s puzzling growth. 
Inspecting China’s development conundrum through a political-economic lens reveals that 
there is a parallel governance system at work in China that is distinct from the legal or administrative 
governance system advanced by the state. This parallel system is actively present at every level of 
society, the administrative state, and the economy. Likewise, it has governance oversight, participation, 
and accountability functions at the individual enterprise and business group levels, by which it impacts 
upon the behavior of firms and their insiders. Political institutions supplant many of the oversight 
functions traditionally provided by firm internal-governance bodies. Political institutions also supply 
external monitoring and accountability, buttressing legal enforcement and the monitoring functions 
of weak markets. In doing so, this politicized corporate governance system credibly signals the 
regime’s commitment to growth and provides assurances against various forms of investor abuse. 
These assurances, despite their political nature, seem to reduce the cost of capital and attract external 
finance, thereby supporting the growth of firms.  
China’s political economy therefore supports firms and capital market growth in ways that go 
beyond developmentalist industrial policies and the attributes associated with state-controlled 
economies (such as state capture by cronies, fostering connections with entrepreneurs, largesse, and 
protectionism). It produces a novel form of governance that mobilizes political and economic 
incumbents to advance reforms and to curb their own abusive behavior. 
This resolution for China’s law and capital market development conundrum brings forth new 
possibilities on the menu of what is now an obsolete convergence/path-dependency discourse. The 
politicization of corporate governance not only counters convergence predictions in showing how 
systems can “diverge back”, in form, but also challenges path-dependence theories in showing how 
systems evolve, in function, even within fixed institutional confines. China’s capital market 
development compels us to view development as an iterative mode of constant change. 
 
*  *  * 




Capital market development is an iterative process, a mutual interaction between politics, legal 
response, and economic outcomes. In this process, corporate governance can be advanced in ways 
and for reasons that are fundamentally different from those offered by corporate capitalism. Different 
systems of governance are possible, while the system applied must be able to adjust to change. A 
responsive corporate governance system that aligns itself with shifts in a dynamic political economy 
can enjoy greater legitimacy and be followed through. Such a system can survive even if its 
configurations are strikingly unfamiliar and patently political.  
Economic development and the growth of the large public firm are not conditioned on one 
specific menu of rules, legal or otherwise. Public firms can prosper even under heavy state ownership 
and political control. Capital markets can develop and thrive with concentrated ownership and even 
while bearing functions that divert from efficient allocation of capital. External finance will flow to 
where the opportunities are, provided that effective assurances exist—no matter their form or original 
motive—to fend off exploitative forces.   
China’s capital market development is a potent example of this fact. Its political-governance 
system allows just enough flexibility to develop coordinated responses to the changing interests and 
demands within its own political-economic equilibrium. This enables the system to provide the needed 
growth stability while deflecting political and economic incursions, and to survive even at the price of 
lesser efficiency.  
 
 
